Image source: Youtube
By Adnan Qaiser 30 May 2023
Editor’s Note: In this nine-part study, Adnan Qaiser, a foreign affairs expert having had a distinguished career in the armed forces as well as international diplomacy examines:
Pakistan’s Garrison State-I: Courting East Pakistan Moment
Pakistan’s Garrison State-II: Societal Paradoxes and Political-Military Divide
Pakistan’s Garrison State-III: Reality of Politics, Elections and Democracy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IV: Military Mindset, Support Base and Legitimacy
Pakistan’s Garrison State-V: Intelligence’s Preoccupation with National Security
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VI: General Musharraf’s Treason Trial and Civil-Military Divergence
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VII: From Religious Extremism to Radical Terrorism
Pakistan’s Garrison State-VIII: A Reluctant War on Terror Ally
Pakistan’s Garrison State-IX: From Water Scarcity to Water Starvation
Pakistan’s Enemy Within
One has always believed history never gets archaic or outdated; it gets perfected and more truthful with age.
The same is true when in retrospect one examines the true nature of Pakistani politicians and how the country’s “elite culture” has brought the country to a precipice.[i] Acting as the “guardian of the nation” Pakistan Army has always tried to safeguard and salvage the country in every crisis – even doing so today.
However, no army can fight without the support and backing of its nation – especially if an “enemy within” morphs among its own people; or the population begins to suspect the character and integrity of the defenders and saviours of the nation.
Having the distinction of serving in Pakistan Army, I wrote a poem sometimes back on the internal challenges faced by the military:
~ My Enemy Within ~
A rival in me, an enemy within
Hiding his jinx, deep down my skin
His sainthood stays, akin his sins
A foe, which never, lets me win
Hits my chin, then kicks my shin
Knocking my senses, keeps head in spin
Rubbing in dust, my face it pins
Scheming against me, to my chagrin
A wolf, cloaked, in lamb’s skin
Weakens my resolve, my courage gets thin
He poisons me, as if, a snake’s kin
Snares me through his venomous fin
Throwing me in, history’s dustbin
Mocks me then, with his loathsome grin
My inner war, brutal has been
For my rival, Qaiser, is “my enemy within”
~ Adnan Qaiser ~
This nine-part study aims to examine Pakistan’s pathological civil-military malaise that continues to ail the country even after three-quarter of a century.
Courting East Pakistan Moment 2.0
In his final address lasting for some nine minutes, eleven seconds, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa touched upon the ignominious and sordid episode of East Pakistan’s break-up – reincarnating into Bangladesh. While commentators discussed “what” the general said, no one seemed to pay heed to “why” the Army Chief felt the need to highlight a mortifying event in the history of a young nation-state, 51 years ago.
While the ex-Army Chief tried to set the record straight by underlining the East Pakistan debacle as a “political failure” rather than a “military defeat,”[1] I believe the Pakistan Army wanted to convey through General Bajwa the “recurring circumstances and events” taking place in the country that had led to the disintegration of Pakistan.
Since history has an evil habit of repeating itself for those who do not learn their lessons, present-day Pakistan stands at the “same political crossroads,” which had led to the country’s dismemberment. General Bajwa’s comments on the East Pakistan’s separation arrived at a time when Pakistan is once again facing its “East Pakistan moment.”
Pakistan’s present state of political polarization; near civil-war situation and anti-Army sentiments; institutional conflict among the pillars of the state; threats to country’s cohesion and integrity from ethnic chasm; Tehrik-e-Taliban’s (TTP) terrorism; Baluchistan insurgency; economic meltdown; apartheid judicial system; and societal and social decay signify a nation-state imploding under its numerous contradictions and conflicts. The perfidy of Pakistan’s disloyal and deceitful politicians, not to mention the corrupt practices of civil bureaucracy and a prevalent culture of unabashed entitlements, perks and privileges among the judiciary and military is further pushing the country off the cliff.
