The return of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led government for a third term in 2024 has meant a continuity in New Delhi’s foreign policy goals and projection, especially with regard to priorities in the Indo Pacific. The pursuit of key global governance issues in order to advance New Delhi’s domestic and foreign policy priorities remains central to India’s Indo-Pacific outreach. These include resilient supply chains, including in energy, food and semiconductors, burden sharing and interoperability to ensure access to the global commons, respect for international law, and a positive agenda for the Indo Pacific. At the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Italy recently, India emphasized this approach and its desire to work with diverse partners when Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar noted: “In an era of collaborative endeavors, the Indo-Pacific will require practical solutions, nimble diplomacy, greater adjustment and more open conversations. The G7 can be one such partner.” This assertion shows that New Delhi is keen on building on the successes of its G20 presidency, during which India caught global attention for its ability to build consensus in a polarized international order.
Building on its diverse partnerships across geographies (such as with the United States and Russia) and via multiple geometries (through groupings like the Quad, BRICS, and G7) is key to New Delhi’s push for more capacities in fields like governance, health, technology, disaster resilience and natural resource management. But India’s emphasis also continues to be on collaboration to support capacity building of nations, including creating viable alternatives to avoid bad borrowing and unsustainable debt, especially with an eye of China. In 2025 and beyond, India’s broader geopolitical focus will be anchored in satisfying its internal mandate of building economic capacities as well as deepening its technological edge and defense capabilities. But while doing so, India will also aim to be seen as a credible voice contributing to managing practical challenges in the region as it looks to mainstream its Indo-Pacific vision and scale up local templates for global solutions.
India’s Indo Pacific Agenda and Achievements in 2024
A snapshot of Prime Minister Modi’s high-profile summit interactions in 2024 demonstrates how New Delhi strived to actively shape the emerging security and development architecture in the Indo-Pacific region and solidify itself as a regional and increasingly global leader this year.
His visit to Washington for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) leaders meet reaffirmed the Indo-U.S. partnership, with significant advancements in defense cooperation, including joint defense tech initiatives, AI & space collaboration, semiconductor partnerships, and energy cooperation. In his visits to Russia and Ukraine, Modi achieved a diplomatic balancing act amid the ongoing conflict. In Russia, he reaffirmed the strategic partnership focusing on defense and energy cooperation, stressing the importance of dialogue for dispute resolution. In Ukraine, Modi extended humanitarian support and called for an immediate ceasefire and peaceful negotiations. With Japan and Australia—two of India’s partners in the Quad—Modi emphasized strengthening maritime security, trade, and clean energy projects. His engagements with ASEAN, including Singapore and Brunei, advanced economic and security cooperation with a focus on capacity building. While hosting Vietnam, defense ties were further solidified with agreements on advanced military equipment, joint exercises, and a commitment to freedom of navigation reiterated. With West Asia, Modi prioritized energy security, securing crude oil and natural gas from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and promoting green hydrogen cooperation. Counterterrorism efforts were also reinforced through enhanced intelligence sharing and defense collaboration. For Africa, India continued to focus on deliverables on infrastructure, agriculture, health technology, while reaffirming its commitment to counterterrorism and peacekeeping.
These key foreign engagements in 2024 reveal a wide but critical spectrum of interests, partners and priorities for New Delhi, which will continue to shape its geopolitics in 2025.
Drivers of India’s Indo-Pacific Geopolitics in 2025
Sustaining Momentum of India-United States ties under Trump 2.0
Speculation on the United States turning isolationist under Trump has many geographies bracing for impact. India, however, seems confident of the trajectory of Indo-U.S. ties, since many of Trump’s top nominees advocate for a stronger India. Additionally, in Trump’s first term the U.S.-India relationship advanced significantly, particularly in defense, counterterrorism, and regional security. The two countries signed foundational agreements that enhanced interoperability between American and Indian forces. Under Biden, these ties deepened further, culminating in the announcement of the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in 2022, focusing on technology and defense collaboration.
iCET has made substantial progress in the last two years, with the review meetings in 2024 highlighting key deliverables in AI, quantum computing, 5G/6G, biotechnology, and space exploration. Despite this progress, however, trust remains fragile in critical technology and cybersecurity collaboration. Recent tensions over India’s alleged campaign against Sikh separatists in Canada and the United States were managed privately, but the public fallout has highlighted the need to preserve this strategic trust between both nations. Moving forward, maintaining this trust will be fundamental especially if Washington remains invested in positioning India as a key technology partner to manage and maintain a competitive advantage over China. New Delhi will be watching closely to see if India’s access to advanced defense and cybersecurity technologies from Washington faces delays due to national security concerns.
