India officially doesn’t recognise the Taliban government and has played coy about making any official statement suggesting recognition or the consular appointment. But this development follows an important visit to Kabul by the Ministry of External Affairs’ point person for Afghanistan.
The official Indian delegation did all the diplomatic niceties in meeting the former President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, as well as the acting defence minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, also the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar. The very fact that Yaqoob met an official Indian delegation is enough to suggest a lot more.
In the public domain is, of course, India’s offer for Afghan businesses to make use of the Chabahar Port in Iran, which has been developed with Indian investments. This offer truly turns the clock back since the India-Iran agreement over the port is in itself from the period where both countries were united in their opposition to the first Taliban regime, from 1996-2001. But a lot of water has since flown down the Oxus, and events regionally as well as globally have raced far ahead of time and expectations. Pragmatism is clearly the order of the day, as it should well be.
Delhi’s diplomatic shift
Indian officials visited Afghanistan when polling was still underway in the US. This is not to suggest in the least bit that Indian officials are soothsayers. But the basic fact remains that Taliban Part II is largely on account of an extraordinary agreement reached between Washington and what was a proscribed group in 2020, during Trump Part I.
While it is always good to preempt an unpredictable Donald Trump presidency, it makes better policy for India to have its own neighbourhood interests paramount. And one of the recurring themes has always been the closeness between Kabul and New Delhi.
The five years of Taliban Part I, between 1996 and 2001, were an aberration in terms of India-Afghanistan relations. Nothing existed between the two countries, which were long joined by history and culture. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, launched after the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks, resulted in the fall of the Taliban, and a significant reawakening of relations between India and Afghanistan. The two decades of non-Taliban rule in Kabul saw enormous Indian participation in infrastructure and political developments across Afghanistan. But these were undertaken at serious risks as well, the chief being the 2008 suicide car bomb attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
India & Afghanistan: An enduring bond
Despite setbacks, India stayed its course of maintaining a presence in Afghanistan and continuing to invest in people. The payback was a public image that remained a bugbear for envious neighbours, as well as those further away from the region. Many in Washington found it hard to bear that billions of dollars, along with the sacrifices of hundreds of brave soldiers, did not yield public perceptions commensurate with lesser Indian investments. This was because Indian monies were being spent on visible assets and institutions, without the jarring visuals and presence of overbearing soldiers in the villages and alleys of Afghanistan.
The isolationist Trump Part I was simply not interested in ‘unnecessary’ foreign wars and sought to end its presence in countries that were beyond the comprehension of the chief executive. In essence, this policy cannot be faulted as it recognises the inalienable rights of the local population to decide their own fate and fortunes. But it is ultimately based on a naive understanding of social and security dynamics, especially given that prevailing conditions are an outcome of decades of international interference and intrigue. So, when Trump and the Taliban decided to tango in early 2020, the endgame of an elected Afghan government began.
India has done well to preempt any new Trump 2.0 initiatives in Afghanistan. For one, it has more enduring interests in Afghanistan than the US can ever have. Then, there are regional dynamics, which decide that come what may, New Delhi and Kabul will find common ground and interests if the prism of pragmatism is allowed to prevail. Taliban Part II has reached out to India, and the latter did well to respond with craftsmanship. But the Taliban has harmed Indian interests as well as friends earlier, so messaging loyalty to those must always remain paramount, even in the age of pragmatism.
Manvendra Singh is a BJP leader, Editor-in-Chief of Defence & Security Alert and Chairman, Soldier Welfare Advisory Committee, Rajasthan. He tweets @ManvendraJasol. Views are personal.
source : theprint