Commentary

Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security

July 7, 2023

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Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security
By Adnan Qaiser
July 2023

Editor’s Note: In this nine-part study, Adnan Qaiser, a foreign affairs expert having had a distinguished career in the armed forces as well as international diplomacy examines:

Pakistan’s Garrison State-I: Courting East Pakistan Moment
Pakistan’s Garrison State-II: Societal Paradoxes and Political-Military Divide
Pakistan’s Garrison State-III: Reality of Politics, Elections and Democracy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IV: Military Mindset, Support Base and Legitimacy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VI: General Musharraf’s Treason Trial and Civil-Military Divergence
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VII: From Religious Extremism to Radical Terrorism
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VIII: A Reluctant War on Terror Ally
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IX: From Water Scarcity to Water Starvation

Strategic Forecasting, the Austin-based global intelligence outfit had once noted, “As long as the army remained united and loyal to the concept of Pakistan, the centrifugal forces could not tear the country apart.”

National Security and Intelligence Apparatus

Pakistan becoming a “national security state” immediately after independence necessitated it to have some thirty-three security and intelligence agencies and state apparatus tasked with internal security, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, as revealed in the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) presented to the parliament by then Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan on February 26, 2014.

While the international community remains oblivious to the secretive worlds of: Military Intelligence (MI); Naval Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Intelligence Bureau (IB); Special Interrogation Branch (SIB); Field Intelligence Units (FIU); Federal Investigation Agency (FIA); Police’s Crime Investigation Departments (CID) and Special Branches (provincial); plus Intelligence of: Civil Armed Forces (CAF); Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF); Airport Security Force (ASF); Maritime and Coastguards; Pakistan Rangers (Punjab and Mehran Force); Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) and; Frontier Constabulary; the premier Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) stays at the centre of global attention, as well as of fellow Pakistanis, for its involvement in the domestic politics.

The ‘Invisible Soldiers of Islam’ (ISI)

While ordinary Pakistanis remain fearful of publicly commenting on ISI, international observers have called it the “dark side of Pakistan’s military establishment” comparing it with Chile’s DINA during Pinochet’s rule, SAVAK under Shah of Iran, and ‘Deep State’ of modern Turkey.[1]

Frequently labelled as a “rogue agency” – often getting more credit than it legitimately deserves – few understand what preoccupies ISI having an estimated 25,000 operatives in its seven to eight divisions with no less than eleven major generals and one lieutenant general, who heads as its director general.[2]

ISI works, as a known secret, outside the ambits of law. During a hearing on ‘missing persons’ (insurgents and terrorists allegedly killed extra-judicially or go unreported in Baluchistan and tribal areas), Pakistan’s former attorney general Maulvi Anwar-ul-Haq informed the Supreme Court in November 2010 that there ‘exists no legal instrument in the government’s archives that could define ISI’s creation or its jurisdiction.’

While there is no dearth of ISI’s detractors worldwide, Indians remain wary of its role in their country. Linking the ISI with almost every evil in the world – such as al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, 9/11, Osama bin Laden, Mumbai attacks of 26/11, Daniel Pearl’s murder, Kashmir uprising, and India’s North-Eastern insurgencies etc. – former director of India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), S. K. Datta, cautions the Indians in his book, ‘Inside ISI: The Story and Involvement of the ISI in Afghan Jihad, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, 9/11, Osama Bin Laden, 26/11 and the Future of Al-Qaeda’ “to counter the ‘incremental invasion’ of India by the ISI.”

Datta views the ISI as a “unique institution, the kind of which is not seen anywhere in the world, is not accountable to anyone except the army of Pakistan. Unlike democracies, the ISI combines the role of internal and external intelligence agencies … It has developed an independent space to function outside the government control.”[3]

However, sometimes referred to as the ‘Invisible Soldiers of Islam,’ the ISI has not only been protecting the ideology and integrity of Pakistan but also safeguarding the interests of the Middle East.

