The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has re-emerged as the primary geographic theatre of twenty-first-century maritime competition. Driven by dense sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the energy-rich Persian Gulf with East Asian industrial centers, the IOR hosts critical choke points—specifically the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca. For Beijing, this geography imposes a fundamental strategic vulnerability long diagnosed as the "Malacca Dilemma." Over 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports transit the narrow Malacca Strait, creating a systemic exposure to potential naval blockades or interdiction by adversary powers in times of conflict.

​To hedge against this structural vulnerability, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone an unprecedented transformation from a green-water coastal defense force into a formidable blue-water expeditionary navy. Crucially, Beijing’s naval expansion is not merely quantitative; it relies on a sophisticated dual-use infrastructure strategy aimed at establishing operational footholds across the IOR. By commercializing port development under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has positioned itself to project sustained naval power along South Asian sea routes. This architectural shift profoundly challenges the regional security equilibrium, placing South Asian maritime nations—particularly Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives—at the center of an escalating great-power competition between Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington.

The strategic geography of the IOR further amplifies this friction. Unlike the open waters of the Pacific, the Indian Ocean is an enclosed maritime domain reliant on precise entry and exit passages. For China, securing these waters is not merely about defensive hedging; it is integral to sustaining its economic engine and advancing its aspirations as a global maritime power. Consequently, Beijing’s strategy aims to shorten supply lines, reduce reliance on vulnerable choke points, and establish an operational footprint that allows the PLAN to maintain a continuous, credible presence in waters traditionally dominated by the Indian Navy and Western forces.

PLAN Expansion and the Dual-Use Strategy: Hambantota and Gwadar

The maritime influence of Beijing within the Indian Ocean Rim is based on an infrastructure plan that prioritizes the commercial domain while maintaining a capacity for military use. Instead of using conventional military installations that would attract political opposition and diplomatic complications, China has financed and constructed large commercial ports that can be converted into logistical bases for its navy. The main points of operation for this tactic in South Asia are represented by the Gwadar and Hambantota seaports.

Gwadar, as the endpoint of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), enables Beijing to avoid delays at the Malacca Strait and gain direct access to the Arabian Sea. Although meant for commercial traffic, Gwadar’s strategic significance comes from its proximity to the Hormuz Strait. The port grants the PLAN a strategic site that is suited for setting up intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) facilities, so that it could track the movements of Western vessels and serve to re-supply the PLAN forces deployed in the region. The port’s characteristics allow for positioning various ships at Gwadar, including submarines.

In the same way, the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka illustrates the point concerning the issue of commercial debt exposure providing a possibility of lengthening one’s leverage. The port became a symbol of the global conversations about dual-use infrastructure after a 99-year leasing agreement concluded by Sri Lanka in 2017 with the China Merchants Port Holdings. Hambantota is located very close to the main East-West shipping routes. In general, the port possesses all necessary infrastructure for bunkering, repair, docking, etc. Although Colombo is enforcing strict rules of sovereignty and forbidding the establishment of foreign military bases, the presence of Chinese high-tech vessels engaged in hydrographic surveying, as well as the Yuan Wang series vessels proves that commercial infrastructures are used for military intelligence purposes under the cover of scientific practice.

Maritime Vulnerabilities: SLOC Security and Submarine Power Projection

The operational reach of the PLAN in South Asia encompasses more than just its fixed port assets; it extends to include significant underwater capabilities. The operation of PLAN conventional and nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean—first explained as part of anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden—has now become a regular routine. There are two purposes of this deployment: analysis of hydrogen layers of the sea for the sake of effective anti-submarine warfare strategy and demonstration of deterrence to the regional naval forces, especially to India.

For littoral nations of South Asia, this growing presence has an impact on the security architecture related to the safeguarding of SLOCs. Small and medium maritime nations utilize the unimpeded approaches to the sea for their economic viability, continuing supply of energy sources, and shipping. However, the militarization of regional choke points can convert peaceful transit areas into a battleground during conflicts.

This dual-use strategy compresses the reaction time of South Asian navies and complicates regional maritime domain awareness (MDA). When survey vessels map the ocean floor off the coasts of the Maldives or Sri Lanka, they gather bathymetric data crucial for submarine operations and mine warfare. Consequently, South Asian maritime states are increasingly forced to manage the security risks associated with hosting foreign naval infrastructure while preserving their national sovereignty.

Regional Response Mechanisms and "Strategic Autonomy"

​Faced with rising Sino-American rivalries and intense Sino-Indian competition, South Asian maritime states are resisting exclusive alignment with any single great power. Instead, they are exercising a refined policy of strategic autonomy, hedging through multi-alignment and regional security cooperation.

