As Bangladesh edges toward its next parliamentary election, its political terrain is being dramatically rearranged. Three principal forces — the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP) — are preparing to enter the fray under the banners of three competing alliances, each hoping to shape the post-Awami League order.

At the same time, a coalition under the banner of Jatiya Party, a fascist accomplice, has also emerged. There is a growing sense that multiple alliances will field candidates in the upcoming polls. None can doubt that the impetus behind these coalitions is the vacuum created by the retreat of the ruling Awami League. Yet in recent months, several electoral surveys have suggested that public backing for the Awami League has crept up to about ten per cent.

During its time in power, even when the Jatiya Party was fielded as a token opponent, only five to eight per cent of voters turned up for the contest. Hence it seems quite plausible that the Awami League’s own vote-base remains around the ten-per-cent mark. For that reason, it would be unrealistic to expect that the new coalition led by the Jatiya Party could exert a major influence on the elections.

After the fall and flight of Sheikh Hasina, intellectuals aligned with the Awami League donned the mask of neutrality and tried to argue that the absence of the Awami League from politics would leave a void. These pro-Delhi thinkers and propagandists contended that an “inclusive” election must allow the return of the “genocidal” Awami League. Yet even before the election schedule has been announced, we can already discern the emergence of multiple political blocs — a strong indication of a broadly competitive contest. The dominant political forces in the country now appear to be the nationalist BNP and the Jamaat-e Islami.

When reports first began to emerge from the field ahead of the elections, there were many accounts of direct competition between BNP and Jamaat candidates. At that time, left-leaning intellectuals allied with BNP criticised those newspapers on social media, accusing it of diminishing BNP by equating it with Jamaat. Their objection was that these newspapers were, in comparing a major party like BNP with Jamaat, effectively belittling BNP. But the reality is that after the fall of the Awami League, Jamaat has gradually emerged as BNP’s main competitor. In the early stages, BNP paid little heed to this development. Some newspapers merely presented the on-the-ground picture objectively. The advice of BNP’s left-leaning intellectuals was that the party’s main opponent would be the Jatiya Party — not Jamaat.

Now, however, a third-way political force — the NCP — is attempting to assert itself. In various surveys, the NCP is placed right after BNP and Jamaat. We may have to wait a few more days to see whether the NCP coalition will strike any accommodation with one of the two major blocs.

Pressured by the prospect of a fiercely contested election, there are signs of significant changes in the political philosophies and campaigning styles of the two main parties. BNP has long defined itself as a nationalist party rooted in Islamic values. During the era of Ziaur Rahman, the constitution was amended to affirm that full trust in Almighty Allah would underpin all state affairs. Secularism was discarded. The opening phrase of the Quran — “Bismillahir-Rahmanir-Rahim” — was inserted into the constitution, foregrounding the Islamic identity of the nation. In much the same vein, Khaleda Zia, during her long political struggle, emphasised Islamic values and Muslim identity as a priority.

Ziaur Rahman and Khaleda Zia’s principal allies were small and large Islamist parties. In fact, leaders of the old Muslim League — some of whom had opposed the country’s liberation — played a major role in forming Zia’s party. On the other hand, Ziaur Rahman himself had been a formal announcer of the Liberation War and had served as a sector-commander. His politics was one of reconciliation and unity. Khaleda Zia too, selected Islamist parties like Jamaat as her political partners. She formed a government in 1991 with Jamaat’s support, and in 2001 Jamaat’s amir and secretary-general held influential ministerial posts in her cabinet. Against Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule, Khaleda Zia sought to build a coalition with Jamaat and other Islamist parties.

Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina, BNP seems to be undergoing a major shift in its political stance — a change that actually began even before the 2018 election. That year, under the leadership of former Awami League figure Dr Kamal Hossain, BNP formed an electoral coalition. At the time, Khaleda Zia was behind bars, with little actual role in decision-making. Since then, left-wing leaders within BNP have gradually gained influence. After the collapse of the Awami League, BNP’s left-leaning ideologues attempted to recast the party as a centre-left force. Leaders of the Awami League have habitually claimed that they represent a liberal centre-left tradition — notwithstanding the fascist seeds in their own DNA. Immediately after independence they had — with support from Moscow sympathisers — established a one-party BAKSAL regime.

