Definitely not. This question is answered in the context of the efforts of the disgraced Sheikh Hasina administration to implicate former President Ziaur Rahman in the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

But before we go into the details, let’s first discuss the roles of a few “darlings” of the Hasina regime to comprehend the issue.

  1. Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf:

He was an angel to the Awami League (AL)! For his role in the November 3, 1975 counter-coup (in an attempt to overturn the success and gains of August 15), the jubilant AL distributed sweets in his name! Khaled’s brother Rashed Mosharraf was made a state minister by Hasina. His Daughter Mehjabeen was awarded a charity membership in the Parliament (from the women quota).

Khaled was Mujib appointed Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the most important and powerful of the army’s Principal Staff Officers. He controlled the tanks, artillery guns, their ammunition and movements. He was also responsible for military operations, including night exercises. Khaled was a bright and capable officer.

Khaled’s nephew was Major Farooq Rahman, one of the top leaders of the August 15 Coup. Farooq and Major Khandakar Abdur Rashid became brothers-in-law by marrying two sisters.

Reportedly, Farooq committed a number of disciplinary offences, some of which were serious enough for dismissal from service, but uncle Khaled saved him each time. In mid-March 1975, six tanks were to go to Hathazari, Chittagong, for a live firing exercise. Farooq was responsible for overseeing the tanks loaded in the train. But he had another idea. At midnight, he went to the residence of fellow tank officer Major Nasir and proposed to oust Mujib with his tank regiment. The unit had many freedom fighters who would obey Nasir, also a freedom fighter. Nasir refused and immediately informed Khaled Mosharraf in Farooq’s presence. Khaled talked with his nephew and desisted him from such an act in future (Ref: Book of Nasir Uddin, pp 58-59).

Farooq’s intention to stage a coup with his tanks and his other disciplinary lapses were known to senior officers, but no action could be taken against him because of Khaled. With Khaled’s blessings, Farooq continued to serve the Tank Regiment as its Second-in-Command.

Yet, Khaled could not be blamed! All blame must go to Zia!

Second Field Regiment Artillery of Dhaka’s 46 Independent Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Hossain. He was sent on deputations to the Military Wing of the President’s Secretariat. Major Khandakar Abdur Rashid, the Second-in-Command, took over the command of the artillery unit. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Momen, the Commanding Officer of the Tank Regiment (which was under Khaled’s direct control), was sent on vacation prior to August 14, 1975. Consequently, nephew Farooq got the command of the tanks. On the night of August 14, Farooq and Rashid grouped their troops with tanks (without shells) and Artillery guns at the Lancer’s unit at the northern fringe of the abandoned Kurmitola airport under the pretext of joint night exercise for which prior permission was given by Khaled. They soon moved to 32 Dhanmondi and other operational targets (Ref: Abu Sayeed, p 122).

Who helped in all these arrangements? Khaled Mosharraf!

Ziaur Rahman was then the powerless Deputy Chief (Ref: Hamid, p 24). Yet, all blame must be assigned to Zia!

Army Chief Major General KM Safiullah, Khaled or 46 Brigade Commander Colonel Shafaat Jamil could have arrested Farooq-Rashid and others. They did not. To the contrary, Khaled urgently arranged to provide the shells for tanks by noon of August 15.

Even so, Khaled was innocent! It was all Zia’s fault!  

 People in the Loop of August 15 Revolution

After the success of the coup on August 15, CGS, Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf called in his office Anwarul Alam Shahid and Sarwar Mollah, Deputy Directors of the Rakkhi Bahini.

“Shahid, Sarwar,” Khaled said, “I know you are patriots, but we had to do it, because we don’t want this country to be a kingdom.” (Ref: Anwarul Alam, Rakkhi Bahinir Sotto Mithya, p 148). After this, is there any doubt about Khaled’s position on August 15?

After the coup, when Safiullah asked Khaled to do something (a proforma act), Khaled replied that Mujib was dead, “and the whole military is celebrating.”

Yet, Khaled is a saint, a Peer Saheb, to the AL!

2.Major General K M Safiullah: 

Major General KM Safiullah

Sheikh Mujib made Safiullah the Army Chief superseding his senior Major General Ziaur Rahman. On the night of August 14, around 2:30 am (August 15), he learned of the movement of tanks and troops towards the residence of Sheikh Mujib. He did nothing to counter it, even though he had two and a half hours at hand. On the other hand, when Sheikh Mujib phoned him (telling him of the attack at his residence), Safiullah advised him to flee the house (by scaling the back wall)!

