Apart from the sheer volume of destruction of civilian and military infrastructure, displacement and death of civilians, war volunteers and military personnel, the Russian war with Ukraine has many significant implications for reordering of international politics as well.
A Solidifying Axis
Russia and North Korea signed a Mutual Defence Treaty in June 2024. The bonhomie that began to strengthen the Assad regime in Syria between Iran and Russia in 2015 acquired steam with the signing of a defence agreement as well as sought to solidify their economic bonding since January 2024.
US President Trump’s apparent moves to appease Russian President Vladimir Putin to put an end to the Russia-Ukraine war more in preferable terms for Moscow will likely not result in Moscow’s proclivity to adjust its well-established ties to other revisionist states such as China, Iran and North Korea to the preference of Washington. In fact, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given strength to an alliance among powers dubbed as the axis of autocracy in the West.
Iran has provided Russia with drones and medium-range ballistic missiles in exchange of Russian intelligence and fighter aircraft. North Korea contributed 11,000 troops aside from munitions, artillery and missiles to help Russia push back Ukraine from Kursk. Russia in return supplied oil in cheap prices, provided fighter aircraft and other weapons to North Korea not only to overcome international sanctions but as measures to strengthen it vis-a-vis South Korea. China has provided Russia with dual use goods to boost Russian defence manufacturing capacity. China, in return, has received defence technology and energy resources in cheap prices from Russia.
It is true to certain extent as many western commentators and analysts of International Affairs prefer to argue that the ‘axis of autocracy’ is driven by individual interest of each member which in Ukraine converged and apparently took a form of alliance, this is unlikely to endure once the conflict ends. However, even while President Trump and his administration seeks to engender an image of US that has little interest in regime types and seems ready to shed American leadership over international liberal order, contrary to such arguments, such alliance may solidify further considering the common challenges all these powers perceive from American hegemony, its bludgeoning sanctions and tariff regime and its desire to counter China that threatens American hegemony the most now. President Trump has not hesitated to express his willingness to use force against these powers in his speeches on certain occasions unless they bend themselves to American interests. It is wrong to assume that US under Trump is going to abandon American primacy as the core objective of its foreign policy rather the President seeks to ensure it in his own ways.
Fragility of Transatlantic Alliance
As the US seeks to marshal more military and economic resources to pivot to Asia to deter China, Europe has been sidelined and left to fend for itself from the Russian threat and defend Ukraine on its own without the traditional leading role provided by the US. The transatlantic alliance currently faces a novel, grave and unprecedented threat from within compared with the past which related to their differing opinions on and approaches to external threats.
Europe’s defence industry appears to be too fragmented to shore up the military capabilities of Ukraine to confront Russia without American sustained military and economic assistance. The nuclear deterrence provided by Britain and France is overwhelmed by the number of active nuclear warheads of Russia.
The ground realities that the current administration in US fails to grasp and reckon with while placating Russia are first, in any likelihood of direct conflict between US and China, the European countries are well-positioned to play a vital back-up role by blocking the shipment of Middle Eastern oil to China much like the way they contributed their naval assets to counter the Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Second, the decline in Russia’s ally Iran’s power position in West Asia following massive blows to its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah and unexpected fall of Assad regime in Syria indicates that Moscow’s capabilities to undercut American global power position is limited. Third, many middle powers such as India and Brazil have sought to ensure that multilateral forums such as BRICS are not used to advance China’s and Russia’s interests at the expense of the West and liberal international order.
Use of Hard Power to Fulfill Territorial Ambitions
Predominant actors of International Politics including US, Russia and China are again trying to carve out spheres of influence based on hard power and economic heft just like the allied powers did through the Yalta Conference in the post-World War II scenario. The norms and practices of multilateralism and collective security are increasingly relegated to the background. Trump’s growing understanding with Putin to leave Ukraine to Russian sphere of influence and his own plans to annex Greenland, Panama and take over Gaza to implement real estate development plan attest to the fact that both Presidents are thinking in terms of maintaining spheres of influence.
Russia’s violation of the international norm of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state in all possibilities is likely to get legitimised by the international community through the peace process just like its annexation of Crimea in 2014. This norm developed in the post-World War II scenario to prevent emergence of irredentist and ravanchist powers as was Germany under Hitler.The norm to keep off from forcible seizure of another sovereign country’s territory was upheld by the states themselves or it was enforced by the international community as was the case when Argentina was invaded Falkland Islands in 1982 and when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. In both cases the norm was upheld by the amorphous international community.
The American security assistance and extended nuclear deterrence removed from Ukraine and from larger Europe prompted a vigorous debate within the continent as to who would provide security and extended nuclear deterrence to European countries and Ukraine in the current circumstances. Some argue that extended deterrence actually does not work. The countries need to develop their own nukes to safeguard their own security interests. Some go to the extent of blaming Ukraine for surrendering nuclear capabilities and transferring nuclear weapons to Russia in return of assurance of security from the US, Britain and Russia in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. Trump’s foreign policy of leaving the allies in insecurity lurch has not only rankled them but that would push them to go for nukes for their defence.