by Commodore Kazi Emdadul Haq 10 September 2021
Preface
In 2007, all the Quad members were fascinated to make economic connectivity with China, but after a decade, none but all Quad members turned into adversaries to China. The deployment of the naval fleet of Quad countries in the East and South China Sea has intensified the tension with China. In March 2021, the first-ever leaders’ level summit blitzkrieg drew much attention to Quad, yet the Quad concept remained ambiguous to many. Consequently, the revitalisation of Quad and India’s Quad conundrum have become a heated discussion in the international forums lately.
The principal architect of Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) was the former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, who professed a region-wide Indo-Pacific arc of democratic peace based on collective security and prosperity in response to the rise of China. However, in 2007, Abe failed to pursue the necessity of such security dialogue amongst Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan and the USA), and, thus, the Quad concept went into partial hibernation. After one decade of hiatus, they started to realise the value of security dialogue. Covid-19 has further hastened the re-emergence of Quad as opposed to China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region.
In pre-WWII, characterised by a weak economy, chagrined by imperial powers, firmly persuaded by Confucian folklore, bellicose China would pose a threat to the world’s most significant maritime powers so swiftly was probably not anticipated by the world’s superpowers. In response to China’s eschewed behaviour and vagary in the Indo-Pacific region, Quad countries rose from dormancy to full-scale competition to aggressiveness.
Within two months of becoming President of the United States of America, Joe Biden’s call for Quad summit bears unsurmountable significance for the West which begun to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. Forgoing the chasm within Quad countries, they became united for what purpose that necessitates careful study. Does the importance of Quad concept, as speculated by Shinzo Abe, remain the same, or its resurgence indicates some other strategic purpose? And, as a Quad member, how best India can manoeuvre its role in the region. These are the few queries that will be responded to in this paper.
Quad Concept
Possibly Shinzo Abe had the intention to initiate an alliance among the great democratic countries within the Asia-Pacific rim. Having this mindset, at the sideline of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila on 25 May 2007, Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia and India met with the then US Vice President Dick Cheney and carried out the first informal dialogue. Later that year, the four Quad countries and Singapore conducted a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean comprising more than 25 naval ships and 20,000 personnel which China viewed as a policy containment and responded with diplomatic démarche to each of the four countries individually.
It was Shinzo Abe who in Indian Parliament on 22 August 2007 mentioned ‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ would be formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian Continent and sought India’s strategic global partnership. Shinzo Abe proposed a “Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue” (QSD) amongst the region’s great democracies, as mentioned by ‘Kevin Rudd’[i] who expressed his opinion in Nikkei Asian Review. He coined the QSD as a classic strategic tool of “offshore balancing”[ii] against Beijing. In 2007, the USA anticipated China as a ‘rising economic power’, but not deemed as an aggressive maritime power. So, the concept of creating Quad raised many questions about the requirement of such dialogue. Some thought it to be a US-led project, an alliance, an axis of democracies, a security diamond, or a way to contain China. There had been several debates at that time, but no clear consensus came out as it was deemed the Japanese scheme against China, which was considered to threaten international rules-based order, especially in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS).
The importance of QSD started to wane when Yasuo Fukuda became the Japanese new Prime Minister in late 2007. With the change of government, the foreign policy also began to reshape as Fukuda commenced rapprochement with China’s Premier Hu Jintao with much benign attitude. Least enthusiasm was also revealed from then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008 about his position on Quad. “Indeed, on the eve of Singh’s first state visit to China in January 2008, Singh stated that he would not be a party to any initiative aimed at containing China, that the India-China relationship was for him a matter of the priority”, noted by Kevin Rudd.
How about the interest of the USA? Kevin Rudd said that in March 2008, he had a whole day meeting with President George W Bush and his senior members of the cabinet in Washington, but “not once was the Quad raised by the American side”. More so, from the interview of the US under Secretary Burns, it was evident that trilateral security dialogue got more priority over Quad dialogue. At that time, the USA acknowledged the rise of China willy-nilly, possibly considering the peaceful ascension, but not fully aware of the risks that might entail. When Kevin Rudd took over the prime ministership in December 2007, he decided to keep himself away from Quad; at the same time, he started to improve the relationship with China through strategic dialogue. In February 2008, Australia announced that Canberra would pull out of the Quad. So the noble initiative of Shinzo Abe’s Quad (first phase) survived roughly from mid-2006 to early 2008. Then onward, there had been no de facto activities of Quad for a decade.