An editorial in Pakistan’s eminent newspaper Dawn noted on May 14, 2023, “If Pakistan had a Doomsday Clock, it would be reading sixty seconds to midnight. For the first time in recent memory, the nation seems to be flirting dangerously with civil war. It is tearing itself apart under the weight of its own contradictions. The ‘darling’ has turned ‘enemy number one’; the ‘democratic movement’ has acquired a taste for authoritarianism; and the law has lost all consistency or objectivity. As our institutions squander what little credibility they have left, the economy remains in shambles. There is a growing realisation that the social contract needs to be rewritten anew.”
Pakistan’s Elite Capture
In the backdrop of politicians’ lust for power and brazen loot and plunder of national wealth and its resources after the end of former President General Pervez Musharraf’s rule in 2008, it is evident that only a miracle can save Pakistan from internal implosion.
General Musharraf’s notorious National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) of 2007, pardoning over 8,000 criminal, money laundering and corruption cases of politicians, ushered in a so-called ear of democratization in which two civilian governments belonging to Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) completed their 5-year-term each from 2008 to 2018. However, true to their history of 1990s when the two political parties alternately ruled Pakistan – in what is ironically called as a “Decade of Democracy” in Pakistan – the country had been plundered through massive corruption, money-laundering and fiscal mismanagement only to be brought to the brink of bankruptcy and economic collapse.[2]
The problem is that historically Muslim feudal elites – called as Ashrafiya in Urdu language – have never invested their heart and soul in their new homeland or stayed loyal to its survival and prosperity.
In his scholarship “What’s Wrong With Pakistan?,” author Babar Ayaz found them “inventing the two nation theory” for the protection of their political capital after a through rout-out in the elections of 1937. Said to be only fifteen wealthy families in Pakistan running the economics and market of Pakistan since its birth, these elites have only been advancing their wealth and business fortunes at the cost of Pakistan’s self-reliance, political and economic maturity and structural reforms.[3]
Pakistan’s self-serving elite politicians have thus enriched themselves at the cost of less privileged citizenry, encashing their poverty and privation as well as Pakistan’s geo-strategic significance from the world powers essentially making the country a “rentier state” – surviving on foreign rents for transactional services rendered. Resultantly, Pakistan could never become self-reliant and remained dependent upon the clutches of foreign aid and assistance and international loans.
In his 2014’s book “The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World,” Canadian scholar T.V. Paul found Pakistan suffering from a historical “geostrategic curse,” – similar to that of “resource curse” or “oil curse” that stagnates a country’s economic development rendering it addicted to foreign-aid for survival. Finding Pakistani elites – including its military – against incorporating much needed reforms – to avoid disturbing the social order and status quo, which grants them perks, privileges and entitlements), Paul blames the Pakistani leadership for not taking advantage of the 20th century’s economic growth opportunities. [4]
A state has, therefore, arrived that in order to run the government and other daily affairs of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country needs to borrow more to meet its expenses – reaching a point of financial default. Having remained dependent on the loans of international financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank besides several other foreign lenders, Pakistan has been pledging its precious family silver or strategic assets through sovereign guarantees.
The (stalled) “China Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) remains the latest example in which sovereign guarantees had been pledged to the Chinese investors guaranteeing them a 27 to 34 percent profit annually – even if the project remained idle and did not work.[5] (See my analysis paper titled China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s ‘Chinanization’ or Colonization?;[6] as well as an eleven-part YouTube presentation: CPEC: Dominance by Debt by Adnan Qaiser).[7]
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan went to IMF no less than 22 times in its history to borrow money through Extended Fund Facility, Structural Adjustments, Stand By Arrangements and Extended Credit Facility.[8]
Eminent journalist, Fahd Husain had notably observed: “Afghanistan may have been bombed to rubble, but Pakistan has been governed into ruins. Ruler after ruler ravaged and pillaged this land, gnawing and clawing at its flesh till there was nothing left but bare bones. This is why there is now a wave of revulsion against all those who exercise authority by wearing the rotting garland of mandate.”