Later, coup leader Abdur Rashid told in an interview that as per plan, Rakkhi Bahini Chief Brigadier Nuruzzaman was sent to the US at that time. Nuruzzam’s overseas trip must have gone through Mujib, Tofael, Safiullah and Khaled.

Director-General of the Forces Intelligence (DGFI) Brigadier Abdul Rouf had

returned from a US trip a few days ago. According to the testimony of the wife of Colonel Jamil, Mujib’s Security Chief, upon learning of the tank movements, Rouf immediately informed Safiullah around 2:30 am (August 15). Around the same time, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Colonel A T Salahuddin also informed Safiullah about the same. Sheikh Mujib phoned Jamil in the early hours of August 15 when his house was attacked, and Jamil immediately informed the Army Chief. Safiullah had more than two hours at hand but did nothing to save Sheikh Mujib!

Yet, Sheikh Hasina exonerated him and made him the Chairman of a Parliamentary Committee.

Hasina’s cousin Sheikh Selim insisted that Safiullah was involved in the coup and he should also be tried. Safiullah and the people around him knew that a coup against Sheikh Mujib was in the making. Whatever the Army Chief subsequently says to the contrary about the coup, could there be any difficulty in assuming that he was involved in it?  (Ref: Abu Sayeed).

  1. Colonel Shafaat Jamil.

Colonel Shafaat Jamil was the Commander of Dhaka’s Independent 46 Brigade. Colonel M A Hamid, then Dhaka’s Station Commander, a course mate of Zia and Safiullah, repeatedly pointed out in his writings that Shafaat Jamil and Army Chief Safiullah were involved in the August 15 coup, even if indirectly. Major Rashid’s 2 Field Artillery was under Shafaat’s 46 Brigade; as such, the Commander was in the loop, Hamid asserted.

In their plan, Majors Farooq and Rashid took care to prevent a possible counter-attack by a weaker (commander less) Rakkhi Bahini, but made no arrangement to contain the 4000-troop strong powerful Dhaka Brigade.

“He (Shafaat Jamil) is our man,” Rashid gave the reason. “We did not expect any opposition from him. Shafaat and all his officers knew about the coup.”

Also, how dare Major Farooq’s tanks roared through the 46 Brigade, just behind Shafaat’s residence, instead of taking the (safe) Banani Road? Clearly, Rashid-Farooq had a prior agreement (with Shafaat). On the other hand, after the fall of Sheikh Mujib, Major Rashid was said to be the first officer to report to Shafaat at his Brigade Headquarters.

“Sir, Sheikh is no more,” said Rashid after presenting a smart salute (Ref: Hamid, p 60).

Colonel Hamid added that almost all officers of the Brigade were present at the time. Everybody was happy and celebrating in the presence of the Commander, as if the Brigade had just made a big conquest!

“Shafaat shook my hand firmly and said, ‘Seen, sir? Freedom fighters did it before. They did it again.’” He had the radiance of a victor!

  1. A H M Qamaruzzaman:

Sheikh Mujib’s Home Minister. On the night of August 14, 1975, the routine musical session was in high pitch at the official residence of A H M Qamaruzzaman. Suddenly, Major Dalim burst in and said to the minister, “I need to talk to you urgently.” The two knew each other from Mujibnagar.

“Forget about your urgent talks,” retorted an annoyed minister. “Come in the morning.”

A disappointed Dalim stormed out the way he came and went to Balughat (northern edge of the Cantonment) to meet Farooq-Rashid.  The question is, what did Dalim want to tell the Home Minister just before the coup? Does it mean Qamaruzzaman was also in the loop about the coup against Sheikh Mujib?

  1. 5. Syed Nazrul Islam:

Then Vice President Syed Nazrul Islam knew there was likely to be an operation to remove Sheikh Mujib (Nazrul learned it from another minister, Professor Yusuf Ali. Ref: Sayeed p 114). Even Sheikh Mujib himself knew it. On August 14 night, Mujib told Syed Nazrul Islam that as a security precaution, the President and the Vice President together needed not go to Dhaka University the next day. As such, everybody seemed to know something was going to happen.

  1. Tofael Ahmed:

Tofael Ahmed, President’s Special Assistant, was awakened on the night of August 14. He learned of the coup and that Mujib’s House was attacked. Sheikh Selim informed him that Sheikh Moni was killed. Immediately afterwards, Sheikh Mujib also called Tofael to tell that his house was attacked and he should do something. 3000 soldiers of Rakkhi Bahini were battle ready just five minutes away. A Deputy Leader of the Rakkhi Bahini said that their force could not do anything without an order from Tofael, who later said that such an order (move) would have brought serious consequences to the country, and he alone could not make such an important decision. In fact, upon learning of the coup, Tofael went to the Rakkhi Bahini Headquarters and stayed there. Many observers see a suspicious role of Tofael with his Rakkhi Bahini. (Ref: Sayeed, p 150).

