Political grievances are a normal feature of any functioning society. In regions that have experienced conflict, displacement, terrorism and prolonged security operations, demands for justice, accountability and political representation can be particularly strong. The challenge begins when legitimate grievances become embedded in narratives that deliberately widen ethnic divisions, delegitimise state institutions and create space for external actors to influence domestic politics. The debate surrounding the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) illustrates this complicated intersection between genuine grievances, identity politics, national security and allegations of foreign influence.
From political consciousness to political mobilisation
The PTM emerged in 2018 from protests demanding justice for Naqeebullah Mehsud and broader accountability for the treatment of Pashtun communities affected by conflict. Academic research describes its early mobilisation as rooted in demands concerning constitutional rights, missing persons, landmines, militarisation and accountability. Its supporters subsequently developed a broader political narrative around Pashtun identity and political consciousness. The essay “نوجوانوں سیاست سیکھو” — “Youth, Learn Politics” — fits within this broader rhetorical framework. It presents PTM as a movement that supposedly transformed Pashtun youth from passive followers of political parties into politically conscious actors prioritising ethnic and national interests.
This language is powerful because it converts political mobilisation into a question of identity. A young person is not merely asked to support a political programme; he or she is encouraged to see participation in the movement as evidence of political awakening.
That is precisely where scrutiny becomes necessary.
Political consciousness should mean the ability to examine competing claims, question leaders, recognise manipulation and distinguish legitimate rights from political exploitation. It should not mean replacing one form of political loyalty with another. The danger of turning ethnic grievances into permanent political fault lines
Pakistan's Pashtun population is not an external constituency standing outside the federation. Pashtuns occupy important positions across politics, the armed forces, judiciary, civil administration, business, academia and wider national life.
At the same time, it would be equally misleading to dismiss every Pashtun grievance as manufactured. Independent research has documented longstanding complaints concerning conflict, displacement, missing persons, checkpoints and the consequences of military operations in former FATA and adjoining areas.
The strategic question is therefore not whether grievances exist. They clearly do. The question is how those grievances are politically framed and who benefits from the resulting narrative. A domestic movement can begin with legitimate demands and subsequently become more polarised. Conversely, the state's response can also contribute to radicalisation if peaceful criticism is treated automatically as hostility. The most sustainable response is therefore neither blanket suppression nor unconditional acceptance, but evidence-based political engagement and accountability.
Foreign influence: allegation, evidence and the proxy question
The strongest allegations surrounding PTM concern foreign financing and contacts with external actors. Pakistani officials have repeatedly accused the movement of receiving foreign support and coordinating with hostile organisations. These allegations were among the reasons cited by the federal government when it declared PTM a proscribed organisation in October 2024 under Section 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
However, the evidentiary picture is contested. Claims circulating online about specific payments — including an alleged £11,000 transfer from an Indian source to a UK-based PTM organiser — have been repeated in social-media and partisan commentary, but I could not locate sufficiently authoritative independent documentation to treat that specific transaction as conclusively established. Similarly, allegations concerning direct intelligence relationships require documentary evidence rather than repetition.
This distinction is critical. Foreign intelligence services around the world have historically attempted to exploit domestic divisions in rival states. Such activity is a recognised feature of modern hybrid competition. But identifying a political movement as a foreign proxy requires evidence demonstrating more than ideological similarity, foreign media coverage, diaspora activism or contact with foreign officials.
In fact, a 2019 statement by a senior US official illustrates the evidentiary problem: when asked about allegations that Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies were funding PTM, the official said the United States did not have information confirming them.
Consequently, the strongest case against foreign manipulation should be constructed through verifiable financial records, communications, organisational links and operational coordination — not assumptions.
The TTP dimension cannot be ignored. The security environment in which PTM operates is particularly sensitive because Pashtun-majority areas have suffered heavily from militant violence. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has conducted attacks against civilians, police, military personnel and political figures, while Pakistan has repeatedly accused Afghanistan of allowing TTP elements to operate from its territory. Kabul has denied the allegations.
This creates a difficult political environment for any Pashtun movement. Criticising Pakistan's security forces is legitimate political expression, but a movement advocating for communities affected by terrorism also faces a responsibility to clearly reject militant violence.
Claims circulating about Taliban figures and alleged relationships with PTM figures have intensified this debate. Recent reporting has attributed allegations concerning Manzoor Pashteen and PTM networks to Khalid Zadran's book 15 Minutes. Yet independent confirmation of the strongest versions of these claims remains limited.
The appropriate response is therefore investigation rather than automatic acceptance or dismissal.
The politics of selective outrage
One of the most important questions concerns political selectivity. Pashtun communities have suffered from state actions, militant violence and cross-border instability alike. Any serious human-rights movement should therefore be prepared to condemn abuses regardless of the perpetrator. Pakistan has paid an enormous price for terrorism. Pakistani sources regularly cite a death toll exceeding 94,000 over the course of the country's prolonged struggle against militant violence.
A credible political movement should recognise this human cost while simultaneously demanding accountability for unlawful state conduct where evidence exists. Treating the suffering of civilians and security personnel as competing narratives ultimately weakens the credibility of both sides.
The same principle applies to the state: allegations of militancy or foreign sponsorship must be investigated through transparent legal mechanisms rather than becoming substitutes for evidence.
The internationalisation of domestic grievances
Another important development is the movement of domestic political narratives into international forums. Overseas demonstrations, lobbying campaigns and diaspora activism can draw attention to genuine human-rights concerns. They can also become instruments for internationalising domestic disputes. This is why overseas advocacy deserves the same scrutiny as domestic political mobilisation. Who finances events? Who organises them? What organisations participate? What claims are made? Are allegations supported by documentation? Are militant organisations condemned consistently?
These questions do not undermine freedom of expression. They strengthen the credibility of political advocacy.
The 2024 PTM ban itself demonstrates how deeply polarised the issue has become. The Pakistani government described PTM as a threat to public order and national security, while Amnesty International strongly rejected the designation and characterised PTM as a peaceful rights movement.
This disagreement demonstrates that PTM cannot simply be understood through one narrative. Political maturity requires evidence, not slogans
The central lesson from the “Youth, Learn Politics” narrative should therefore be taken seriously — but applied consistently. Young people should indeed learn politics. They should learn to distinguish constitutional rights from separatism, peaceful protest from violence, independent advocacy from foreign influence, and evidence from propaganda.
For Pakistan, the strategic objective should not be to silence every critical voice. It should be to prevent legitimate grievances from becoming instruments of violent extremism, ethnic polarisation or foreign interference. For political movements, the responsibility is equally clear: demonstrate financial transparency, condemn terrorism unequivocally, participate in constitutional politics and provide evidence for allegations against state institutions. For the state, the answer must be equally principled: protect national security while ensuring that genuine grievances receive legal and political remedies.
The greatest danger is not political dissent itself. The greater danger is when real grievances are converted into permanent ethnic hostility, when external actors learn to exploit those grievances, and when evidence is replaced by propaganda on all sides.
Political consciousness, therefore, should not mean unquestioning loyalty to PTM, the state, a political party or any foreign narrative. It should mean the ability to question everyone.
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