Meanwhile, India, which got independence from the British simultaneously in 1947, has turned into a regional power with GDP touching US$3.713 Trillion, successively growing at a pace of over 6 percent annually. Pakistan, on the other hand, witnessing negative growth rates faces a strong possibility of defaulting on its international liabilities and going bankrupt.[9]
Renowned international economist Dr. Ishrat Hussain argues in his scholarship Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State: “… since elites have captured the market and the state in Pakistan, it has resulted in the creation of a vicious cycle of inefficiency and inequitable distribution of wealth.”[10]
PTI versus PDM and Military Establishment
Since Pakistan has never experienced real democracy in the past 75 years of its existence, the current political unrest and violence can be termed as the “evolution of democracy” or its teething pains. In my view, the present political turmoil is akin to the Arab Spring of 2011 or the street protests in Lebanon, Iraq and Algeria in 2019, demanding an altogether new social contract and a political order.
The violence that started after the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from power on April 10, 2022, took another ugly turn when the paramilitary forces – representing the military – arrested Mr. Khan from a court of law, ostensibly illegally, on May 9, 2023. It was when the supporters of Mr. Khan’s political party, the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) came out in angry protests – ransacking and charring down a few military installations and buildings. The new Army Chief, General Asim Munir responded with an equal fire and fury vowing to try the civilian perpetrators of vandalism under the Army Act of 1952 through military courts.
What Pakistan is facing today was destined to come one day. It results from a few factors, such as:
1) Public awareness about their democratic rights and privileges through education, enlightenment and social media awakening
2) People getting fed-up from the corrupt practices and poor governance of successive governments. Except for lofty and false promises, the old order politicians have delivered nothing. Resultantly, an ordinary Pakistani remains caught up in privation due to high inflation, unemployment, lack of adequate health facility, and disrespect internationally. Pakistan’s “elite capture” and politicians’ loot and plunder of state resources in the name of hapless population further caused resentment among the masses, who find a messiah in the shape of Imran Khan.
An analyst recently portrayed Pakistan’s elite capture as: “While countries in the world had a right kind of elite capture where the elite earned through productive investment in export oriented industries, in Pakistan the elite earned through non-productive investments through state patronage. Pakistan had a Westminster polity based political system geared to pander to the needs of an extractive elite. It was a system where the MPs got elected to get enriched and kept the Prime Minister hostage to their extractive agenda. The flow of the public goods therefore to the public was stymied by such an extractive political system.”
However, regrettably, Pakistan’s (governance) “system” is not mature enough or carries the capacity to handle democracy in its real essence because of a few factors:
1) Feudalistic Constitution Favouring Elites: First of all, Pakistan’s constitution of 1973, which had been distorted with the 18th amendment in 2010,[11] has been feudalistic in nature. Created by a feudal prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had blackmailed and bribed his fellow politicians, including religious clergy, into acquiescence, the constitution did not carry any input from the powerful Army and had only been advancing the interests of the elites. Lacking any “institutional checks and balances,” the constitution, as well as the “system” favours the political elites in their loot and plunder of the state resources.
Former president, General Pervez Musharraf concurred by saying: The “inherent weakness” of Pakistan is that democracy in the country has not been tailored in accordance with the dictates of the environment. “There are no checks and balances within the system. The Constitution doesn’t provide those checks and balances.”
2) Military’s Preoccupation with National Security: Secondly, owing to politicians’ perfidy and disloyalty, not to mention their avarice, greed and ineptness, the Pakistan military had to step in directly or indirectly to save the country from total collapse a number of times.
Moreover, due to archrival India’s refusal to accept the reality of Pakistan, besides having unresolved territorial disputes and India’s overt and covert machinations to destabilize the country, Pakistan became a “national security state” very early in its incarnation facing existential threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Thus, the two constraints led the Pakistan Army to adopt the role of a “guardian of the nation,” running the country through “controlled or guided democracy” or “hybrid governance.” Such a role, however, caused great resentment among the politicians, which resulted into civil-military distrust, frictions, political brinkmanship and constitutional deadlocks.
