The Indo-Pacific has become the principal arena in which economic security, military power, and political norms intersect. No longer defined simply by maritime geography, it now serves as a stress test for the credibility of the so-called rules-based international order. It is against this backdrop that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s January visit to India should be assessed-not merely as a bilateral engagement, but as an illustration of how middle powers are responding to strategic competition while quietly relaxing normative consistency.

For Germany, the Indo-Pacific turn reflects growing unease. Trade fragmentation, supply-chain exposure, China’s expanding leverage, and uncertainty surrounding US economic and security commitments have pushed Berlin to diversify partnerships beyond the transatlantic sphere. India-large, fast-growing, strategically positioned, and politically non-aligned-has become central to this recalibration. Merz’s visit, his first to Asia since taking office, signalled Germany’s intent to embed India more firmly within its Indo-Pacific strategy through defence cooperation, technology partnerships, and supply-chain resilience. The visit marked a trade milestone, with Modi noting bilateral commerce exceeded $50 billion.

For India, however, the engagement fits into a longer-established pattern: capitalizing on geopolitical demand while preserving maximum strategic autonomy.

Strategic alignment without strategic discipline

During the visit, India secured expanded defence-industrial cooperation, technology transfer commitments, and deeper collaboration on semiconductors and critical minerals, alongside strong political signalling ahead of the EU-India summit and ongoing free trade negotiations. Germany framed these steps as mutually reinforcing-strengthening European economic resilience while helping India reduce reliance on Russian military hardware.

The reality is more qualified. India continues to operate Russian-origin platforms at scale, import discounted Russian energy, and remain outside Western sanctions frameworks. Diversification has been tactical rather than transformational, designed to broaden options rather than replace dependencies. Berlin seems to tolerate this ambiguity, prioritising access and long-term positioning over alignment.

Such flexibility is rarely afforded to smaller states. India’s strategic weight and Indo-Pacific utility have effectively insulated it from the conditionality that often accompanies Western partnerships.

Defence cooperation and asymmetric dependence

Defence-industrial cooperation lies at the heart of the Indo-German relationship and reveals its asymmetry. Negotiations over submarine construction involving Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and India’s Mazagon Dock, alongside collaboration on UAVs, counter-drone systems, and advanced platforms, promise India sustained access to high-end dual-use technologies.

For New Delhi, this partnership aligns with its Atmanirbhar Bharat vision-boosting its domestic manufacturing, accelerating technology absorption, and reinforcing strategic autonomy. For Germany, the gains are narrower-commercial access and a foothold in Indo-Pacific security networks.

The imbalance lies in leverage. German firms commit capital and intellectual property within procurement frameworks that privilege local control, export discretion, and long project horizons. Once embedded, such arrangements are costly to unwind. India accumulates options; Germany accumulates exposure.

This is not exploitation, but it is deliberate strategic bargaining-and India has become adept at it.

Democracy as strategic credential

The normative dimension of the partnership is more consequential. Both leaders invoked shared democratic values and commitment to a rules-based order. Yet Germany’s public reticence regarding India’s internal trajectory-shrinking civic space, media constraints, minority treatment, and the prolonged securitisation of Kashmir stands in contrast to its posture elsewhere.

India has successfully reframed scrutiny as interference and dissent as extremism, a language increasingly reflected in counter-terrorism cooperation. By positioning itself as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi has reduced external willingness to apply pressure over democratic backsliding.

Germany’s restraint reinforces this insulation. For much of the Global South, the message is familiar: norms are applied unevenly, according to strategic weight.

Indo-Pacific presence, selective rules

Berlin’s expanding Indo-Pacific footprint naval deployments, joint exercises, and participation in regional security forums signals genuine engagement. Yet its embrace of India exposes a deeper inconsistency. Germany champions freedom of navigation and international law while overlooking regional coercive practices that do not directly impinge on European interests.

India’s assertive posture toward neighbours, resistance to third-party mediation, and selective interpretation of international norms sit uneasily with the principles Germany promotes elsewhere. The partnership may enhance stability, but on terms shaped more by power than universality.

The strategic trade-off

None of this negates the logic of engagement. India matters, and Europe cannot afford strategic absence in the Indo-Pacific. The partnership delivers tangible benefits: supply-chain diversification, defence interoperability, climate cooperation, and economic opportunity. Germany’s Green and Sustainable Development Partnership, alongside cooperation on renewable energy and hydrogen, underscores that shared interests extend well beyond security.

The risk lies in imbalance without accountability. By normalising selective adherence to norms, Germany weakens the credibility of the order it seeks to uphold and limits its influence over a partner that prioritises autonomy over alignment.

A partnership at a crossroads

India has played its hand skillfully securing technology, legitimacy, and access while retaining freedom of maneuver across sanctions, energy, and regional policy. Germany, confronting global uncertainty, has opted for pragmatism over pressure.

Whether this partnership evolves into a genuinely stabilising force in the Indo-Pacific will depend on Berlin’s willingness to pair engagement with consistency. Strategic partnerships need not demand uniformity. But without clearer expectations, they risk reinforcing a system in which power, rather than principle, sets the rules.

For Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the test is not whether it can engage India but whether it can do so without eroding the very norms it claims are under strain.