ANKIT TIWARI

Seven months after Nepal’s “Gen-Z revolution” – protesting entrenched corruption and years of persistent governance failures – violently toppled the government and led to the dissolution of the parliament, the Himalayan country conducted general elections on 5 March with remarkable results.

The three established political parties which had for decades dominated the polls were thwarted by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), a party formed just four years ago on an anti-corruption platform. The RSP’s landslide victory was unprecedented and fell just two seats short of a two-thirds majority in parliament. The RSP’s extraordinary victory indicates that every section of Nepali society has joined Gen Z’s open revolt against the septuagenarian and corrupt old guard. In its 18 years as a federal democratic republic, Nepal has seen 15 different coalition governments in power, and not one completed a full term.

The new parliament will have more than 70 members under the age of 40. The 35-year-old rapper and former mayor of Kathmandu, Balendra Shah, or “Balen”, will become Nepal’s youngest PM.

This sea change in Nepali domestic politics could herald a complete reset in Kathmandu’s foreign policy template.

Traditional foreign policy dynamics – in which the Communist parties of Nepal enjoyed close relations with Beijing, whereas the Nepali Congress preferred New Delhi as a partner – have essentially unravelled.

The baseline goals are likely to remain stable. As a landlocked country between – and economically dependent upon – two Asian giants, Nepal will still need to balance its partnerships with India and China. International developmental cooperation will also be essential, given a youth unemployment rate at over 20% and a GDP per capita that ranks in the bottom 30 worldwide.

However, the traditional foreign policy dynamics – in which the Communist parties of Nepal enjoyed close relations with Beijing, whereas the Nepali Congress preferred New Delhi as a partner – have essentially unravelled with the parties’ dismal electoral performances.

The RSP election manifesto emphasised “balanced relations” and conceived of the country as an economic “bridge” rather than a geopolitical “buffer” (between India and China). But beyond these generic articulations, the party neither appears to have a foreign policy ideology nor has it declared any concrete positions on key issues such as China’s Belt and Road (BRI) projects, the boundary dispute with India, or the implementation of a US $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation grant for infrastructure.

The scale of RSP’s mandate and Balen’s massive popularity suggest that Nepal could finally see a stable government complete a full term, which in turn would allow Kathmandu to implement foreign policy decisions that are not abruptly changed or reversed by a new administration.

Yet neither Balen nor anyone else in his party has diplomatic experience at a time when Nepal’s regional and global geopolitical challenges have sharpened and multiplied.

The new administration will have to negotiate with Moscow, for instance, in order to repatriate thousands (15,000 according to a CNN estimate) of Nepalis enlisted by the Russian Army for its war in Ukraine. Kathmandu will also be tested by the intensified conflict in the Middle East, a region where anywhere between 2 and 3 million Nepali migrant workers reside, predominantly in the Gulf countries, and at least one Nepali citizen has already died.

The interim government has begun to coordinate rescue efforts, but if the war escalates, the expansion of evacuation efforts will require a “national plan” as the interim foreign minister recently admitted. Given its limited resources, Kathmandu will need to seek assistance from either or both India and China.

Nepal is also completely import-dependent on India for its energy supplies, which itself is largely import-dependent on hydrocarbons. Balen will have to tactfully negotiate for a steady supply amid turmoil in the global energy market.

The larger question facing Balen will be how to manage or benefit from the longer-term contest for influence between India and China, as well as the United States. He has already courted controversy. Before coming to power, he called for a ban on Indian films in Nepal in 2023, displaying a map of Greater Nepal (which included Indian territories), and characterised Nepali courts as “Indian slaves”. The same year, he cancelled a trip to China to protest Beijing’s refusal to recognise Nepal’s new political map. And in 2025 he made headlines for the use of profanity against India, China and the United States in a social media post.

India lost a key partner in the ousted PM KP Sharma Oli. But not everything has run China’s way. A corruption scandal around the Chinese-backed Pokhara International Airport has forced the RSP to keep a distance from Nepal’s northern neighbour. Balen also dropped a key BRI project, Damak Industrial Park, from his election manifesto ahead of the polls.

Nevertheless, how Kathmandu’s foreign policy will evolve under an unpredictable new leadership remains an open question.

The article appeared in the lowyinstitute