It is although, ironic, that despite becoming a nuclear armed country – covertly by 1984, when Pakistan had conducted a nuclear “cold test” and overtly in May 1998, after carrying out six nuclear explosions – the Army doesn’t seem to be coming out of its national security fixation. Trying to match India through conventional arms race as well as stockpiling nuclear missiles and eleven delivery systems, Pakistan Army’s intentions remain unclear for not getting benefit from “strategic stability” (nuclear equilibrium) between India and Pakistan. The Army, however, thinks that it is only its generals who understand Pakistan’s geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic compulsions better.
Therefore, expecting the Army and its intelligence apparatus to relinquish their hold over the state’s politics is impractical and unrealistic.
Nonetheless, the Army finds itself in a bind or a quandary. On one hand, a majority of Pakistanis – to include intelligentsia, educated middle class and expatriate Pakistani community – demand Army’s withdrawal from the politics to focus only on country’s defence and its borders. However, politician’s intrigue, India’s espionage and subversion, Baloch insurgency and Tehrik-e-Taliban’s (TTP) terrorism doesn’t allow the Army to step back from its role of nation’s patriarch or paterfamilias (more on this subject in Parts-II, IV, V, and VI).
An authority on subcontinent and Pakistan Army, Stephen P. Cohen notes: “There are armies that guard their nation’s borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three.”[12]
3) Archaic and Decayed Judicial System: Third, Pakistan’s judicial system is age-old and rustic. Still following the colonial era’s common law, all Pakistan’s statutes are medieval: Pakistan Penal Code was enacted by British Lord Macaulay in 1860 and its Code of Criminal Procedures dates back to 1898.
The courts, which in the past have remained a part of military establishment – duly condoning and legitimizing martial laws and military amendments to the constitution under infamous “Doctrine of Necessity”[13] – are generally viewed as protecting the affluent rather than the less privileged citizenry.[14] Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s judicial system ranks at a dismal 129 out of 140 in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index-2022.[15]
4) Unrepresentative and Abused Parliamentary Democracy: Fourth, Pakistan’s parliamentary legislative model remains unrepresentative and abused. As discussed in Part-III, the country’s political system is “patronage and personality” driven. The National Assembly and Senate remains an exclusive club of affluent elites, who neither understand nor protect an ordinary Pakistani’s democratic aspirations. In a National Assembly that survives on number game, the politicians keep buying and selling their loyalties and votes to the highest bidder through a turncoat practice, contemptibly called as “lotacracy.”
Imran Khan’s Popularity and Cult Following Myth
Although, Mr. Khan failed in delivering anything substantial to the country during his three and a half years in office as prime minister, his public support comes from three factors:
1) First is Mr. Khan’s public image as “Mr. Clean,” free from any stain or stigma of financial corruption or any wrongdoing while holding public office. This is despite the fact that people around him – including Mr. Khan’s wife and close compatriots – were not so pious and found selling state gifts of Toshkhana in the market and minting money through sugar scandal.
2) Second is Mr. Khan’s iconic charisma as a star cricketer who had won Pakistan a cricket world cup in 1992. Thus, the youth – comprising of some 64 percent younger than 30 years of age and 29 percent between 15 and 29 – finds itself captivated with Mr. Khan’s charm and magnetism.[16]
3) Third, the people of Pakistan – especially the educated and politically aware middle class – find themselves fed up from the old politicians who have been enriching themselves through plundering state resources and carrying out financial corruption in the past three decades. Finding no other alternative, people are betting on Mr. Khan to better their lot and by reforming the system of governance put the country on the path of progress and growth. Thus, Mr. Khan’s support coming from a sizeable majority can be classified through an Urdu language phrase of “Bughaz-e-Mua’waiya” rather than “Hubb-e-Hussian” (tried politicians’ public detestation instead of Khan’s devotion).