Concerns about Trump’s stance on tariffs and military cost-sharing with key strategic allies also remain. India’s cautious response to Trump’s tariff policies, particularly regarding BRICS’ de-dollarization plans, underscores its pragmatic approach. Responding to the threat of 100 percent tariffs on BRICS countries, India reiterated the preeminence of the dollar in global trade and transactions, but also highlighted the opportunity it sees in forging new partnerships within the Indo-Pacific. This could translate to India and other regional powers taking on more leadership roles within trilateral and plurilateral platforms, creating more options for the region. As India prepares to host the Quad summit in 2025, it will prioritize aligning with its partners to ensure that the security and development agenda for the Indo Pacific is sustained and is not mutually exclusive. Thus, the uncertainties of Trump 2.0 will push India to innovate, and do more, not less.
The India-China relationship is one of the most complex and contentious aspects of India’s foreign policy. Ties remain fragile following the Galwan clashes in 2020, which severely damaged strategic trust. A cautious re-engagement in 2024 has led to agreements on patrolling protocols and grazing rights in two key areas—Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh. However, these agreements do not extend to buffer zones established at other friction points, and the process of disengagement remains ongoing. The Modi-Xi bilateral meeting in Kazan in 2024, the first since 2020, discussed what the disengagement would translate into going forward. Although the agreement marks a diplomatic achievement, it falls short of resolving the deep-seated mistrust and rivalry between the two powers. Driven by pragmatic considerations, this cautious détente reflects a delicate balancing of regional priorities, economic necessity, and a mutual recognition of the dangers posed by escalating border tensions.
Despite political tensions, trade with China remains significant, valued at approximately USD $118 billion in 2024. India’s priority will be to reduce dependence on China by diversifying trade partners and boosting domestic manufacturing. China’s growing military and economic assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Indian Ocean Region and South China Sea, has heightened India’s security concerns. Beijing’s close ties with Pakistan and efforts to establish a permanent military presence in the region with port visits, spotting of nuclear submarines and speculation of an IOR Fleet, challenge India’s strategic position. To offset this, India will continue its outreach to resident Indo-Pacific powers, particularly through the Quad, to counterbalance China’s dominance. India’s strategy will be to continue engaging China through multilateral forums like the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, while ensuring that its own position in the Indo-Pacific remains robust and it is able to push back against any Chinese adventurism.
Keeping Russia in the Room
Five months after Prime Minister Modi’s visit, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh met with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, declaring that “India has made a conscious decision that the country will not only continue close contacts with Russia but will also deepen and expand our interaction.” But New Delhi also used this opportunity to urge Russia to expedite the supply of the two remaining units of the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile systems. Apart from the S-400s, several key deals, including the Krivak-class stealth frigates, nuclear attack submarine (INS Chakra) and the supply of spares and components, have experienced considerable delays since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In this regard, the two sides discussed new opportunities in India for Russian defense industries in terms of joint production of various military hardware, which will ensure India is not vulnerable to supply chain disruptions in future.
While most observers would chalk up India’s delicate balancing act of managing the Russia relationship on the one hand while working towards the resolution of the Ukraine war on the other hand as a practice of its axiom of strategic autonomy, the reality is anchored in New Delhi’s assessment that it is imperative to keep Russia in the room. India believes maintaining its relationship with Moscow is essential to managing its China challenge. Having Russia draw closer to India’s adversaries, China and Pakistan, will play spoiler to its larger geopolitical ambitions. India’s broader strategy has been on getting technology transfer from Russia to help build more of its own defense equipment while diversifying its traditional reliance on Russian arms by increasing engagement with the West, especially EU and its member states.
Going forward, India’s challenge will be balancing defense cooperation with Russia, while adhering to U.S. sanction laws under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). India may continue to rely on Russian energy supplies, including crude oil, to mitigate energy insecurity, while not putting itself in the cross hairs of Western sanctions.
Future Forward: 2025 and Beyond
While managing its big power relations, India in 2025 will look to solidify its Indo Pacific credentials by managing three focus areas: stabilizing its neighborhood, being part of attempts to manage the region’s economic integration and actively developing a technology edge to deliver goods in the region.
India’s “Neighborhood First” policy will focus on stabilizing its surroundings amidst political instability, economic crises, and increasing Chinese influence. It will emphasize non-reciprocity, and strategic patience as central to its diplomacy, focusing on enhancing economic integration through development partnerships and connectivity. In this regard, New Delhi will prioritize regional trade facilitation and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) while India-led platforms like BIMSTEC ((The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) will serve to offer regional alternatives to China.
On the missing economic heft to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific, India shares concerns with partners on the impact of Trump’s tariff regime and the lack of momentum on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) launched by Biden in 2023. The IPEF, which had already lost steam in the absence of outcomes on the trade pillar, continues to reflect the larger political divide in the United States on all things trade. In these circumstances, India’s 2019 decision to withdraw from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), primarily because of worries of over dumping by China is reportedly being reconsidered, with the aim to seize global economic opportunities.
Finally, India will focus on building its technological edge by strengthening cybersecurity and defense collaborations, and investing in AI-driven defense capabilities. It will look to scale up local templates via the Digital India initiative to promote regional digital integration, especially in areas like 5G, AI, and green energy. Together, these strategies will enable New Delhi to position itself as a key player in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future, prepared to take on greater responsibilities amid global challenges and a potentially isolationist United States under Trump.
source : southasianvoices