U.S. centrality in the Middle East security order lasted longer than in most other regions. For over thirty years, its military deployments helped keep strategic waterways secure, its partnerships offered reassurance to Arab regimes, and its diplomatic efforts aimed, with little success, at resolving the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Today, that order is facing an existential turning point.

The Gaza war and the emerging US-Israeli clash with Iran have highlighted the fragility of an order based overwhelmingly on coercive power. Washington is still the strongest external player in the region. But power is no longer synonymous with political leverage, regional stability, or assurance of allies' loyalty. The era of the "American Middle East" may not end overnight, but its underpinning premises are quickly fading.

The Architecture of American Primacy

The existing order emerged after the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Soviet Union's collapse. With Iraq vanquished and Iran isolated, Washington found itself in a position of unrivaled power throughout the Middle East that it would not enjoy again. New military bases were built around the Gulf, bilateral security partnerships expanded, access to the world’s energy supplies was secured, and America came to see itself as the region's guardian of security.

Underlying this relationship was a basic quid pro quo. Arab states got access, political alignment, and energy security. In exchange, they received arms, military security, and regime security. Israel would stay as America’s closest ally in the region.

This order had its advantages. No adversarial state came to dominate the Gulf, energy supplies largely kept flowing to market, and Israel had never faced a conventional military alliance akin to those fielded against it in decades past. It also allowed the United States to maintain regional influence without permanently stationing troops across the region.

And the costs of these decisions soon mounted. Washington’s pledge to autocrats hindered reform; its toleration of Israel’s settlement enterprise slowly undermined support for the peace process. Militarism and proxy wars devastated Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and more besides. To many in the region, the American order would grow to represent war, repression, and poverty rather than its alternative.

When Protectionism Creates Dependency 

Security guarantees can deter aggression, but they also risk moral hazards. Governments that grew accustomed to American support grew emboldened to act in provocative ways they otherwise would not. Regional partners intervened in civil wars, armed groups hostile to U.S. allies, and turned their backs on diplomatic solutions that infringed upon their interests.

The United States itself faced this paradox as well. Each base, commitment, and weapons sale granted Washington more influence but also created new liabilities. Bases let a country project power, but in wartime they can become vulnerable targets that need protection. Partners can support U.S. policy when it benefits them, but box Washington in when their territory, assets, or citizens are at risk.

These contradictions became harder to avoid after the Arab uprisings of 2010–11. The Gulf monarchies watched the United States turn on Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and feared they too could one day fall victim to domestic unrest. Liberalizing reform wasn’t necessarily the answer.  Washington could provide military support, but it could not immunize its partners from their citizens. Gulf states reacted by asserting themselves more independently.

The Saudi oil attacks of September 2019 sent a similar shock through the region. While Washington retained tremendous sway over Tehran, it had proven unwilling or unable to deter attacks on Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure. Riyadh can cozy up to Washington all it wants, but it can’t relocate its oilfields. Qatar can buy whatever air defense it wants, but it can’t move its gas liquefaction facilities. The UAE can spend whatever it wants on missile defense, but it can’t magically move its ports and banking sector. Oman can talk with Washington until the cows come home, but it can’t relocate away from the Strait of Hormuz.

America’s security commitment has therefore led Gulf states to hedge their bets by opening channels with Iran. The reopening of Saudi-Iranian dialogue in 2023 was not a repudiation of Washington; it was a recognition of geopolitical reality. As America took a hard line with Iran over one set of issues, Gulf states needed a way to talk to it over another.

Gaza and the Crisis of American Credibility

The destruction of Gaza delivered another powerful blow to Washington’s regional standing. American support for Israel created the impression across much of the Arab and Muslim world that Washington applied international law selectively. Its calls for civilian protection and a two-state solution increasingly seemed disconnected from conditions on the ground.

The crisis also revealed how badly American policymakers had underestimated the continuing political importance of Palestine. The Abraham Accords encouraged the belief that Arab governments could normalize relations with Israel without resolving or even seriously addressing the Palestinian question. That assumption proved deeply flawed.