Imran Khan’s Cardinal Sins
However, taking a cue from Pakistan’s history and the treatment meted out to defiant politicians who did not toe in the military’s line, like Liaquat Ali Khan and the two Bhuttos, one remains doubtful about Imran Khan’s return to power:
1) First of all, all popular leaders in the world who defied the domestic and international establishment found it hard to stay – or return – to power. Notable among them are former U.S. President Donald Trump; Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro; Philippine’s President Rodrigo Duterte; South Korean President Park Geun-hye; Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff; and Aung San Suu Kyi, the democratic icon and prime minister of Myanmar who faced a coup d’état on February 1, 2021.
2) Mr. Khan has not only annoyed the U.S. administration but also Pakistan’s military administration, which has remained a close ally of the former, safeguarding U.S. interests in the region.
Besides beginning to defy the military on its “policy advice,” Imran Khan made three major judgement errors: (i) First he snubbed a superpower with undiplomatic words like “Absolutely Not” on a suggestion of granting military bases to America for operations in Afghanistan. (ii) Later, he defied saner counsel to postpone his visit to Russia on February 24, 2022 – the day President Putin invaded Ukraine. (iii) Lastly, a naive and rookie Mr. Khan blamed the U.S. for conspiring to remove him from the office. Then Army Chief General Bajwa, although, tried to damage control Pakistan’s longstanding ties with the U.S. by condemning the Ukraine invasion, but by that time an obstinate prime minister had already piqued and peeved the military establishment – which remains the ultimate kingmaker and sole arbiter of power in the country.
3) Thus, even if Mr. Khan manages to return to power through a miracle, he will have to concede his power and make several compromises with the military establishment like former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had done in 1988. Benazir had to give concrete assurances to the establishment for not interfering in the power domains of the Army, staying away from Pakistan’s nuclear program and keeping incumbent Sahibzada Yaqub Khan as country’s foreign minister for the continuation of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Conclusion
There is no denying the fact that politicians’ treachery, spoils and graft compelled the military establishment to control the domestic politics as discussed in subsequent chapters of this study, a perspective can be gained through my 2016’s paper titled Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: Internal Battlefronts Exposed from Media Leak.[17]
General Bajwa’s farewell speech, although, signified Army’s departure from the politics; however, through his “naming and shaming” and disclosure of secret information, Imran Khan has brought the Army into disrepute, flaring up public emotions against the only organized and respected institution in the country.
The way Mr. Khan and the government, comprising of 11 political parties of Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) are washing their dirty linen in the public – with all kinds of barbs, accusations and audio and video tapes’ leaks, Pakistan’s politics has taken an ugly turn. Moreover, with a violently charged and fragmented population taking law in their own hands, General Bajwa had rightfully feared a repeat of East Pakistan episode, if things go out of control.
Amid all this chaos, Army Chief’s decision to try the vandals in military courts will not only draw condemnation by international community and rights groups, but will further flare up anti-Army sentiments – widening the growing chasm between the civilians and the armed forces of Pakistan. People have already begun to relate Army’s heavy-handedness to the brutal and ruthless “Operation Searchlight” in March 1971 that proved as the last nail in East Pakistan’s coffin.
Madiha Afzal of Brookings Institution wrote in the The New York Times on May 10, 2023: “[Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran] Khan’s popular support has protected him against the establishment’s assertiveness until now. But now that the establishment has asserted itself, it’s hard to see it backing down anytime soon. Volatile, dangerous times ahead for Pakistan.”
Adnan Qaiser can be reached at: [email protected] and Tweets @adnanqaiser01. Views are personal and do not represent any institutional thought.
