Pakistan’s army was the clear election loser

Ayesha Siddiqa

The results of Pakistan’s election two weeks ago came as a shock to analysts who expected Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf to wilt under intense pressure from the country’s military authorities.

Instead, PTI-linked candidates running as independents — due to the Election Commission of Pakistan’s decision to bar the use of the party’s signature cricket bat symbol on ballot papers — came away with 93 National Assembly seats, besting all other parties.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) won just 75 seats while the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) took 54. Khan’s party also swept polling for the regional assembly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

The election outcome demonstrates the depth of public resentment in Pakistan of the army’s meddling in politics and state affairs as well as disenchantment with the country’s traditional political parties. People voted for Khan’s party not just because the former cricket star is a better politician but because he has become a symbol of standing up against military dominance.

The military and its intelligence agencies failed to take into account the fact that nearly half of Pakistan’s electorate is now less than 35 years of age or that the country’s youth have become resentful of military intervention thanks to Khan’s consciousness-raising since his removal from office in April 2022.

The Pakistani electorate’s rejection of the will of the military carries a whiff of the public uprisings against the generals who seized power in Myanmar in 2021 and against Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Notwithstanding a few intrusions into military bases last year, revolt is not on the cards in Pakistan, but the fact remains that the army has been considerably downgraded in people’s estimation from its previous status as a guarantor of political security and wellbeing. Indeed, a spreading sense of the military as the source of problems bears watching.

The PTI’s success in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can probably be attributed in part to regional sympathy for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic militant group responsible for hundreds of attacks last year. Khan has proposed allowing the group to open an office in the province and has characterized Pakistan’s war on terror as an American war being fought by Pakistan’s military. Consequently, Khan is likely to continue to claim that his ouster as prime minister in a no-confidence vote was the result of a U.S.-led conspiracy.

PTI supporters protest election results in Peshawar on Feb.10: Pakistan’s youth have become resentful of military intervention.   © Reuters

In some ways, the election outcome was inevitable due to the manner in which army intervention meant there was no way for the military to be viewed as a neutral arbiter just stepping into politics periodically.

Times have changed considerably since the military removed Nawaz Sharif as prime minister in 1999. At that time, images of people celebrating the civilian government’s departure flashed across television screens.

Later, as Gen. Pervez Musharraf and his military administration lost popularity due to his authoritarian approach to the judiciary, the army echelons decided not only to support a return to civilian rule but also to move toward managing governance rather than controlling the state directly. This approach allowed the army to exert control over decision-making and national resources without being held publicly responsible for bad outcomes.

Beginning around 2013, senior generals became ensconced in strategic government decision-making. Their role expanded further in 2018 with the army chief becoming a member of the core economic policymaking apparatus of the state.

This formula was good for the army’s image temporarily but has proved costly over the years as the public has still come around to seeing the army as jointly responsible for the tragic state of the country’s politics and economy.

The army perhaps might regain some credibility if Khan were allowed another chance to lead. But that seems especially unlikely after his three back-to-back convictions in the days immediately before the election. The army leadership is also showing no interest in striking a deal with the PTI.

Yet a coalition government without the PTI will not bring stability nor rehabilitate the army’s public image. Ever looming in the background will be PTI accusations about the party’s stolen election mandate. These will make things uncomfortable for a new government needing to make more unpopular financial decisions to retain financial support from the International Monetary Fund.

It appears the next government will be formed based on the formula of the PPP getting the presidency but not sitting in the cabinet, which is to be run by the PML-N’s Shehbaz Sharif as prime minister. He will be running a highly polarized country where each of the three main provinces are run by a different major party. No Pakistani prime minister has ever completed a full term in office and Sharif will probably be no exception.

As unlikely as it may be, the best way forward now would be for the PTI and other political parties to join together to take back control of the government from the military. That, in turn, would do wonders in softening public resentment of the army.