Smaller littoral states are utilizing minilateral arrangements to strengthen their naval capabilities without entering into formal alliances. The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC)—formed by India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Bangladesh—provides the main mechanism for maritime safety as well as anti-piracy and anti-terrorist measures. Active participation in joint MDA projects like India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) allows smaller nations to increase their surveillance capabilities while remaining transparent in administrative matters.

In order to reduce dependence on Chinese investments, coastal nations are exploring various sources of overseas direct investment. For instance, Bangladesh succeeded in maintaining a balance of Chinese investments in Chittagong by entrusting the realization of the deep-water port project in Matarbari to Japanese investors (JICA). The same approach is observed in Sri Lanka, which has been attracting the investment of Indian and Japanese partners to develop the West Container Terminal of Colombo Port in order to reduce the influence of China in Hambantota.

Secondary powers are upgrading their own naval platforms to maintain credible domain awareness. The Bangladesh Navy's acquisition of submarines and frigates, along with Sri Lanka's expanded coast guard patrols, reflect an intent to enforce territorial sea sovereignty and prevent foreign forces from conducting unchecked intelligence gathering inside their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Policy Framework for Sustainable Maritime Governance

​To preserve regional stability, prevent the weaponization of commercial port infrastructure, and secure critical sea lines of communication without provoking systemic militarization, South Asian maritime states and regional stakeholders must execute targeted policy interventions. First, regional governments must move toward standardizing dual-use regulatory port codes by establishing transparent protocols for foreign naval vessel visits, deep-sea hydrographic surveys, and commercial port infrastructure leases. Specifying clear boundaries between permissible scientific oceanography and unauthorized military intelligence collection will provide small states with normative legal leverage to withstand foreign diplomatic pressure.

At the same time, enhancing the maritime domain awareness through the minilateral capacities is crucial for the clarity of operations. The wider functionality of arrangements such as the Colombo Security Conclave is going to democratize the usage of ocean monitoring systems in South Asia, meaning that such systems as the Automatic Identification System, radar systems, or satellite monitoring systems provide access to all coast countries to experience the live maritime traffic. Such information sharing would create a situation in which all countries would be provided with the same information and it would reduce the operational blind spots that sometimes enable non-flagged reconnaissance vessels or any other assets to perform their activities freely in the Exclusive Economic Zones of other nations.

The problem of structural debt is solved through the implementation of new infrastructure financing mechanisms by multilateral institutions and democratic minilateral formations. Various initiatives of the Asian Development Bank in cooperation with Quad's infrastructure funds will have to be launched in order to create transparent and commercially viable port financing mechanisms that will prevent nearby countries from having to enter into risky single-source debt arrangements and losing sovereign authority over strategic coastal assets.

Finally, South Asian maritime diplomacy must take the lead in establishing a multilateral Code of Conduct for Indian Ocean choke points under the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Developing a clear regional consensus specifically intended to ensure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, and Bab-el-Mandeb eliminates unilateral use of naval power and substitutes it with collectively agreed-upon norms.

Strategic Outlook: Navigating the Future of Indian Ocean Security

The long-term future of security in the Indian Ocean will rely on the capability of the littoral states of South Asia to effectively manage the demands of security alongside the need for investment in a way that allows the two to co-exist. The People’s Liberation Army Navy of China transforms into a complete two-ocean navy, operating in the Indian Ocean and continuously monitoring the central portion of the Indian Ocean. The difficulty for small and medium states will not be in reversing this situation but finding a way to live with it.

​In this regard, strategic resilience means not just military protection. It involves economic independence and clear rules of regulations and fairly flexible institutions in place. The countries, which have established good regulatory control over maritime assets, diversified diplomacy, and a successful contribution to a transparent regional awareness will be better equipped to face the challenges of great-power competition while keeping their sovereignty intact.

For major regional and extra-regional powers—including India, the United States, Japan, and Australia—the key to supporting stability lies in offering constructive partnerships rather than demanding binary political alignments. Providing accessible infrastructure financing, technical assistance for maritime law enforcement, and shared real-time domain intelligence enables South Asian states to maintain an open, rules-based Indian Ocean. By prioritizing multilateral governance, transparent investment, and law-based maritime norms, the region can ensure that its vital chokepoints remain conduits for global trade rather than flashpoints for international conflict.

Conclusion

China's naval modernization and expansion into the Indian Ocean signify a major reconfiguration of South Asia's maritime architecture. Through the utilization of dual-use infrastructure at sites like Gwadar and Hambantota, China has established an operational presence that undermines previous regional dynamics. However, it's important to note that the states of South Asia are not mere animals in this game. They are adopting strategies such as hedging, forming minilateral security arrangements, and diversifying their infrastructure, thereby making efforts to strengthen their resilience strategies.