Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar attends a panel during the annual Munich Security Conference in February 2020. © Reuters
Chietigj Bajpaee
India is betting that Donald Trump’s return to the White House will offer New Delhi some breathing room with a more conciliatory U.S. approach towards Russia, and reduce scrutiny of its own relationship with Moscow.
This comes as New Delhi prepares to host both the Russian and U.S. presidents this year: Vladimir Putin will make his first visit to India since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, while Trump is scheduled to visit India for a Quad summit. Trump has announced that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be visiting the U.S. this month, making him one of the first world leaders to meet Trump since he began his second term.
However, a more conciliatory Russia-U.S. relationship is not guaranteed, as Trump’s pledge to end the Ukraine war “within 24 hours” does not match the reality of the challenges of de-escalating the three-year old conflict. Exacerbating this are several underlying contradictions in the India-Russia relationship that will come to the fore under Trump 2.0.
The most obvious one is India’s effort to maintain close relations with both Russia and the U.S. New Delhi’s narrative of not being an enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine is becoming harder to sustain amid revelations that India has emerged as the second-largest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia.
Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on 19 Indian entities as part of a probe into third-country sanctions evaders. Claims that New Delhi stands apart from Moscow’s other partners — China, Iran and North Korea — will hold less weight under Trump’s more value-neutral foreign policy that does not draw a distinction between democratic India and the “axis of autocracies.”
Another contradiction that is often overlooked is India’s simultaneous dependence on Russian and Ukrainian military hardware. India commissioned a Russian-made stealth frigate in December. While the vessels are Russian-made, they are powered by gas turbine engines from Ukraine. Amid the Indian Navy’s reliance on Ukrainian engines, Indian company Bharat Forge acquired a majority stake in Ukrainian arms manufacturer Zorya-Mashproekt.
In theory, India’s simultaneous dependence on Russian and Ukrainian military hardware gives New Delhi an added incentive to see a resolution of the Ukraine conflict. New Delhi is also well-positioned to play the role of mediator given its close relations with both Moscow and Washington. In reality, India’s actions during the war have been largely driven by self-interest, with New Delhi not offering any concrete peace proposals on par with what has been put forward by other countries — notwithstanding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s much-touted statement that “now is not an era of war.”
A third contradiction is within the India-Russia relationship itself. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has referred to the friendship between both countries as “higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest ocean,” while Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has called the bilateral relationship the “one constant” in global politics over the last half-century. This alludes to New Delhi’s historical affinity toward Moscow rooted in the India-Soviet friendship during the Cold War. It also reflects New Delhi’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy, which entails engaging all poles of influence in the international system.
This photo shows the Indian Navy Ship INS Talwar, a 4,000-metric ton Russian-built Krivak Class warship. © APBeyond this, there are practical considerations driving the relationship. In July, India overtook China as the largest buyer of Russian crude oil (much of which goes to Western markets in the form of refined product). In December, both countries concluded their largest energy deal with a 10-year agreement for the supply of 500,000 barrels per day, equivalent to half of Russia’s seaborne oil exports. The Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor has also reduced shipping times and transport costs for Indian imports of Russian crude, liquefied natural gas and fertilizers. These developments have helped make the country Russia’s second-largest trading partner.
However, the India-Russia relationship is also undergoing a managed decline. While over 50% of India’s in-service military platforms remain of Russian origin, there has been a steady decline in India’s dependence on Russian hardware as New Delhi has diversified its defense imports and strengthened indigenous production. This predates the war in Ukraine but has been accelerated by the conflict amid delays in the delivery of numerous platforms (including the S-400 missile system that India purchased in 2018).
Adding to this are New Delhi’s concerns about Russia’s growing dependence on Chinese dual-use technologies. India’s Defense Ministry has issued a directive against the use of Chinese components in the production of its military drones. No major defense deals have been announced between New Delhi and Moscow since the start of the Ukraine war, although India is discussing the purchase of a radar system from Russia.
Where does this leave New Delhi’s relations with Washington?
On the one hand, fissures in the India-Russia relationship offer opportunities to the U.S. American defence companies are among the key beneficiaries of India’s push to reduce dependence on Russian military hardware. However, there is room for further improvement. Russia remains India’s preferred joint production partner because of Moscow’s ability to provide advanced military platforms (that other countries are unwilling or unable to supply) at reasonable prices with fewer or no end-user constraints.
Washington also needs to recognize where the India-Russia relationship complements the broader strategic interests of the U.S. For instance, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile — an Indo-Russian joint venture — has been sold to the Philippines while other countries, including Vietnam and Indonesia have also expressed interest in acquiring it. These are countries with a history of difficult relations with Beijing and active territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. While India does not have sufficient leverage to facilitate a repeat of the Cold War-era Sino-Soviet split, New Delhi does offer Moscow strategic options as it fears becoming more beholden to Beijing.
Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2024, Jaishankar remarked that India should be “admired” for maintaining “multiple options” in its relations with Russia and the West. However, this position is becoming increasingly untenable. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, India-Russia relations will remain a thorn in the India-U.S. relationship. This includes the risk of India getting caught in the crossfire of further U.S. sanctions, such as those targeting Russia’s “dark” tanker fleet.
New Delhi cannot rest its hopes on the U.S. dialing down tensions with Russia under a second Trump administration. If anything, fissures in the India-Russia relationship are likely to become more pronounced under Trump 2.0.
source : asia.nikkei