Resurface and Transfiguration of Quad Concept
A question might be raised on why Shinzo Abe kept pursuing the need to propound such Quad dialogue for long. The answer lies in the remarkable speech replete with sentimentality by Shinzo Abe at the Indian Parliament in 2007, where he expounded some new hypotheses, such as, “confluence of the two seas coming into being”, “broader Asia”, and “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”. The first phase of Quad was almost moribund when his party succumbed to defeat in the Japan Parliament, but after winning for the second time in 2012, Shinzo Abe again started to warrant the significance of such dialogue.
By 2017, Strategic and geopolitical circumstances in Indo-Pacific have gone through tremendous transformation with the rise of China’s hegemonistic attitude in the ECS and SCS. China also began to challenge the US status as the number one in the world. China started ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ with countries that moved against the interest of China. Amidst such turbulence, the geostrategic perception among the leaders of Quad countries has also developed on how to deal with ironclad China. The Quad concept has also gone into mutation, and Quad2.0 (second phase) revitalised among the nations. Yet, as not being clearly specified how to achieve the aim of principles of the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS)[iii], the Quad was still in a questionable state in determining its aim and target. Staying so close ally to the USA and threatened by China’s aggression in the ECS, South Korea was not included in the Quad. Moreover, there were several mini-lateral groups already in existence, such as, the US-Japan-South Korea Defence Trilateral Talks (established in 1999), the US-Japan-Australia Security Dialogue (established in 2002), the US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue (established 2011 at assistant secretary level, and held at foreign ministerial level from 2015), the Australia-India-Japan Trilateral (established in 2015 at foreign secretary-level) and even a US-Japan-Mongolia Trilateral (2015). The presence of such mini-lateral groups raised the debate of creating another Quad alliance among the strategists.
Quad held three dialogues until that time without producing any binding official joint statement, yet it was gaining much attention in the current geopolitical discourses. One of the reasons it could be gaining momentum is because the USA passed an act ‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018′, and its Section 207 reads (part) as follows:
‘SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.
It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) The security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote–
(A) A rules-based order;
(B) Respect for international law; and
(C) A free and open Indo-Pacific.
The USA reaffirmed the need for ‘security dialogue’ with the Quad countries by approving the above act. By enacting this act, the USA has recognised that China posed a threat to the USA’s global hegemony, which the USA failed to apprehend back in 2007.
Clashing Interests Among Quad Countries – Dividend for China
Even though all the Quad countries enjoy a proven democratic environment, they have nuance of conflicting interests. Being a strong proponent of non-alliance, India tends not to make any formal alliance with the USA. On the other hand, the USA would look for India, the best-suited member of the Quad that proximate to China, to counter China’s rise, especially in the Indian Ocean. However, the descending economy shattered by Covid-19, the balance of India’s dependence on the USA is growing in maintaining dominance over the Indian Ocean. In coaxing multilateralism, India possibly finds itself unbalanced to get along with China.
India remains a large arms importer from Russia, which was once India’s most significant partner during the Cold War. New Delhi almost finalised the purchase of 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30MKI fighters and, most notably, Russia’s self-propelled S-400 missile system costing US$5.5 billion. It is almost certain that US sanctions would be invoked under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) agreement if New Delhi goes ahead with the purchase. India’s diplomacy has kept on teetering as it vacillates between two superpowers – the USA and Russia. Under such sanctions threat within the Quad members, how India, even the USA, take forward the Quad agendas that could lead to misunderstanding. Indeed, it would be a difficult challenge for India to meet the Quad agendas while maintaining an endearing relationship with Russia.
With Australia, India had visible resentment for a long. Australia was vocal in supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). India was not a signatory to NPT. Due to India’s objection, Australia was not able to participate in Malabar naval exercises since 2007. Australia’s economic benefit from China was a significant factor in shaping the India-Australia relation. Australian trade with China was over eight times larger than India. Australia was enjoying good economic trade with China, for which Australia was more cautious before making Quad alliance that might retaliate China.
