The exposure of nuclear trafficking involving a Japanese Yakuza leader operating in Myanmar sent shockwaves through the international community. Takeshi Ebisawa, who pleaded guilty to trafficking nuclear materials, was apprehended after Thai authorities, in collaboration with the U.S. investigators, intercepted two powdery yellow substances described as “yellowcake.” A U.S. laboratory determined that the isotope composition of the plutonium found in the nuclear samples was weapons-grade, meaning the material, if produced in sufficient quantities, could be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. Furthermore, Ebisawa and his associates reportedly had access to over 2,000 kilograms of thorium-232 and more than 100 kilograms of uranium in the form of U3O8, a compound commonly found in yellowcake.
What makes this case even more alarming is the claim that proceeds from the sale of these materials were intended to finance arms purchases for an ethnic insurgent group in Myanmar. This incident lays bare the dangerous nexus between nuclear material trafficking and insurgent financing, particularly in politically unstable regions like Myanmar. It underscores the vulnerabilities of countries grappling with internal conflict and porous borders, which allow organized crime networks to exploit weak regulatory frameworks.
This revelation of nuclear-related material theft in Myanmar, including both plutonium and uranium, marks a deeply troubling development for regional security. The discovery of such materials in Myanmar raises critical questions about their origins and the vulnerabilities of nuclear material security in South Asia. Myanmar’s proximity to India, sharing a 1,643-kilometer border, adds a further layer of concern, especially considering India’s own challenges with securing its nuclear materials.
Plutonium, which is found in theft above, is not a naturally occurring material but rather a byproduct of nuclear reactors, requiring sophisticated reprocessing facilities for its extraction. India, with its growing nuclear energy program, is one of the few countries in the region equipped with such facilities. The presence of plutonium in Myanmar strongly suggests that the material was sourced from outside its borders, with India being the most likely origin due to its proximity and nuclear infrastructure.
India’s nuclear facilities, particularly those involved in plutonium reprocessing, have long been subject to scrutiny over their security protocols. The country’s expanding nuclear ambitions, including projects like the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), further amplify concerns about the adequacy of its safety measures.
India’s history of nuclear material thefts and smuggling incidents reinforces suspicions about the source of the Myanmar case. Notable examples includes the Nepal case 2022, in which eight individuals, including two Indian nationals, were apprehended for possessing uranium-like substances. Investigations revealed that the material had been smuggled from India, highlighting severe lapses in security. Another case in 2003, in where Bangladeshi authorities seized 225 grams of uranium oxide, believed to have been stolen from India’s uranium mines in Meghalaya. The material’s potential use in crude nuclear devices was confirmed by experts. Furthermore, in 2021, in India seven kilograms of uranium were seized in Maharashtra, underscoring the recurring threat posed by smuggling networks. This followed earlier incidents in 2016, when nine kilograms of depleted uranium were discovered in Mumbai, and in 2013, when uranium was reported stolen from facilities operated by the Uranium Corporation of India Limited in Jharkhand.
While much of the stolen material has been in raw or low-enriched forms, less immediately suitable for weaponization, the potential misuse of these materials by non-state actors has drawn international scrutiny. The threat of such materials being used in a dirty bomb, capable of widespread contamination and panic, cannot be dismissed lightly.
The Myanmar incident represents a troubling escalation in this pattern of nuclear material theft. The discovery of plutonium—a processed and highly dangerous material—indicates a level of sophistication absent in earlier cases involving unprocessed uranium. This suggests the involvement of well-organized networks operating across borders.
Given India’s role in the region for nuclear processing, the likelihood that the plutonium originated from India cannot be overlooked. The porous nature of borders in South Asia further exacerbates the risk of cross-border trafficking of such materials.
As for the region, these developments are a cause for serious concern for Pakistan. As a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan has consistently advocated for stringent measures to ensure the security of nuclear materials. India’s repeated failures undermine trust and escalate tensions in an already volatile region. Moreover, the trafficking of nuclear materials through Nepal, Bangladesh, and now Myanmar highlights the regional scope of this threat.
Pakistan’s position remains clear: nuclear security is a shared responsibility. India must take immediate steps to overhaul its nuclear security infrastructure and work collaboratively with its neighbors to address cross-border trafficking. Enhanced intelligence sharing, stricter border controls, and adherence to international safety standards are imperative.
The global community cannot afford to overlook these alarming trends. India’s inability to secure its nuclear materials not only threatens regional stability but also endangers global peace. It is high time for collective action to hold India accountable and safeguard South Asia from the catastrophic consequences of nuclear insecurity.