Having a history of acrimonious relations with Afghanistan, former Afghan President Sardar Daoud’s hostility towards Pakistan and his bloodless coup of 1973 in Afghanistan led former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to start patronizing Afghan Mujahedeen groups for a favourable dispensation in Afghanistan.[4]

Later, as Afghanistan became Pakistan’s backyard – through what is termed as ‘strategic depth’ in military’s parlance[5] – ISI opened up its horizons to Central Asia. The God-sent opportunity of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan not only enhanced ISI’s prestige in the Muslim world for taking on the might of a superpower but also helped Pakistan establish a strong foothold in Central Asian Republics – and beyond.[6]

Lt. Gen. (Ret’d) Hameed Gul, who headed the ISI during the critical culminating days of Afghan jihad (March 1987 to May 1989), proudly claimed, “It takes an Afghanistan to make an ISI.”[7]

In his scholarship ‘Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within,’ military researcher, Shuja Nawaz, notes: As ‘ISI singlehandedly distributed unaccounted funds among the Mujahedeen that had come pouring in from assorted sources for Afghan Jihad, it developed strong ties with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern financers, gaining a self-sufficiency in financial resources, which gave the agency increased dominance over foreign policy and domestic politics. Alleged to have used the lucrative avenues of narcotics trade, private banks, and business houses as sources of funding, ISI didn’t have to look towards cash-starved governments under crippling economic sanctions to fund its operations.’[8]

Shuja Nawaz further records, ‘later a born-again Muslim Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir [who headed the ISI from March 1992 to May 1993], gave a pan-Islamic worldview jurisdiction to ISI. The director general had been personally involved with the Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers through the setting up of a gunrunning operation and other fund raising activities, known as ‘The Bangkok Operation.’’

Nawaz keeps chronicling, ‘Being a disciple of former President General Zia-ul-Haq’s philosophy of global jihad and a member of ‘Tableeghi Jamaat’ [Islamic missionary group], the general had been a staunch supporter of Islamic causes around the world. Such pan-Islamic ideology led the director general to not only back Islamic groups in China and Philippines but also defy a UN arms embargo to supply weapons to Bosnian Muslims in collaboration with Iran. Promoting extremism by ‘privatizing jihad’ to freelance non-state actors – especially in Kashmir – the general reportedly hurt India by blessing the ‘Mumbai blasts’ on March 21, 1993 and also provided arms to Arakanese Muslims fighting for independence in Burma’s border with Bangladesh.’[9]

The International Court of Justice at The Hague demanded the general’s custody to prosecute his alleged support to the Muslim fighters in Bosnia. However, Islamabad turned down the request in September 2011.

Hein G. Kiessling quotes former director general ISI, Hamid Gul in his book ‘Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan’ as having said, “… the Foreign Office has to convert but not to design the country’s foreign policy.”

The author further documents, “… [the ISI] soon portrayed in journalistic shorthand as a state within a state – as an intelligence agency that was influencing and controlling Pakistan’s domestic and international politics. Reports proliferated that the ISI did not shy away from kidnapping and liquidating individuals it considered undesirable … Even if no proof or connection to the ISI is revealed, suspicions of its involvement remain.”[10]

ISI’s Political Manipulation

Viewed as a ‘shadowy organization,’ ISI’s ‘S’ and ‘Z’ Divisions are said to direct policy on external threats, counterterrorism and jihadists activities by non-state actors, while its ‘political cell’ watches domestic politics,[11] and its ‘media management wing’ supervises the activities of journalists.[12] The political cell that had been created by former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973 to monitor his opponents could not be closed down despite repeated efforts of the politicians.[13] The cell continues to function even after the Supreme Court ordered its “immediate closure” adjudging the “existence [of political cell] as illegal void ab initio” on July 17, 2012.