In 2014, with the visit of Australian Liberal Prime Minister Tony Abbott to India, who agreed to supply uranium to India, the bilateral relation between India and Australia started to reshape through trust-building with Prime Minister Modi. Professor Amitabh Mattoo then commented, “After six decades characterised by misperception, lack of trust, neglect, missed opportunities and even hostility, a new chapter in India’s relations with Australia has well and truly began”. On 04 June 2020, both the prime ministers of India and Australia agreed to cooperate in support of free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region in support of freedom of navigation at sea. For the first time, both countries signed two bilateral military agreements that reflect maturing of trust-building among the two countries. The meaningful engagement of both member countries at the North and South of the Indian Ocean is paramount for the Quad to proceed ahead. Japan had no visible opposing opinions from other Quad members.
China’s Retaliatory Rhetoric Against Quad Countries and Plus
When the Quad started to reinvigorate in 2017, China remained at loggerheads with all the Quad countries that became more evident during the Covid-19 crisis. China heavily came down on Quad countries. China’s bilateral relationships with all the Quad countries have now at the nadir compared to other developed countries. It’s a matter of discourse why there is a fear of ‘China’s rise’ and what makes the Quad countries change their position after ten years.
China claims almost all of 1.3 million sq miles of the SCS as its sea area. As a result, in the Indo-Pacific, a new trend of security paradigm has emerged with a nuance from the traditional security, eg, presence of hundreds of Chinese fishing trawlers supported by ships of Coast Guard in the disputed islands, making or increasing artificial lands in the disputed islands, construction of the structure in the disputed islands, militarisation in disputed islands despite President Xi’s pledge not to militarise, manoeuvring Chinese naval ships dangerously close to the US naval ships, refusal to solve disputes with ASEAN countries instead China prefers to deal one-to-one, not respecting the UN resolutions, that alienated almost all the littorals of ECS and SCS.
To add to China’s belligerent behaviour, China has started arming the fishing fleets to gain a strategic advantage at sea through regular encroaching other’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This maritime militia is considered part of China’s Navy, which now creates the possibility of confrontation with other coastal states. The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Karl L. Schultz rightly raised the concern of littoral states, and said, “disregard for this sovereignty and territorial integrity by Chinese and other IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing perpetrators not only threatens the stability of nations who rely on marine resources for food security and economic development, but it is also a direct violation of international rules-based order”.
China also started adopting a very unconventional way of showing hegemonistic attitude in the SCS. In 2012, when Philippine naval ships stopped Chinese fishing boats in the disputed SCS, China stopped accepting Pilipino bananas citing not meeting the Chinese standard. Again, when Seoul installed the US missile system in 2016, China stopped 74 South Korean supermarkets operations in violation of fire standard safety precautions.
At the outbreak of Covid-19, Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origin of Covid-19, which was considered as a legitimate right to ask for, China elicited fiercely with economic retaliation and stopped importing Australian coal, beef, barley, wine, seafood, timber, cotton, et al. China-US is already at economic war, which started mainly during the former US President Trump era. Historically China considers Japan as their rival, and over the claim of Senkaku Islands by China, the relation became sourer. Lastly, the Sino-India relation stood on a sharp razor edge after the Ladakh incident at the Himalayan border on 14 June 2020.
These sorts of unconventional challenges, regional forcefulness, and no respect towards international law and rules-based orders forced the rest of the countries to worry about exercising Freedom of Navigations Operations (FONOP)[iv] in the Indo-Pacific. The unclear intentions of Chinese vagary in the ECS and SCS caused serious concern for not only the Quad countries but also the most maritime powers.
The rise of China, over the past few decades, both in terms of economic and military, has enhanced Chinese moral strength in the diplomatic sector. China now dares to lambast the nations going against Chain’s interests. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhao Lijian warned the UK to abandon the cold-war mentality and colonialist mindset on the issue of 3 million Hongkongers holding ‘British National Overseas’ passports. The Chinese warning reflected deep-rooted Chinese resentment against the UK; in 1839, it was a humiliating defeat of China in the Opium War that ceded Hong Kong to the UK.