Arab governments can build backroom relationships with Israel when it comes to intelligence, trade and technology. But they can’t mute public opinion indefinitely.  Images of Palestinian civilians being killed changed warm relations with Israel from being a strategic opportunity to becoming a serious domestic vulnerability. Saudi-Israeli normalization talks during the Gaza war underscored the degree to which Washington’s diplomatic ambitions have outpaced the political limits of Arab governments.

The Palestinian question, repeatedly treated as a manageable secondary issue, has returned to the center of regional politics.

The Iran War and the Limits of Force

The confrontation with Iran further weakened confidence in the existing order. Gulf governments opposed a war that could expose their cities, ports, desalination facilities and energy infrastructure to retaliation. When the United States and Israel escalated their campaign without adequately accommodating Gulf concerns, American allies faced the consequences of decisions over which they had little influence.

The key issue wasn’t whether the United States could unleash massive destruction against Iran. Of course, it can.  Rather, it was whether Washington could obtain sustainable political gains at a reasonable price through military means.

Iran will never have to win conventionally.  Even limited attacks on shipping, regional infrastructure, and energy markets would threaten instability. Missile defenses could be taxed.  Insurance rates and energy prices would climb if the Strait of Hormuz became even somewhat unreliable. Those losses would be passed on to consumers everywhere, including in the United States.

Destroying materiel is not the same thing as achieving strategic progress. Dropping bombs on missile launchers, radar installations and command posts won’t make insurers confident about dangerous shipping lanes. And using up expensive munitions and interceptor missiles in the Persian Gulf may come at the opportunity cost of deterring China, which Washington sees as a far more consequential long-term competitor.

If plans for regional order deplete military resources without sufficiently benefiting America’s strategic position, they may need to be scrapped.

A Gradual, Not Sudden, Transition

Comparisons with the 1956 Suez crisis are tempting. Britain and France did not vanish from the Middle East immediately after their failed intervention in Egypt. Nevertheless, Suez exposed their declining power and accelerated a transition already underway.

American influence will almost certainly taper off slowly, too. No natural replacement for US military power exists in the Gulf, and partners there will not suddenly cut ties with Washington. They will keep buying US weapons, maintaining defense ties, and depending on American intel and missile defense.

At the same time, they will diversify their relationships. Some will deepen economic engagement with China, preserve political channels with Russia, and pursue accommodations with Iran. Regional powers will increasingly act according to their own interests rather than automatically joining American-led coalitions.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Qatar, Egypt, and Iran are all regional powers pursuing autonomy. Mutual rivalries may lead to shifting alliances rather than a single overarching alternative to American power. The Middle East may become multipolar with no external power able to dominate.

Such a transition will not necessarily produce peace. Israel and Iran may both find advantages in continuing low-intensity, borderless conflicts. Israel appears determined to preserve freedom of military action across Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. At the same time, Iran has developed comparatively inexpensive missiles, drones and nonstate partnerships capable of imposing disproportionate costs on its adversaries.

Toward a Sustainable Regional Strategy

Declining American primacy is unsettling.  But it need not be apocalyptic.  Washington can and should remain engaged in the Middle East. It just needs to be engaged differently.  The new administration will not and should not do everything. It should, however, prioritize what matters most: drawing the line between actions needed to defend its core interests and actions taken to try to police every conflict that arises.

A prudent approach would prioritize collective defense, freedom of navigation, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy. It would treat military force as a last resort far from Washington’s policy driver. And it would accept that however much we may want to isolate Iran, we cannot keep it outside of the regional order indefinitely.

Recalibrating American engagement will also require a renewed partnership with allies. Supporting Israel does not mean endorsing annexation, expulsion, or occupation as a perpetual status quo. Working with Arab governments does not mean ignoring repression, proxy wars, and calls for foreign intervention that shred other countries. We cannot build stability by silencing the public indefinitely.