However, the scheming nature of Pakistani politicians necessitated monitoring their activities through wire-tapping phones and maintaining their dossiers to stop rogue elements from crossing a certain threshold in policy-making or maintaining intimate relations with foreign countries at the cost of Pakistan’s security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.[14]

Former head of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Brigadier (Ret’d) A. R. Siddiqi chronicles in his book ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality,’ that after imposing Pakistan’s second martial law on March 25, 1969, General Yahya Khan shared the establishment’s thinking in his address to Baluch Regimental Centre by stating, “I simply cannot throw the country to the wolves.”[15]

While the Supreme Court, in its judgement of October 19, 2012, found the Army and the ISI manipulating the elections in the past, the honourable court failed to take into account the insidious character of the politicians. Wary of Pakistan’s dynastic political parties getting a complete sway in the parliament (⅔^rd majority) to fiddle with the constitution for their prolonged stay in power and unchecked misappropriation of national wealth, the military establishment finds itself constrained to sometime bribe or pressurize the politicians to form alliances – as counterbalancing force – in the larger national interest. Thus, despite calling for their trial after finding an ex-army chief and a former director general ISI guilty, the matter has been hushed-up by the politicians knowing their own soiled hands in the undertaking.

PPP’s Tug-of-War with the Establishment

Having a history of acrimonious relations with the military establishment, Bhuttos’ government of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) tried to undermine the Army and the ISI through political manoeuvring and mud-slinging a number of times from 2008 to 2013.

First, the PPP government allegedly got ‘military oversight pre-conditions’ added to the controversial U.S. “Kerry-Lugar Berman Act” for the grant of US$7.5 billion aid to Pakistan in 2009. Voicing “serious concerns” as the military put its foot down, an embarrassed Obama administration immediately reconciled.

Secondly, PPP foolishly tried to put ISI under the control of Interior Ministry on July 27, 2008, only to (humiliatingly) reverse the decision under establishment’s pressure within hours.

Third, in the aftermath of the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011, PPP allegedly sent a treasonous ‘Memo,’ to the U.S. authorities seeking support against a ‘fictional military takeover’ – compromising in return Pakistan’s nuclear program and its national security. Smelling conspiracy against the state, the Supreme Court’s judicial commission found PPP’s then (absconding) ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani as prime culprit.

Fourth, an agitated former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani further condemned the intelligence establishment as a “state within a state” on the floor of the parliament on December 23, 2011.

Fifth, following South Africa’s model of voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapon program, the PPP government further tried to bring major cuts in Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Sixth, while announcing his peace initiative to archrival India, President Asif Ali Zardari arbitrarily showed his willingness to forgo Pakistan’s stated policy of “first use of nuclear weapon under Indian aggression” in a videoconference with Indian audience on November 22, 2008. The president’s unilateral alteration of country’s “nuclear posture” caused a furore sending shockwaves in the military circles.

Seventh, Pakistan’s former Permanent Representative to the UN, Zamir Akram, startlingly revealed in December 2015 that the PPP government greatly harmed Pakistan’s strategic interests by mischievously ‘not blocking’ (a non-NPT signatory) India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008.

Eighth, PPP not only tabled a ‘private member bill’ in the Senate for the civilian control of ISI on July 8, 2012 but the ‘Committee of Whole Senate’ also directed the government to clip ISI’s wings in its resolution on January 8, 2016.

Finally, PPP’s co-chairperson, Mr. Zardari – who ironically remained Pakistan Armed Forces’ supreme commander during his five-year presidency – contemptuously threatened his own Army with fire and brimstone for checking political malpractices. In an angry outburst filled with political hubris and scorn on June 16, 2015, Zardari publicly berated the army chief by saying, “You come here for just three years [tenure], while we are here to stay forever.”

On the other hand, while former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif remained reluctant to condemn India for its brutalities in Kashmir and subversion in the country, Pakistan’s Pashtun politicians keep fraternizing with an increasingly hostile Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan’s sovereignty, integrity and national interest.

As has been the theme of this study, with such divergent worldviews on national security, it is getting difficult for Pakistan to survive as a nation-state under its self-serving and disloyal politicians.