Sino-Indian border clash at the Himalayan border at Ladakh exhibited China’s military strength. The killing of 20 Indian soldiers by China, without shooting a single bullet, at the Himalayan border (Ladakh) between India and China amidst pandemic economic war, China sent a signal to India that any activities against the interests of China would further aggravate the situation. The innovative idea of attacking Indian soldiers without resorting to any arms proves China’s versatility of manipulating border agreements not by using any arms. It appears to be Chinese generosity not to escalate the conflict further.
China does not share border with Quad countries but India – 3488 km contentious land border. Among the four Quad countries, India’s economy (per capita) is lower than others. To escalate the situation, China, at its will, picks India’s weakness to attack (one of the members of Quad) and can open war-front, starting from the Himalayan border, the famous ‘Chicken neck’ at Siliguri, Arunachal area, at al. Not to mention the Indo-Pak border, even China has the capability to escalate conflict at the India-Myanmar 1331 km porous border through supporting insurgent groups operating both in India and Myanmar. China brazenly supports Myanmar’s dictator and, using its veto power, saved Myanmar from being imposed UN sanctions. Consequently, China is believed to have the upper hand over India to influence the Myanmar policy, which might place India in awkward situation.
These are the geostrategic disadvantage for India, not for China. So, these age-old geostrategic issues will keep on resurfacing in any discourse, and India will have to address them, considering the prevailing geopolitical condition. A Pew research shows that 63.6% of Americans neither support India nor China in case of conflict between the two. More so, Covid-19 has put the world’s great powers so shattered that it’s no wonder that in case of Chinese aggression, India may not find anyone beside her (India) except for condolence. It’s a straightforward calculation for China to retaliate against Quad is to harass proximate India.
Chinese leader, Mr Xi Jinping, during his address on the occasion of Communist Party’s 100th birthday, said, “Anyone who tries to do so shall be battered and bloodied from colliding with a great wall of steel forged by more than 1.4 billion Chinese people using flesh and blood,”. Although truculent as it appears, usually undiplomatic, especially by a great leader, targeted against the Colonialists, it now implies more towards India as China has many contentious issues in disputes.
Chinese diplomats are no more with naïve attitude, instead, they appear aggressive in the diplomatic arena. Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s policy began to contradict former premier Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘hide your strength, bide your time’. Their recent assertive diplomatic endeavours started to show down since the Covid-19 engulfed the world, although it had started long ago immediately after Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of Central Military Commission in 2012.
Embarkation on Quad Alliance by the USA
Knowing very well the potency of Quad, China would prefer the strategy of deception, which was articulated in the teachings of Sun Tsu’s “Art of War”.[v] China’s incredible strategy was so successful that even in 2000, former President Bill Clinton desperately engaged China and allowed China’s accession to WTO (World Trade Organisation). Since then, China’s economy got the opportunity for smooth sailing under the nose of the USA, and after two decades, China has challenged the USA to become the number one economic power in the world (Figure).
The Communist Party of China played the strategy so successfully that the Quad countries remained preoccupied to fight their respective old enemies, and at the same time, China, deceitfully, brought chasm among the Quad countries. India remained obsessed with Pakistan’s terrorist threats, and the USA remained engaged with North Korea over the nuclear threat. Moreover, the West saw the rise of some despotic leaders in the Middle East as their main threat and the USA and its allies attacked Iraq in an unjust war in 2003. So, when the Quad idea was floated in 2007, the Westerns couldn’t envisage the Chinese strength as they remained engrossed in quashing ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Taking this advantage, China built a strong economy with Western countries and virtually made developed countries dependent on China to supply almost every daily necessary commodity.
China’s deceitful strategy was too late to alarm the Wests, and when realised, although too late, former President Donald Trump became fed up to teeth and berated China in a meeting, saying “we can’t continue to allow China to rape our country, and that’s what they’re doing,”. While shifting focus away from China, over the decades, China has stealthily built its People’s Liberation Army, Navy (PLAN) and strengthen its economic ties with Asia, Africa and Europe through ‘Belt and Road Initiative(BRI)’.[vi] – a highly ambitious, trillion USD economic projects (the exact figure appears to be more than USD 4 trillion but sounds overhyped). Amidst US-China economic war, the USA believes that China is gaining strategic advantages through BRI connectivity.
