Alon Pinkas
Ever since October 7, the United States’ main concern has been to prevent the justified war in Gaza – as the Americans saw it – from escalating into a regional war.
That’s why at the White House on October 10, Joe Biden declared his famous “Don’t” – he was addressing Iran and Hezbollah. He followed up his warning by sending two aircraft carrier strike groups to the eastern Mediterranean: the USS Gerald Ford, the largest aircraft carrier in history, and the USS Dwight Eisenhower.
As the Israel-Hezbollah low-intensity war gradually escalated into a larger conflict, but still short of a full war, Washington developed a “communicating vessels” theory. It applied a scientific principle to geopolitics: Two containers (Gaza and Lebanon) containing one fluid (armed conflict) are connected below the top of the liquid. Once the fluid settles (the level of violence), it settles to the same level in both (or more) containers regardless of the shape and volume of the containers, because the gravity and pressure on both is equal.
In plain words, preventing a spiraling escalation in Lebanon requires a cease-fire in Gaza. Only then can a diplomatic effort resolve outstanding issues between Israel and Lebanon, for which Hezbollah claims to speak. Israel not only rejected the “communicating vessels” theory, it has built a logical but dangerous case for attacking Hezbollah as a defensive move.
On the one hand, Israel’s Hezbollah predicament is real, tangible and intolerable. In the absence of a cease-fire in Gaza, no matter who is responsible for the absence, continued Hezbollah attacks cannot be tolerated. Here is a Shi’ite terror organization that gradually became a major political force that eventually grew into a state within a state in Lebanon.
Its well-trained military force is heavily armed, possessing anywhere between 100,000 and 130,000 rockets and missiles, 20,000 of which are believed to be precision missiles. It’s generously funded and politically backed by Iran, and even though Hezbollah is not the de jure sovereign, no major decision in Lebanon can be made without it.
Since October 7, Hezbollah has engaged Israel in dangerous brinkmanship. The group started by passively supporting Hamas, then it launched a campaign of trickling mortar, rocket-propelled-grenade and short-range-rocket fire. That was elevated to more precise munitions and armed drones, which caused the displacement of tens of thousands of Israelis, who left ghost towns behind.
Hezbollah rendered Israeli deterrence ineffective and upended the power relations. What is Israel expected to do? How would any other country react to such a crude and blatant infringement of its sovereignty and the security of its citizens?
And still, Israel and Hezbollah pretend that they control the level of escalation and both assume that the other will be careful not to provoke anything that would tip the balance and justify a full war. “Hezbollah is deterred” proclaim the same geniuses who before October 7 said “Hamas is deterred.” They say that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah “knows what’s at stake and is very calculated.”
These are the mavens who knew exactly what the Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was thinking for months and on the eve of October 7. These hollow platitudes have now been replaced by a bellicose tone predicated on the inevitability of a war.
Similarly, the arrogance coming from reckless advocates of “Israel needs to strike Hezbollah once and for all” is astounding given what happened on October 7. This doesn’t mean that a military operation isn’t warranted or justified, it just means that it may be deeply unwise and ill-conceived at this point in time.
The recurring Israeli illusion that once every few years or decade – the 1978 Operation Litani, the 1982 first Lebanon war, the 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath and the 2006 Second Lebanon War – Israel can conduct a military operation or even an invasion and change the power relations or the political order in Lebanon is an irresponsible and costly fantasy. It only validates the quote, wrongly attributed to Albert Einstein, that the definition of insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”
Another flawed assumption is that this will be contained to Lebanon and can also be limited in duration until deterrence is restored. Based on what? Nothing indicates that this assumption is viable. The United States is now warning Israel that an operation in Lebanon can get Iran involved.
The implication is clear: Once Iran is involved, whether intentionally or through a miscalculation, the United States can be dragged in militarily. This isn’t only a negative regional development with far-reaching extra-regional consequences, it’s also a conflict that Biden surely doesn’t need less than five months before the November election.
The current thinking in U.S. defense, intelligence and policy-planning circles is that there is no such thing as a “small-scale” or “limited” military operation that Israel can initiate and expect Hezbollah to restrain itself and avoid a wider war. The idea that after the 2006 war and the devastation of Lebanon, which Nasrallah later claimed surprised him, he would be more risk-averse is based on wishful thinking, nothing more. Maybe and maybe not, but is the risk worth it?
The Israel Defense Forces has a worst-case scenario for such a war. This doesn’t mean that it will materialize in full, but this is what Israel needs to be prepared for. It should be noted that this scenario was drafted before a fatigued IDF was mired in an eight-month war in Gaza. It begins with a broad air-ground attack to drive Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, which is around 30 kilometers (19 miles) north of the border. Hezbollah then responds with the following:
Missile and rocket salvos of up to 1,000 a day. This would happen for several days, inflicting mass destruction and hundreds, possibly thousands of casualties. Despite preemptive strikes by the Israel Air Force on missile-launching sites, Hezbollah will still be capable of firing missiles.
The precision missiles are aimed at military bases, particularly air force bases in the north and central Israel, as well as the power and water grids, Ben-Gurion International Airport, oil refineries and ports. As a result, Israel’s stockpile of Iron Dome interceptor missiles will be depleted.
Drone attacks. Hundreds of armed drones are launched at army bases, supply convoys and cities and towns.
Cyberwarfare. Massive cyberattacks hit Israel’s energy infrastructure, as well as communications and internet services.
Peripheral support. The Yemeni Houthis disrupt Red Sea routes, while in Iraq and Syria, pro-Iranian militias attack Western targets.
Terror. A terror wave ensues in the West Bank as part of Hezbollah’s war effort.
Israeli targets abroad are attacked. The enemy hits diplomatic missions, businesses, tourists.
No one is suggesting that this is the scenario most likely to happen or be successful. It doesn’t account for Israeli preemptive strikes and the country’s intelligence prowess, which would locate and destroy missile arsenals and counter the enemy’s cyberwarfare capabilities. But this is a possible scenario that can be exacerbated if Iran considers itself under attack and retaliates.
That too isn’t a forgone conclusion but a scenario that must be taken into account. If it does play out, with both Iran and the Houthis in the mix, it’s only a question of time before the United States may be sucked in.
That was Washington’s main concern as early as October 7. Unsurprisingly, this seems to concern the Americans much more than it does the Israelis, who still don’t see – or refuse to see – the connection to Gaza.
source : haaretz