  1. Brigadier Abdur Rouf:  

Inspector-General of Police (IGP) Nurul Islam requested the Army to remove the rumored “JSD (Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal) planted Mines” at Dhaka University. Accordingly, General Safiullah ordered the Engineers Brigade to report to the Suhrawardy Uddyan by midnight (of August 14). Farooq-Rashid moved their tanks to the city a little later. Was it a cover-up camouflaging ploy of Safiullah to deploy a few tanks in the name of tackling JSD, for the next phase of movement? The question also arises, why then did the Army Chief not move the Engineers Brigade or Dhaka’s 4000 troops of 46 Brigade after learning of the attack at the residence of President Mujib?

Curiously, Brigadier Rouf and his wife slipped out of their residence at 3 am (August 15) and hid under the trees in the Cantonment’s Golf Course for safety. At dawn, a lungi-clad Rouf showed himself at the residence of Army Chief by jumping over the wall (Ref: Hamid, p 62). He was the DGFI; he thought of his own safety but why couldn’t he advise the President to move away? Rouf was under direct control of the President.

  1. RAW:

Indian Intelligence Agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) had been getting reports since the end-1974 that Sheikh Mujib could be attacked. A few days before August 15, RAW’s Director Kao, in the guise of a Betel Businessman, met Sheikh Mujib and informed him of an imminent danger to his life. Mujib dismissed the idea. But Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi later said that the US had a hand in the August 15 coup. On the other hand, the US suspected that India knew about the coup in advance.

The Hasina government never tires itself of pinning Ziaur Rahman in the Mujib killing. It lured convicted “killer” (of Mujib) Captain Majed in return for his clemency to implicate Zia in the coup. After obtaining the interview, Majed was led to the gallows. The false interview was taken inside the Jail House, an illegal act and a criminal offence.

Based on the so-called “revelation” of Captain Majed, Hasina and her Awami League continue to claim that General Zia knew everything. What did he know? He knew that something was going to happen!  Safiullah revealed in an interview that senior officials of the Army knew of the coup– not only Ziaur Rahman, it was known to Khaled Mosharraf and Shafaat Jamil too.

“When Khaled Mosharraf felt that the plan was about to succeed, he patronized them (the Coup Plotters),” said Safiullah.

In fact, in 1975, almost everyone in the cantonment had the knowledge that Mujib would be ousted– from Army Chief Safiullah to Ziaur Rahman to Khaled Mosharraf to Shafaat Jamil. The news/rumor reached Sheikh Mujib too.

Altaf Parvez wrote in his book Osomapto Mukti Juddho, Colonel Taher O Jashod’s Rajneeti (Incomplete Independence, Colonel Taher and JSD’s Politics, page 82): “10 days before August 15, General Zia gave advance information to Sheikh Mujib about a possible military coup.” The Far Eastern Economic Review wrote on August 29 (1975) that Ziaur Rahman had met Sheikh Mujib 10 days before the coup and informed him of the growing disenchantment within the Army, and it had become difficult to maintain discipline. He requested Mujib to take urgent steps to curb smuggling, inflation and corruption so that restoration of military discipline became easier. Whereas, when Sheikh Mujib wanted to confirm the facts from Safiullah, the Army Chief assured Mujib that the army was okay; no problem!!! The coup took place within a few days, on August 15.

Conclusion 

That August 15 Coup was to take place was known to Sheikh Mujib and others; the entire military was involved in it; the whole country celebrated the event. Yet the AL felt comfortable and delighted to point fingers at Ziaur Rahman only for political benefits.

In another sense, nothing to be unhappy about (Blaming Zia). Rather, if Zia was involved in the August 15 Coup, it was a matter of great pride. Because it (August 15) was the Second Liberation for Bangladesh. It should have been a matter of pride! But the fact is Zia was not in it, even though he, like most others, had moral support for it.

August Coup, Ziaur Rahman’s Involvement and Comments

Major General Ziaur Rahman

In the face of Pakistan military’s brutal attack on the night of March 25, most political leaders and activists, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, ran for life or surrendered. But thousands of innocent and defenseless Bengalis got massacred. Bengali elements in the military, police and Rifles were also attacked. They had earlier been disarmed and now faced bullets. That included 8 Bengal Regiment in Chittagong.

At that crucial juncture, Major Ziaur Rahman of 8 Bengal made a daring but risky initiative. He declared the Independence of Bangladesh from Kalurghat Radio Station. Upon hearing it, people from all walks of life immediately joined to fight for liberation. After spilling a sea of blood for nine months, they liberated the land. Bangladesh became independent.