The USA now considers China a revisionist power because of China’s unjust and dubious claim over most of the SCS Ocean water and the various islands in the SCS and ECS. China’s unfair claim compelled Quad countries to carry out FONOP by deploying their naval vessels in the SCS. Some members of NATO countries have also joined with the USA to deploy their naval vessels, ie, the UK deployed its newly built 65,000 tons aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in July 2021. Before entered to disputed SCS, the carrier also carried out ‘Exercise Konkan’ with the Indian Navy, held from 21 to 22 July in the Bay of Bengal.
Shinzo Abe’s proponent of QSD was emanated from China fear, and he pursued that goal. Within two months of becoming President of the US, Joe Biden calls for the first-ever official summit of Quad does convey some critical message, and that may not be necessarily the COVAX issue. Several meetings held at different times since the formation of Quad; the outcome of those meetings signalled the actions to counter the assertive behaviour of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Xi Jining’s ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ has upended Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Keeping a low profile’ policy. Possibly, Shinzo Abe could foresee the situation more than a decade ago, the US and other countries started to appreciate it now.
Understanding Quad Motif
The Quad came to the centre of limelight when the US Present Joe Biden hurriedly hold the first-ever Quad virtual meeting at the leaders’ level on 12 March 2021 with a smorgasbord of issues, mainly to combat Covid-19 (Quad leaders’ joint statement). The meeting outcomes appear that its aim was not to counter China, which made all strategists, including China, ponder upon it. The USA’s national interests seem got priority, as visible when the USA carried out FONOP within the EEZ of India on 07 April 2021 by one of the destroyers of the US 7th Fleet without the prior consent of India.
Shinzo Abe’s viable concept of Quad was mainly to address security in Asia-Pacific, but the 12 March Meeting brought out a wide range of issues that overlaps with the idea of the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). Albeit, after the retirement of Shinzo Abe, both Quad and IPS are de facto led by the USA and, to some extent, to pursue the US interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Notwithstanding great initiatives covering the whole of Indo-Pacific, both Quad and IPS are still at an informal level without any factual statement and clear charter, as such, their objectives are still in infancy to many strategists, for which the interlocutors interpret them as deemed necessary. However, China is clear on the Quad issue as said by the foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, ‘Quad as a mechanism to contain China’s global rise’.
As of now, none of the Quad or IPS has been placed for signing or have asked countries to participate as opposed to China-led BRI. ‘Quad Plus’ concept is a matter of discourse as different thinkers floated this idea to include other countries as speculated. After the first official Quad summit, the inclusion of the UK and France came to the limelight as these imperialist powers still maintain sizable colonies and strategic interests in Indo-Pacific. The UK (including the USA) has been maintaining military forces of around 3000 in British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). Similarly, France is also maintaining sizable military power in the Indo-Pacific region – the size of the armed forces is around 7000 in UAE, Djibouti, Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. After the British Prime Minister’s boastful declaration to back to ‘global Britain’, and subsequently, the deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth in SCS, the inclusion of the UK in Quad became a popular argument among the strategists.
Ladakh incident and Chinese diplomats’ rhetoric all over the world insinuate China’s aggressiveness against Quad. In May 2021, on what ground, China’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming, suggested that Bangladesh should not join the Quad initiative, remained conundrum to many. Chinese ambassador’s uncalled-for advice gave rise to vast controversies among the interlocutors, not only in Bangladesh but also in the whole world. At least, it is clear that China appears scared of the formation of Quad and its expansion in the Indian Ocean region, where China’s vital economy rests.
It is most unlikely that the USA will open the Quad initiative to other countries, especially to the South and Southeast Asian region. If like-minded littoral countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, et al, are brought under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), then entire Indo-Pacific security strategy somehow could be integrated under one Quad umbrella. Possibly, in anticipation, China wanted to convey its warning to use economic leverage to the littoral countries not to align with Quad or IPS. In achieving that strategy, China has already started lambasting countries that go against its strategic interests.
