Sikyong Dr Lobsang Sangay apprising His Holiness of the newly built and renovated buildings of CTA. Photo/Tenzin Jigme/CTA.Sikyong Dr Lobsang Sangay apprising His Holiness of the newly built and renovated buildings of CTA. Photo/Tenzin Jigme/CTA.

by Ghulam Suhrawardi

“Where ignorance is our master, there is no possibility of real peace.” – The 14th Dalai Lama

On the occasion of his 90th birthday, the 14th Dalai Lama reaffirmed his long-held position that the reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama will be decided by the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala, India. The process will be managed by the Dalai Lama Trust, based in the same town. India’s Union Cabinet Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Minority Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, quickly endorsed the announcement, stating unequivocally that the Dalai Lama, as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, holds the sole authority to decide his successor. India, while supportive of the spiritual process, officially distanced itself from political involvement, emphasizing that the matter is spiritual and internal to the Tibetan people.

China’s reaction was predictably swift and severe. Chinese authorities reiterated their long-standing position that Beijing alone will determine the next Dalai Lama, thereby asserting their political control over the institution and, by extension, over Tibet itself. For China, the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is not merely a religious matter but a critical tool for consolidating authority over what it regards as an integral part of its territory.

The 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet in 1959 following a failed uprising against Chinese rule, first took refuge in Tezpur, India, before settling in Mussoorie and later Dharamsala in 1960. That same year, he established the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, and assumed the dual role of spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama’s core belief was that Tibet’s downfall stemmed from its isolation from the world and the lack of international support. Determined to change this, he launched a global diplomatic campaign to connect Tibet with Western capitals, especially Washington and Brussels.

In 1988, speaking before the European Parliament, the Dalai Lama proposed a “Middle Way” approach: Tibet would not seek independence but instead request genuine autonomy within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. However, this was unacceptable to Beijing. The Dalai Lama’s vision of Tibet included the three historical provinces of U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo. Unfortunately, much of Kham and Amdo had already been absorbed into neighboring Chinese provinces, leaving only U-Tsang—which became the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965—as the official remnant of Tibet.

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The Dalai Lama’s expectations that the United States and Europe would pressure China proved overly optimistic. Despite international sympathy, geopolitical calculations and economic interests curtailed meaningful intervention.

In 2011, the Dalai Lama renounced his political role, and the CTA transitioned to an elected democratic leadership. Lobsang Sangay, a Harvard-educated legal scholar, became the first Sikyong (Prime Minister) of the CTA. He continued the global advocacy for Tibetan rights, exposing human rights violations and cultural suppression under Chinese rule. He was succeeded by Penpa Tsering, the current Sikyong. Under their leadership, the CTA has grown in global presence, establishing offices in over 25 countries—including 10 within India—and staffing approximately 600 civil servants.

However, the exile community now faces a generational challenge. As Tibetan refugees grow more integrated into host societies, their ties to Tibet weaken. Despite calls for Indian and American governments to pressure China into negotiations, both nations have adopted a cautious, calculated approach—balancing diplomatic sensitivities and national interests.

The Strategic “Tibet Card” in India-China Relations

Tibet has long been a sensitive flashpoint in India-China relations, dating back to the Simla Agreement of 1914. During this British-brokered agreement, Sir Henry McMahon drew a line dividing “Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet,” creating what is now known as the McMahon Line. While the Tibetan and British representatives signed the map, the Chinese representative merely initialed and never ratified the agreement. China has refused to recognize the McMahon Line ever since.

Post-independence, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recognized the strategic value of the Tibet issue. In 1972, she converted the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)—a disputed region of about 90,000 square kilometers—into the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. This move was a calculated assertion of Indian sovereignty. In 1980, India launched “Operation Falcon,” a military strategy to strengthen border infrastructure and communication systems along the Chinese frontier. For Indira Gandhi, this was India’s “Tibet Card”: an assertion of strategic strength.

When Rajiv Gandhi assumed office, he upgraded Arunachal Pradesh to full statehood in 1987. However, his successors—Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee—took steps that effectively weakened India’s position. During Rao’s 1993 visit to China, India formally referred to the McMahon Line as the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC), effectively signaling appeasement. This emboldened China. In 2003, during Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing, India formally recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China in return for an informal verbal assurance that China would recognize Sikkim as part of India—a promise never fulfilled.

Following this, China began referring to Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” and, since 2009, has ramped up efforts to assert its claim. In 2015, China restructured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), creating the Western Theater Command, covering Tibet and Xinjiang, with a singular focus on India. China’s military strategy has included legal warfare—renaming Arunachal Pradesh locations with Mandarin terms to assert historical claims.

By 2024, China publicly declared that the LAC is no longer a matter of dispute but of sovereignty—claiming Arunachal Pradesh as integral to China. Thus, China’s “One China” policy, while presented to the West as including Taiwan, is presented to India as including “Southern Tibet,” i.e., Arunachal Pradesh.

A Future of Two Dalai Lamas?

With the current Dalai Lama aging, the posthumous power struggle looms. China is expected to appoint its own Dalai Lama, most likely a child selected and controlled by Beijing. Conversely, the Dalai Lama Trust will recognize a reincarnation under the traditional Tibetan method. This will result in two competing Dalai Lamas—one backed by China, and another by the exile community.

In the aftermath, Beijing may pressure India to shut down the CTA and strip Tibetan refugees of political agency. China will demand recognition of its chosen Dalai Lama and attempt to eliminate the Dharamsala-based leadership.

India now faces a strategic conundrum. Tibet remains the only unresolved territorial issue that could potentially lead to armed conflict with China. A full-scale war would likely be disastrous. Chinese military capacity has advanced significantly since 2015. The PLA is prepared for “joint integrated operations” across five domains: physical, virtual, informational, mission-specific, and psychological warfare. It is believed that the Chinese military, with its Beidou satellite system and air dominance, could overwhelm Indian defenses.

The strategic imbalance is stark, and Indian defense experts acknowledge that in the event of war, India could face devastating losses.

Conclusion

Tibet remains not only a spiritual and cultural issue but a geopolitical powder keg. The Dalai Lama’s passing will trigger a contest not just of theology but of global diplomacy and hard power. How India navigates the Tibetan question—balancing its moral obligations, strategic interests, and military realities—will shape the future of its relationship with China, and perhaps the future of Asia.