The Bhuttos’ Jinx

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, known for crossing several ‘red lines’[16] remained a ‘national security risk.’ Under apprehensions about divulging and rolling back Pakistan’s nuclear program to appease the United States, Benazir was never granted a visit to the Kahuta Research Laboratories during her two-stints in office as prime minster. Ms. Bhutto was also alleged to have secretly handed over a list of Sikh insurgents – who were supported by the ISI in ‘Khalistan Movement’ – to the visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during their meeting in July 1989.[17] On his return, Mr. Gandhi crushed the insurgency within no time. Since past karmas keep haunting in some form or another, the same accusation kept echoing during the joint-session of the parliament on October 6, 2016.

In his memoir, General Musharraf’s repeated allusion to Benazir and her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as ‘The worst things ever happening to Pakistan’ is enough to portray military establishment’s contemptuous views about the two Bhuttos.[18]

Benazir’s lust for power, loathing of clergy, and her unconditional offerings to the U.S. for her power led General Musharraf to further record: “Benazir was very unpopular with the military. Very unpopular … [for] you shouldn’t be seen by the entire religious lobby to be alien – a nonreligious person … [and] don’t be seen as an extension of the United States.”[19]

As noted by Carey Schofield in her book ‘Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror,’ [20] Benazir’s two brothers, Mir Murtaza and Shahnawaz Bhutto, remained involved in anti-state subversive activities in Pakistan through their terrorist organization ‘al-Zulfiqar.’

Schofield documents: “Over the next ten years [after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s hanging, their terrorist organization] al-Zulfiqar staged a campaign of bombings, robberies and assassinations in Pakistan – culminating most famously in 1981 with the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines flight from Peshawar to Kabul.”

Meeting their ultimate fate, Shahnawaz Bhutto died mysteriously through poisoning in 1985 and Murtaza Bhutto was killed in a police encounter while his sister Ms. Bhutto was Pakistan’s prime minister in 1996.[21]

As highlighted in Part-IV of this study,[22] it is on record that after his hanging on April 4, 1979, [23] former prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s body was unclothed and photographed (to ascertain if he was a proper Muslim with circumcision).[24]

Heraldo Munoz, the Chief UN Commissioner assigned to investigate Benazir’s assassination, apportioned blame on Pakistan’s security agencies – albeit in a nuanced manner – in his book ‘Getting Away with Murder: Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination and the Politics of Pakistan.’ Without understanding the political and cultural dynamics of Pakistan and primarily relying on circumstantial evidence – whiffing smoke where there was none – such an accusation can be termed as lazy investigation. While political assassinations have historically remained inconclusive in Pakistan, pointing fingers at intelligence agencies has unfortunately remained a norm.[25]

Establishment’s Preoccupation with National Security

Even a cursory glance at Pakistan’s peculiar history highlights military establishment’s constant trepidations. Conspiring and playing into the hands of the enemies of Pakistan,[26] the intelligence establishment justifiably controlled the erring politicians, civil servants, judges and journalists through coercion, intimidation and blackmail.[27]

As noted by me in my 2016’s paper titled ‘Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: Internal Battlefronts Exposed from Media Leak,’ Muttahida Qaumi Movement’s (MQM) treason by receiving funds, training and weapons from India and Baluch separatist leaders finding sanctuaries in Afghanistan, passports from India and asylums in the UK and Switzerland highlight the threats to the state of Pakistan from within.[28]

As noted in Part-I, II, and IV of this study as ‘guardian of the nation’ the military establishment remains preoccupied with the issues of national security to safeguard the country from collapse or disintegration – for which it can take any measure or go to any extreme.[29]

Although blamed on military establishment’s high-handedness, all Pakistan’s major historical events had a national security context demanding stern action by the

guardians of the state:

1) Military coups and martial laws (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999);
2) Enforcement of emergency (November 3, 2007);
3) ‘Rawalpindi conspiracy case’ (1951)[30]
4) Political assassinations starting with former Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (October, 16, 1951);
5) Sacking of seven successive prime ministers due to political intrigue and conspiracies (1950 to 1958);[31]
6) ‘Agartala conspiracy case’ against Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman (1969);
7) Repression in East Pakistan – ‘Operation Searchlight’ (March 1971);
8) Hanging of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (April 4, 1979);[32]
9) Elections manipulation, forging of right-wing alliances and mid-wifing ‘third-force’ (1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2018);
10) Removal of democratically elected governments (1990, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2022);
11) Mysterious assassination of Benazir Bhutto (December 27, 2007);[33]
12) Secretive deaths of rogue journalists[34] – Syed Saleem Shahzad [35] (May 31, 2011) and Arshad Sharif (October 24, 2022)
13) Afghan jihad and Kashmir uprising (1980s and 1990s);
14) The ‘Kill and Dump’ game in the Baluchistan insurgency (2006 to present); and
15) The ‘missing persons’ issue’ (people extra-judicially killed or illegally detained for subversive activities)

Critically analyzing “Pakistan’s secretive, paranoid, dysfunctional government(s) and politics,” James P. Farwell, in his scholarship “The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability” finds “Pakistani politics are devious, complicated, and nuanced. In a place where contriving conspiracy theories is a national sport, politicians are always suspects for possible betrayal.”

Farwell further notes, “Musharraf’s … mindset and attitude were forged and nurtured by the culture of a military that, as in many nations, neither respects nor trusts its own civilian population.”[36]

The predominance of national security in the military establishment’s psyche is evident from ISI and MI regularly picking up anti-state elements, never to be produced in any court of law. Although negating fundamental human rights, such measures are necessitated by a legal system that has been unable to punish the terrorists due to lack of proper legislation, weak political will, poor prosecution and threats to the judges and witnesses, which allows the accused to walk scot free only to be picked-up by the agencies again. Between 2007 and 2013, the courts acquitted no less than 1,964 arrested terrorists, out of which 772 reportedly rejoined their groups.

Over the years, intelligence agencies have invoked statutes such as the ‘Official Secrets Act 1923,’ ‘Security of Pakistan Act 1952,’ ‘Pakistan Army Act 1952,’ ‘Defence of Pakistan Act’ and ‘Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act 1972,’ to justify rounding up, investigating and prolonged imprisonment – even using ‘third degree’ (torture) – on people involved in seditious activities.

Despite the proclamation of ‘Protection of Pakistan Act’ – granting safeguards and powers to the investigative agencies fighting terrorists on a daily basis – the bill had been challenged in the Supreme Court and rejected by opposition Senators as “blackest of black laws” only to be passed in diluted form in July 2014.

Resultantly, in the current Baluchistan insurgency [37] one keeps witnessing mutilated bodies at the roadsides in a game called ‘Kill and Dump.’[38] Both the Supreme Court’s suo-moto on ‘missing persons’ as well as the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances [39] could not grasp the gravity of the existential threats to Pakistan, blaming the intelligence agencies for their non-cooperation[40] – which takes me back to my poem shared in Part-I of this study [41] titled “My Enemy Within.”[42]

Conclusion

While army’s takeovers of the country and intelligence establishment’s coercive measures are roundly condemned, it must be kept in mind that when the ‘time comes,’ the military, considering it a national duty, doesn’t bother much about international community’s condemnation, political ramifications, economic implications, judicial repercussions, or domestic response (which incidentally remains favourable due to politicians’ financial corruption and malgovernance). And the time remains ripe![43]

As Pakistan keeps dragging with its primitive culture of ‘democratic swindling’ by ‘dynastic politics,’ the civil-military distrust cannot wish away. It is, therefore, futile to talk about intelligence agencies’ reforms [44] to bring them under legal or parliamentary oversight; or to make them accountable for extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses [45] without first correcting the political fundamentals of Pakistan.[46]

Former director general ISI, Lt. Gen. (Ret’d) Asad Durrani had admitted, “While intelligence agencies enjoy unlimited state sanctioned immunities, they have unlawfully grabbed a lot of extraordinary powers too for doing all the dirty work of respective civil and military governments.”[47]

Adnan Qaiser can be reached at: [email protected] and Tweets @adnanqaiser01. Views are personal and do not represent any institutional thought.

Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security

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