Whatever China’s motif in the recent standoff with India on the Himalayan border, Ladakh, on 14 June 2021 would subtly push India more towards the Quad alliance, which is evident by the Indian decision to deploy four naval ships for a two-month period in SCS. The assertive behaviour and economic retaliation against Australia led Australia’s defence budget to increase; and strengthen the Quad alliance by participating Malabar Naval Exercise in November 2020 after 12 years. NATO was almost inactive during the Trump era. Joe Biden, after becoming President, started to activate NATO with anticipation to counter the resurgence of Russia. Seemingly, the USA will want Quad in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China. China’s continued assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region would likely compel the USA to act as a bellwether of Quad and further bolster the growing ties among the Quad countries in the future.
Myanmar Conundrum and India’s Quad Challenge
Myanmar has become a twenty-first-century challenge for the Quad countries, especially for India being proximate. Even Myanmar is considered as the source of all evils and a ‘pariah state’ in the region that produces illegal drugs and supplies to the whole world. After the assassination of the father of the nation, General Aung San, insatiate Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) leaders made Myanmar a vassal state of China since 1962, and an authoritarian government was established by the military junta that continued till now. China is the largest exporter of arms and helping Myanmar’s dictatorial regime survive amid the Western sanction; on the other hand, Myanmar’s different ethnic groups found fighting (against the Myanmar government) using Chinese arms.
Myanmar is a lynchpin for India to materialise its ‘Act East’ policy, more precisely, ASEAN connectivity. Notably, leaders of China and Myanmar are the two cronies who underscored the need for dependency on each other in fulfilling their respective agendas. For the survival of the dictatorial military regime, Myanmar needs the support of China. Vis a vis, Myanmar also plays a pivotal role in China’s economic connectivity. China is constructing China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) for Indian Ocean connectivity to escape the contentious Malacca strait. High-speed rail, road, gas and oil pipelines are being connected from Kyaukphyu Port (Myanmar) to the Yunnan Province(China), a hinterland. How India will implement its trilateral highway (India-Myanmar-Thailand) connecting ASEAN countries crossing CMEC is a matter yet to be judged. Given the situation that the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that started connecting Kolkata to north-eastern states of India through Sittwe (Myanmar) could not be completed in two decades.
The lurch of Joe Biden has become unpredictable – lamenting Russian President Putin ‘a killer’ but next moment calling meeting with him. The US – declared ‘war on terrorism’ targeting Taliban calling both Afghanistan and Pakistan as ‘save heaven’ of terrorists – has now agreed to form a ‘Quadrilateral Diplomatic Platform’ with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The age-old cliché, ‘there is no permanent friend or foe in politics’, is a stark reminder to all. The USA (Speech by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III) appears to emphasise ‘to forge a more resilient regional order’ in the region. In such a conjuncture it would be challenging for India to assess the motif of Quad and act prudently ‘without rocking the boat’ too much in the region. According to many strategists, maintaining regional harmony gets priority than farfetched strategy.
Trust and confidence among the leaders of Quad are yet to take shape in taking meaningful engagement. After a long pause, the inclusion of Australia into the Malabar Exercise – 2020 is a process of gaining trust between two countries. India’s relation with the USA has yet to establish an all-weather tested friend. In many ways, Biden administration has a number of issues with India to mistrust and misjudge. As such, India’s risk assessment gets priority before taking further steps under the Quad umbrella.
Another critical issue is the Sino-Indian proximity having border dispute, and they fought a war in 1962 where China emerged as the complete victor. After six decades, China appeared more formidable both in economy and military than India. Also the great power competition in the Indian Ocean gave rise to the possibility of China-Russia cooperation. The recent resurgence of Russia’s military power also compelled the possibility of reinvigorating the decaying NATO. Similarly, China’s rise also gave the likelihood of strengthening the Quad, where the US would want India to play a crucial role in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean being the backwater of India, India would be in an advantageous position in playing a dominant role in this region. But away from the Indian Ocean, the Indian decision to deploy naval ships in SCS, China had various options to retaliate against India that needs careful analysis by India.
