Stirring in April-June, India’s GDP for the first half of fiscal year 2024 rose 7.7 percent in real terms. Nominal GDP climbed 8.6 percent. The difference between nominal and real growth, the implicit deflator, is one measure of inflation. It suggests inflation is running just below one percent, which takes on the appearance of an awkward compromise between direct price measures.

Retail inflation was choppy April through September, averaging about 5.5 percent. If that were used to deflate GDP, real growth would barely clear three percent. In contrast, wholesale prices fell roughly 1.7 percent. The deflator effectively weighs wholesale prices more than retail, to a dubious extent. Or, if the higher prices faced by households do matter less in GDP, then GDP per capita overstates real household income and GDP gains overstate prosperity.

More broadly, India continues to be in a hurry to claim global economic importance. To the extent this occurs, data quality will be increasingly contentious. There are recent questions about sharp inconsistencies; there are also older questions implying political manipulation. One example of an odd result is the purported invulnerability of bad bank loans to COVID, with a 10-year low reported for the end of fiscal 2022. There have been many others.

This year, manufacturing raced ahead in the first half, yet overall exports contracted. First-half imports were down double-digits. Strong manufacturing should have boosted imports supporting it. Yet oil import volume was flat. Domestic private consumption was slow, but not slow enough to explain the extent of import contraction. The rupee has set all-time lows against the dollar, strange when India is supposed to be the fastest-growing major economy.

External results can be verified by partners, so external economic weakness makes internal strength less credible, even when discrepancies are not conclusive. There are also purely domestic questions. The government says construction stood out positively in July-September. This would seem very good for jobs, but job results were mediocre. Growth hasn’t made state enterprises attractive—returns from divesting shares are far short of government targets.

The single biggest issue might not be data quality but policy quality. Official figures say government spending was a major contributor to GDP. That’s believable because spending is soaring. So much so that, despite solid tax revenue, India’s annual fiscal deficit remains on course for 5.9 percent of GDP.

This is roughly equivalent to the huge, widely-criticized 2023 US federal deficit. Both countries are borrowing large sums while insisting they have no economic need to. But this mistake is considerably worse in India, which is far poorer and needs to sustain rapid growth for at least a generation. Borrowing heavily now undermines sustainability.

India’s full set of economic results is odd, casting some doubt on the upside GDP surprise. The alternative view is a little better: GDP is genuinely quick, but household purchasing power is sluggish, job gains are limited, external accounts are plain bad, and aggregate growth isn’t sustainable. Delhi is announcing the fast growth it wants, but growth is a means to various ends and the ends may not be getting closer.