With an evident political vacuum after the Awami League’s downfall, BNP appears to have opted for a secular middle-of-the-road stance, rather than an explicitly Islamic one. In their view, such a repositioning might attract former Awami League voters to BNP, gradually drawing them in. This, they hope, will help fill the void. Secondly, given that their main rival is an Islamist party like Jamaat, it would be hard to compete in religious influence. Yet adopting a secular and middle-of-the-road identity could improve the party’s acceptability in India and other Western countries. Thus we see BNP emphasising the spirit of the Liberation War — a narrative long advanced by the Awami League — over Islamic tradition; and using the latter to keep pressure on Jamaat through reminders of its wartime position.

BNP’s current posture may delight the urban secular middle class and the small left-leaning circles that orbit it. But the party’s long-standing vote bank—built on an appeal to Islamic values—will turn away from it.

Recent surveys have shown Jamaat’s support climbing as high as 26%. Jamaat secured 12% of the vote in 1991, and in 1996—when it fielded candidates in 300 constituencies—it won roughly 4%. The rise in Jamaat’s support today stems largely from devout, BNP-aligned voters who believe in Islamic values and have begun to abandon the party. As the election draws nearer, this polarisation will only deepen. BNP’s vote bank may fragment further. Yet there remains considerable doubt as to how much BNP’s support can grow, given its newly adopted centre-left and secular character.

While BNP shifts toward secular centre-left politics ahead of the election, Jamaat appears to be trying to woo voters with a more liberal Islamic and nationalist strategy. After 2011, the conditions for Jamaat’s registration at the Election Commission compelled it to amend its constitution. In that process, significant changes were made: the inclusion of increased participation by women, and the inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities in the party’s political process. Jamaat is now harvesting the dividends of those amendments. The party has already nominated a candidate from a minority community, and signals from within the leadership suggest more minority candidates will stand in the election. At the same time, Jamaat’s organisational efforts among women have intensified. Party leaders have expressed hope that female voters — especially in rural and small-town constituencies — will play a decisive role in electing Jamaat candidates.

Jamaat’s leadership has also assured supporters that there will be no compulsion on women to wear hijab or burqa. That, they say, has largely allayed many women’s fears about Islamist politics. In recent campus politics — including elections to student union bodies at universities — many women have joined Jamaat-affiliated panels. Some of them have stood for election without wearing hijab. That push for inclusive candidacy at student elections has helped reassure women voters about Jamaat’s appeal. Additionally, Jamaat has sought to highlight concerns about women’s health and workplace security in its campaign. However, it remains unclear whether Jamaat will field female candidates in the national election. If it does, it may significantly reduce female voters’ apprehension towards the party. Western and European countries that view Jamaat through the lens of liberal inclusive politics may also see this as a positive signal.

This liberal turn in Islamist politics is significantly affecting BNP’s traditional vote-bank. Moreover, Jamaat continues to cling to its long-standing position against Indian dominance — a stance it has maintained for decades. By contrast, BNP seems to have adopted a somewhat more flexible approach on that front. With its centre-left strategy, BNP’s voice is unlikely to be strident; nationalist voters unnerved by anti-Indian rhetoric may now hesitate to back BNP — and Jamaat might try to capitalise on that hesitation.

Yet BNP’s experience in governing the state for extended periods may still influence voter behaviour. The party might successfully convince voters that only it is capable of running the country. Jamaat, on the other hand, lacks significant administrative experience in governance. Among bureaucrats, media, oligarch-businessmen and civil society, there remains fear and suspicion around Jamaat’s political ascent. Whether Jamaat’s leadership can dispel that trepidation is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that BNP is heading toward the kind of secular, centre-left politics once claimed by the Awami League — while Jamaat has adopted a liberal-moral political strategy rooted in Islamic values. The success of the new party NCP will depend on whether it can present itself as a genuine nationalist force grounded in Islamic values — if it is seen instead as a left-influenced party, it may struggle to attract mass support. In any case, the shifts in ideological postures among parties ahead of the election have filled much of the vacuum created by the absence of the Awami League. Which party stands to benefit most from these strategic recalibrations is something we will only discover when the ballots are cast.