Concluding Remarks:
Quad is still a babe in the wood without any clear charter or mandate, but the members are from great democratic backgrounds with vast experience. However, the great leaders of Quad failed to admit the concept of Quad in 2007, but after one decade of hiatus, Quad leaders, including the West, realised China’s increased unconventional threat challenged the freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas. More so, stubborn China has started economic retaliation against countries that goes against the interest of China.
Although several informal meetings were held since the inception of Quad, within two months since Joe Biden became President of the USA, his call for the Quad summit in March 2021 formalised the Quad alliance. However, the outcome of the first official summit containing smorgasbord of issues put everyone into bewilderment about the purpose of the Quad. The outcome of previous informal meetings indicated that the Quad intended to counter the rise of China or its belligerence. Possibly, the clogged economy of the Quad countries due to prevailing Covid-19 pandemic deterred the summit from taking aggressive outcomes against China. The summit reflects mostly the interests of the USA in upholding its Indo-Pacific strategy (IPS).
Quad is yet to make its own set of clear objectives or charter. According to many strategists, the objectives of Quad and IPS overlap with each other and at times become ambiguous. As such, the different strategists interpret them as deem necessary. Albeit, both Quad and IPS are now de facto led by the USA. The great power competition in the Indian Ocean does not necessarily intend to be economic decoupling, rather, the USA appears to maintain meaningful economic engagement with China keeping the USA’s strategic edge unchallenged.
As a crucial member of Quad, India plays a pivotal role, especially in the Indian Ocean region. The USA would also expect India to play a leading role in fulfilling the Quad agendas, as such, India’s imperative is to grasp the motif of Quad. The revitalisation of Quad aided close cooperation between China and Russia, which would put India in an awkward position as Russia was a great ally to India during the Cold War, and till today India nurtures that relationship. A good understanding among the leaders of Quad countries is quintessential.
Before it gets stuck by stagflation in the coming years, an unplanned stride in persuasion to Quad initiative would put India to increase its downwards economic trend already hobbled by Covid-19. India’s lack of investment strategy in the region has allowed China to supplant the void left by India, allowing China’s influence go up in the region compared to India. For its own and the region, India necessitates enhancing regional harmony by establishing a resilient regional strategy rather than looking for coattail benefits from Quad.
Conducting Malabar exercise among Quad countries and placing naval vessels in the contested South China Sea will instead entice China to retaliate in any suitable fronts out of many. On top of that, if China is to retaliate against the Quad, the preferred option would be to provoke India, being proximate to China. Of course, the more China becomes assertive in the Indo-Pacific region, the more it will push the Quad countries towards a strong alliance. As such, the endurance of Quad depends on China’s assertiveness in the East and South China seas. As long as the great power competition continues in Indo-Pacific, Quad would play a dominant role where India’s role would be vital as a regional power. Through confidence building methods, India needs to ensure that America will be right by its side in times of need.
[i] Kevin Michael Rudd is an Australian former politician who was the 26th Prime Minister of Australia, serving from December 2007 to June 2010 and from June to September 2013. He held office as the leader of the Australian Labor Party. He was the non-Chinese world’s first Chinese-speaking prime minister of Australia.
[ii] “Offshore balancing” is a strategic concept used in realist analysis in international relations. It describes a strategy in which a great power uses favoured regional powers to check the rise of potentially hostile powers.
[iii] In 2017, President Trump announced vision of the US for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ in persuasion to IPS. Principles are to uphold: 1. Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations; 2. Peaceful resolution of disputes; 3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and
connectivity; and, 4. Adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and
overflight. Reference: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF
[iv] The US Department of Defence defines FONOPs as “operational challenges against excessive maritime claims” through which “the United States demonstrates its resistance to excessive maritime claims”. … The FON Program challenges what the US considers to be excessive territorial claims on the world’s oceans and airspace.
[v] The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the Late Spring and Autumn Period (roughly 5th century BC). The work, which is attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (“Master Sun”, also spelled Sunzi), is composed of 13 chapters.
[vi] The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as One Belt One Road, is a global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 involving infrastructure development and investments in nearly 70 countries and international organisations.