Subsequently, people made Zia the President of the country; his administration was the best so far. This rare credit of Zia could not be tolerated by the Mujib family and its followers. They spared no opportunity to defame Zia and destroy his legacy and his family. The people of the country know the details. As such, on the occasion of the so-called “Mujib Borso” and on Mujib’s death anniversary, the Awamis cannot rest in peace without slandering Zia a dozen times on each occasion.

During the Sipahi-Jonota Revolution in 1975, Taher’s forces killed about two dozen army officers, including Khaled Mosharraf and his cohorts. After the airmen’s rebellion and killing of officers in 1977, the trial was held under the military rules. It was the demand of the entire military at the time. Zia had nothing to do with the death and other penalties awarded by the court. He followed military procedures and brought discipline in the forces.

Sometime back, I wrote the following in an online forum, which may be of interest on in this context:

I cannot claim to be an authority on August 15, but know some inside facts. According to Colonel Shafaat Jamil, Commander of Dhaka’s 46 Brigade, on August 15, 1975, immediately after the success of the coup on August 15, 1975, some of the coup leaders (I believe they were Lt Col Amin Ahmed Chowdhury and Major Dalim) went to General Ziaur Rahman requesting him to take over. Zia declined.  

“If the President is dead, there is a Vice-President,” retorted the Deputy Army Chief, who was shaving at the time and still had foam on his face. “Why have you come to me? The constitution must be upheld.”  

This has been corroborated by many authors/analysts. I understand Col Amin Chowdhury was to be a part of the coup, but failed to join in the mission with his 16 Bengal from Joydevpur. However, he continued to remain with the coup leaders for some time. So, I don’t find any clue of Zia’s involvement in the August 15 coup. As a loyal officer, he had joined the BAKSAL with other senior officers when asked to do so. 

It is unfortunate, however, that Sheikh Mujib and most of his family members died or became circumstantial victims on the day.     

Again, those who lived in Bangladesh in 1975 will bear it out that the rumors of a possible coup or a military showdown was in the air since the Fourth Amendment, and became intense after the formation of the BAKSAL early in the year. I believe even Sheikh Mujib was warned about it by Indian intelligence. But Mujib was so bloated with power and pride he thought he was invincible.  

Senior military officers, including Safiullah, Zia, Khaled Mosharraf and Shafaat Jamil were not immune to those rumors. They might even know of some suspicious developments among various military groups. But, what could they do? First, there was no concrete proof to take counter-action. Second, knowing the writings in the wall, as well as the mood in the military, they perhaps desired the change too. (While explaining his failure to prevent the August 15, Safiullah admitted to the Daily Star that he found the entire army supportive of the coup). Third, senior officers rarely take risks (because they already enjoy great perks) for any history making event. Many of them might have thought: if the juniors succeed, we will join them. If not, let them face the music!     

I am not aware of Khaled’s prior involvement with the group until about August15. The story does not seem to hold good. But I heard Khaled was the first senior officer to react positively after the coup. The moment he learnt that the main guns of the tanks did not have ammunition, he, as the Chief of the General Staff, immediately ordered the release of shells. After the coup, he tried to befriend the coup leaders for a leadership role but failed. When he learnt that he in fact topped the list of about two dozen officers to be purged, he staged his conspiratorial putsch on November 3, 1975, only to fail in four days.  

A question: August 15 enjoyed the backing of the entire military and the whole nation. Within hours, Chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force, BDR, Police, Rakkhi Bahini and Ansar rushed to new President Mushtaque Ahmed to announce their loyalty and complete support for the coup. Their announcements of support were broadcast in the national hookup the same morning and heard by all. Why then punish only those who made the much desired and nationally hailed coup possible? Why not those chiefs, the entire military, and the whole nation (tried)?

Again, this is in regard to blaming Ziaur Rahman for providing diplomatic assignments to the coup leaders.

Those who lived in Bangladesh in those days will agree that offering (minor and insignificant) diplomatic assignments to some of the coup leaders was the minimum the administration of President Ziaur Rahman could do to the heralded Surjo Sontans who saved the nation from the destruction of BAKSAL dictatorship.  Army Chief General Safiullah was said to have proposed to the President (Mushtaque) to promote all those Majors to Brigadiers, which the coup leaders declined. An insider told me that during Zia’s time, the Gradation List of Seniority in the Foreign Office, and consequently the promotion, of those officers were viciously held up by the ministry for six years on various pretexts. It was President Ershad, not Ziaur Rahman, who finally regularized their services in 1982.