ANDREW SELTH
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced in January that a Japanese national had pleaded guilty to the attempted trafficking of nuclear materials, including uranium, thorium and plutonium, from Myanmar to Iran. In rather triumphant tones, the DOJ press release described the man’s capture and his crimes, but left one critical question unanswered: where did the plutonium, said to be “weapons grade”, really come from?
So, the question remains, where did the “weapons grade plutonium” come from? No doubt intelligence agencies around the world are trying to figure this out.
During the early 2000s, the international news media was filled with sensational stories, purportedly sourced from “defectors” and others with inside knowledge, claiming that Myanmar’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) had launched a clandestine nuclear weapons program. A few reports even claimed that two reactors had been secretly built in Myanmar, probably with the help of Russia or North Korea.
Significantly, no government or international organisation was prepared to confirm such stories, although the US did worry about the possible transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea. Despite that, in 2009 two respected Myanmar-watchers claimed that the secret nuclear weapons program was well advanced and that, if all went according to plan, the SPDC would be able to produce “a bomb a year, every year, after 2014”.
As the supposed program was given closer scrutiny, and by more objective analysts, it was ultimately accepted that, even if the SPDC entertained fantasies of building a nuclear weapon, Myanmar lacked the expertise and facilities to do so. The generals had always been interested in acquiring a small research reactor, but talk of the world’s first Buddhist bomb faded away.
Because of this record, stories in early 2024 of “weapons grade plutonium” being sourced from Myanmar immediately set alarm bells ringing. The details are unclear, but it appears that, in a sting operation dating from 2020, undercover agents from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were able to persuade a Japanese yakuza gang leader named Takeshi Ebisawa to hand over two vials of nuclear material that he said was for sale.
The two samples were found to contain “detectable quantities of uranium, thorium and plutonium”. Ebisawa boasted to the DEA undercover officers that he had access to large quantities of such materials. This seems to have prompted the DOJ to warn in its 2025 press release that “the plutonium, if produced in sufficient quantities, would be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon”.
In all the reporting on this saga, few details were provided about the possible source of the nuclear materials and how they were produced. An investigation by Frontier Myanmar canvassed a number of options but was unable to prove anything. Similar exercises by other news outlets also came up with nothing solid. Western experts who were consulted confessed that they had no idea where the nuclear materials could have come from.
There are deposits of uranium in northern Myanmar, some of which may have been mined from time to time. However, as far as is known, the Myanmar government does not possess a mill to process the ore, nor the reactor and advanced facilities necessary to convert it to plutonium. The notion that one of Myanmar’s small, poorly resourced insurgent groups may be able independently to manufacture plutonium was considered, but immediately dismissed.
Undercover agents from the US Drug Enforcement Administration were able to persuade a Japanese yakuza gang leader to hand over two vials of nuclear material.
Ebisawa was apparently trying to raise funds to purchase arms for resale to Burmese insurgent groups. This saw attention focused on Yawd Serk, the head of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). At one stage, the RCSS was rumoured to be mining uranium for sale to foreigners. Although reportedly cited by the DOJ as a co-conspirator with Ebisawa, Yawd Serk has denied any involvement and nothing has yet been proven.
The Karen National Liberation Army and the United Wa State Army, also named in the case’s legal documents, stated that they have no knowledge of the nuclear deal.
So, the question remains, where did the “weapons grade plutonium” come from? No doubt intelligence agencies around the world are trying to figure this out. They may know more than has been reported in open sources, but to date no satisfactory explanation has been offered.
One possibility that does not seem to have been examined very closely is that the proposed sale of nuclear materials was in fact an elaborate scam and that Ebisawa, a known hoaxer, had nothing to offer Iran beyond the small samples handed over to the DEA. The question of where he may have acquired them in the first place remains open, but there has long been a black market in nuclear materials of various kinds.
Also, if it was a scam, citing Myanmar as the source of the nuclear materials makes sense, given past rumours of a secret nuclear program, the country’s notoriously opaque government and its well-known reluctance to permit outsiders from undertaking any kind of investigation inside its borders. The current civil war would also make such an enquiry extremely difficult.
Such an explanation may seem rather far-fetched. However, it is easier to believe than the idea that, somewhere in Myanmar, hidden from the outside world for more than a decade, there exists a secret nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility able to produce the core ingredient for a nuclear weapon.
The article appeared in the lowyinstitute