By Husain Haqqani
The results of Pakistan’s general elections on Feb. 8 reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s civil and military establishment, but they seem to have brought about the opposite of what many voters wanted. Independent candidates affiliated with former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party—barred from running under its banner—won more seats in parliament than any major party, but not enough for a majority. Parliamentary arithmetic necessitates a coalition, and Khan, who is in prison on corruption charges, refuses to negotiate with his rivals.
Pakistan’s next government will instead be formed by a coalition of legacy parties, including the center-right Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by former President Asif Ali Zardari and his son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. On Feb. 8, Pakistan’s entrenched political order—in which parties vie for votes as well as the powerful military’s favor—was jolted but did not crumble. Although PTI’s surprising performance damaged the military’s reputation and mystique, the military’s ability to influence the course of events remains intact.
The latest episode in Pakistan’s game of thrones comes amid a serious economic crisis as well as security threats from the resurgent Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups. Political polarization makes it difficult to address Pakistan’s swelling debt and deficit. With a GDP of $340 billion, Pakistan must repay nearly $78 billion in external debt before 2026. Imposing taxes on key sectors of the economy—agriculture, real estate, retail—is difficult without political consensus. And amid the uncertainty, various loss-making state-owned enterprises, from Pakistan International Airlines to the country’s power distribution companies, which collectively cost the government around $1.7 billion annually, cannot be privatized.
Pakistan also needs a comprehensive strategy to deal with jihadi groups, which are now responsible for terrorist attacks inside the country but were once encouraged or tolerated as part of unconventional warfare against India and a way to secure influence in Afghanistan. Populist narratives blaming India, Israel, and the United States for holding back Pakistan’s progress hinder action against extremists, who portray themselves as Islamist heroes. Meanwhile, peace with India, relations with the West, and ties to economic benefactors in the Arab world are now held hostage to Pakistan’s internal divisions: Those holding office at any given time are often accused by their opponents of selling out Pakistan’s interests.
If there was ever a time for Pakistan’s squabbling politicians to form a government of national unity, it would be now. Given the fragmented election results and allegations of vote-rigging, a stable cross-party government could pave the way for the military’s withdrawal from politics. It could also help Pakistan transition away from its long-standing tradition of one major politician or another being in jail—such as Khan—while their supporters are harassed. Parliamentary debates on alternative policy ideas could replace the current shouting matches between rival leaders’ supporters about who is more corrupt.
But rather than inspiring unity, the coalition government that is taking shape will immediately face opposition from Khan’s supporters. As things stand, it seems unlikely that Pakistan’s divisions will end anytime soon. The results of last week’s elections confirmed voters’ weariness with the political elite and dynastic politics, as well as with the meddling—both overt and covert—by the country’s generals. Widespread dissatisfaction with the economy and the absence of opportunities for Pakistan’s burgeoning young population have given rise to populist politics that will not lead to reconciliation.
Khan, the cricket star-turned-quintessential populist leader, dismisses the idea of a negotiated settlement with his political opponents. He has built a powerful narrative of victimhood that blames Pakistan’s political elites and foreign conspiracies for the country’s problems. His grandiloquence may not offer realistic solutions, but it does create an outlet for powerless people to vent their rage and frustration. Khan seems to believe that a revolution could give him greater power than embracing the idea of a new national pact. Instead of using PTI’s electoral success to talk to the other major parties, Khan has offered an alliance proposal to two minor religious parties, although one of them has already refused the partnership.
Ironically, Khan came to power in 2018 with the help of Pakistan’s military and security services as a crusader against corrupt civilian politicians. The generals built up Khan as an alternative to these politicians, many of whom had quarreled with the military at some point in the past. But Khan also ran afoul of the military as prime minister because he defied the generals’ wishes and mismanaged the economy; his populism harmed Pakistan’s precarious external relations. To remove Khan from office, the military turned to the same politicians it had sought to discredit.
After his ouster in a parliamentary no-confidence vote, Khan saw an opportunity to continue his anti-elite bombast, adding the country’s top generals to the list of villains from whom he would save Pakistan. His supporters lapped it up. The military has influenced the country’s politics for decades, but it now faces a unique challenge. Khan has poisoned even traditionally pro-army constituencies by arguing that the generals were acting at the behest of the United States—allegations that Washington denies—and against Pakistan’s interests. Military leaders have now been trying to get an entire nation to change direction away from Khan for nearly two years with little success.
The generals and their new civilian allies may have assumed that jailing Khan, bringing back Sharif from exile, and implementing repressive measures—such as barring PTI-affiliated candidates’ access to the media—would ensure the election result that they wanted. Instead, young PTI activists used social media to mobilize voters and upended the establishment’s plans.
Still, the reaction of voters to the Pakistani military’s highhandedness is unlikely to unleash a revolution. In the short term, the country will continue to have a weak civilian government willing to work closely with the military while Khan will remain in prison and his party will remain out of power. Any widespread political violence will only result in a clamor for the military to take over and restore order.
For years, Pakistan’s military has repeated the cycle of “elect, dismiss, disqualify, and arrest” for civilian politicians. But in the long term, the country’s leaders must collectively address the widespread frustration and polarization that has contributed the success of Khan’s populism. Although unlikely, Khan changing tack and accepting political compromise could also help ease Pakistan’s pain. In any case, the hostility toward the military’s political role among its former supporters makes it difficult for generals to act as if nothing has changed.
Sourcr : Foreignpolicy