Notes
[1] The documentary explores the roles played by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Indira Gandhi and Yahya Khan
Experience the truth in Javed Jabbar’s ‘Separation of East Pakistan’: The Untold Story, The Express Tribune, Dec 15, 2021
[2] Khan Faqir, Fakhrul Islam, Shahid Hassan Rizvi, Revival of Democracy in Pakistan 1988-1999: An Analysis, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 201-212, Bahauddin Zakriya University
https://www.bzu.edu.pk/PJSS/Vol35No12015/PJSS-Vol35-No1-16.pdf
[3] Babar Ayaz, What’s Wrong With Pakistan?, Hay House, (Jan 1, 2013), 364 pp
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/603445/whats-wrong-with-pakistan-by-babar-ayaz/9789384544270
[4] T.V. Paul, ‘The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World,’ Oxford University Press (2014), pp. 3 to 5
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-warrior-state-9780199322237?cc=us&lang=en&
[5] The Belt and Road Initiative’s flagship project in Pakistan is struggling to fulfill China’s hopes.
David Sacks, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—Hard Reality Greets BRI’s Signature Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations, March 30, 2021
[6] Adnan Qaiser (Author) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s ‘Chinanization’ or Colonization?, Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Canada’s On Track magazine, Spring issue, Page 12, Jun 14, 2018
https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ON-Track-Spring-2018-Final-1.pdf
[7] CPEC: Dominance by Debt by Adnan Qaiser (2018)
An eleven-part YouTube presentation on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the larger context of China’s geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic interests as an aspiring global power
Introduction and Breakdown of Presentation: https://youtu.be/rKrdE6CltFU
[8] Pakistan: History of Lending Commitments as of February 29, 2020, International Monetary Fund
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=760&date1key=2020-02-29
[9] There is a real danger that Pakistan could default on its debt, which could lead to intensifying political turmoil amid already surging terrorism.
Shahbaz Rana, Pakistan’s Existential Economic Crisis, United States Institute of Peace, Apr 6, 2023
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/pakistans-existential-economic-crisis
Also see:
(2) Pakistan has already defaulted, claims Khawaja Asif, Dawn, Feb 19, 2023
https://www.dawn.com/news/1737882
[10] Ishrat Husain, “Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State,” Second Edition, Oxford University Press, (2018), pp. 538
Book Review, PDF
Ms. Arhama Siddiqa, Institute of Strategic Studies, July 25, 2020
https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2-BR_Arhama_Siddiqa_No-2_2020.pdf
[11] The 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan has subjected the state to a predicament. Although the articles amended are quite admirable, the author notes, despairingly no proper way is suggested to implement the provisions highlighted in it. She further elaborates that while it has delegated power to the provinces, it has also made the center weaker.
Sidra Azeem, 18th Amendment To The Constitution: Pakistan’s Dilemma, Paradigm Shift, Mar 5, 2021
https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/18th-amendment-to-the-constitution/
Also see:
(2) Imran Ahmed, The 18th Amendment: Historical Developments and Debates in Pakistan, National University of Singapore, Sept 4, 2020
[12] Dr Muhammad Ali Shaikh, History: The Birth of the Pakistan Army, Dawn, April 22, 2023
https://www.dawn.com/news/1748721
[13] Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 16, Issue 2, Summer 1983
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=cilj
[14] “The opposite of poverty is not wealth, it’s justice.”
Taimur Malik, In Pakistan, justice is the title of an important person. Not an ideal of hope and fairness, Dawn, Sept 5, 2018
https://www.dawn.com/news/1431101
[15] Pakistan Ranks 129 out of 140 in Rule of Law Index-2022, World Justice Project Rule of Law Index ®
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index ® finds rule of law fell globally for 5th consecutive year. Authoritarian trends and some pandemic pressures continue in majority of countries. Pakistan’s score decreased, ranks 5th out of 6 regionally
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global
PDF Report:
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/Pakistan.pdf
[16] The 2017 Pakistan NHDR looks at the role of youth as a key force for enhancing human development.
Shakeel Ahmad, Unleashing the potential of a young Pakistan, UNDP Human Development Report, Jul 24, 2018
https://hdr.undp.org/content/unleashing-potential-young-pakistan
[17] Adnan Qaiser (Author), Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: Internal Battlefronts Exposed from Media Leak, Global Village Space, Oct 14, 2016