Iran marks Trump’s inauguration by signing a partnership treaty with Russia

0
10

by Jamaes M Dorsey

Iran’s newly minted strategic partnership treaty with Russia may not be more than a bargaining chip if the first five years of Iran’s 25-year, US$400 billion cooperation agreement with China are any indication.

The symbolism of this week’s signing of the treaty days before US President-elect Donald J. Trump is inaugurated will not be lost on Iranian and Russian leaders when they sign their 20-year partnership agreement during this week’s visit to Moscow by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

The signing of the agreement years in the making comes as Iran reels from the fallout of 16 months of Middle Eastern conflict that has reversed its regional fortunes, braces for what the incoming Trump administration has in store for the Islamic Republic and seeks to revive nuclear talks that would enable the lifting of crippling Western sanctions.

Listen now · 11:26

Moreover, when he enters the Oval Office next week, the treaty will take on added significance, with Iran and Russia likely to be high on Mr. Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Mr. Trump has promised to end the Ukraine and Gaza wars.

In a twist of irony, Iran is the piece of the puzzle that links the two wars.

Lost in the speculation that Mr. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin could sacrifice Ukraine and Iran in a grand bargain is the fact that Iranian support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine while backing Hamas against Israel’s assault on Gaza is no less hypocritical than US support for Ukraine while backing Israel’s devastation of the Palestinian territory.

Similarly, double standards are written all over Iran’s application of the treaty’s reference to the principle of territorial integrity to three islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates that it seized in 1971 but not to Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian land.

Mr. Trump may be able to claim an initial success even before he takes office, provided his threat that “all hell will break loose” in the Middle East if Hamas does not release its hostages by the time of his inauguration, produces a Gaza ceasefire.

The strategic partnership treaty‘s signing fuels Western and Israeli fears that Russia could award Iran for its support in the Ukraine war by supplying it with the technology it needs to utilise enriched uranium in a nuclear warhead.

Iran has denied Western assertions that the Islamic Republic has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, drones, and ammunition.

Western and Israeli officials are concerned that the treaty could speed up the delivery of Russian Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jets and preparations for the plane’s production in Iran, and persuade Russia to sell Iran its top-of-the-line S-400 anti-missile air defence system.

Russia has so far hesitated to honour Iran’s request for the S-400. It is unclear whether Russia would be more or less willing to give Iran the S-400 after Israel last year knocked out the Islamic Republic’s S-300 batteries in one fell swoop.

For their part, Iranian officials worry that Mr. Putin could shape Mr. Trump’s expected effort to end the Ukraine war by offering to halt Russia’s support for Iran in exchange for US pressure on Ukraine to concede territory and drop its quest for NATO membership.

On a visit to Paris last month, Mr. Trump suggested that “Russia and Iran are in a weakened state right now, one because of Ukraine and a bad economy, the other because of Israel and its fighting success. Likewise, Zelenskyy and Ukraine would like to make a deal and stop the madness… There should be an immediate ceasefire, and negotiations should begin.”

Mr. Trump was referring to the weakening of Iran’s regional influence because of the loss of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, Israel’s destruction of Iranian air defences, and its debilitating targeting of Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah, a central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s forward defence strategy.

Mr. Trump has vowed not to allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Israel is lobbying Mr. Trump to greenlight Israeli strikes at Iranian nuclear and other facilities, if not launch joint operations together with Israel.

Israel has argued that Iran is at its most vulnerable because of the destruction of its air defences and regional geopolitical setbacks.

In addition, Israel points to US assertions that Iran, since the US withdrawal from the nuclear accord, has reduced from a year to a week or two the time it would need to produce the necessary fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

Credit: UNN

Iran, in the absence of renewed nuclear talks, has forged closer ties with Russia, China, and North Korea, since Mr. Trump withdrew in 2018, during his first term in office, from the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme.

At the very least, the strategic partnership with Russia serves Iran as a hedge in hopes that Mr. Trump may couple his sanctions-driven maximum pressure approach with an effort to cut a deal with the Islamic Republic.

What that means in practice is unclear. Iran’s 2021 cooperation agreement with China could have been a game changer by significantly boosting Iran’s regional influence and challenging US policy in the Middle East.

The agreement did neither. Instead, it seems to have been put in the deep freeze with officials asserting the agreement constituted a roadmap for specific accords that have yet to be concluded.

Iran’s treaty with Russia, which will need ratification by parliament, could prove to be no different.

Even so, Iranian reformists warn that the treaty will deepen Iran’s dependance on Russia and turn the country into a Russian client state.

The treaty’s 40+ articles reportedly cover a wide range of issues, including cybersecurity, nuclear energy, counterterrorism, regional cooperation, money laundering, organised crime, and defence. Cooperation on many of these issues will depend on the conclusion of more detailed agreements.

Driving closer cooperation is Iran and Russia’s need to circumvent US and European sanctions.

Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin said in November that the two countries had created an interbank network that would allow them to evade Swift, the US dollar-based financial messaging system that dominates the world’s money and security transfers.

The new system connects the two country’s networks, allowing Iranians and Russians to make online purchases and withdraw money in each other’s country.

Russia and Iran intend to expand their network to Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. That could prove difficult with neither Turkey nor Iraq willing to so blatantly violate sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia.

Similarly, sanction busting in cooperation with Russia is risky business for Iran as it counts on Britain, France, and Germany, to help revive indirect talks with the United States.

Iran refuses direct talks as long as the United States fails to return to the 2015 agreement, which Mr. Trump has denounced as the “worst deal ever.”

In anticipation of European criticism of the partnership treaty, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi offered to discuss Iranian support for Russia in Ukraine if Europe opens for discussion its support for Israel.

Contradicting Iran’s earlier denials, Mr. Araghchi argued, “If Europe is upset about Russia using Iranian weapons, it should also be held accountable for its military cooperation with Israel.”

Mr. Araghchi’s offer was unlikely to earn him brownie points in European capitals.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Previous articleAUKUS: Flawed and Sinking
Next articleThe Possibility of a War Against Iran
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, a syndicated columnist and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. A veteran, award-winning foreign correspondent whose career focused on ethnic and religious conflict, James focuses at RSIS on political and social change in the Middle East and North Africa, the impact of change in the Middle East and North Africa on Southeast and Central Asia and the nexus of sports, politics and society in the Middle East and North Africa and Asia.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here