‘Hydro diplomacy’ offers hope for India-Pakistan relations

At last month’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit hosted by Pakistan, the participation of India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar raised many questions about the possibility of normalizing relations between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Jaishankar’s speech was a display of diplomacy and reservation. He acknowledged Pakistan’s importance to the regional platform but swiftly pivoted to a staunch critique of terrorism, separatism and extremism emanating from the country. This familiar narrative, focusing on what India terms the “three evils” was mostly ignored by the Pakistani media and policymakers, indicating that Islamabad has started to adjust itself to New Delhi’s signature sloganeering.

India’s calculated engagement in the SCO indicated some kind of “ice melting” but also highlighted deep-seated fractures within South Asia, a densely populated region mired in simmering political and security rivalries. Among these, the Kashmir dispute looms largest, an issue rendered more complicated when in 2019 India stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomous status. Another chronic issue that has started to heat up between the neighbors is the revision or modification of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT).

On Aug. 30, India issued a second formal notice to Pakistan seeking a “review and modification” of the 64-year-old treaty, citing changes in population growth, agricultural needs and the evolving water usage situation since the treaty’s inception. The latest notice denotes India’s push to renegotiate the water-sharing agreement, which governs the use of the Indus River and its tributaries between the neighbors.

At the heart of the issue are two hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir — the Kishanganga and Ratle dam projects — both of which Pakistan has repeatedly claimed violate the terms of the IWT. While Pakistan has not yet officially replied to this notice, the current Pakistani government, keen to improve relations with India, is likely to handle the situation sensibly. Islamabad might see it as a good opportunity for the resumption of bilateral communication. Since Pakistan has many reservations about the execution of the IWT, the Indian notice for discussion could become the starting point for fresh talks between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar attends the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Goa, India May 5, 2023.   © Reuters

India cannot unilaterally exit the treaty without triggering an international backlash, as it also has similar agreements with neighbors like Bangladesh and Nepal.

Pakistan was categorized as one of the most water-insecure nations in the Global Water Security 2023 Assessment. It is grappling with water shortages that threaten its agricultural stability and overall economic health. A rapidly growing population estimated at around 240 million has exacerbated these pressures, outstripping an already strained infrastructure and prompting fears that the country’s rivers might soon run dry. Pakistan’s dependency on the Indus and its tributaries for nearly 80% of its agricultural irrigation intensifies its strategic vulnerabilities.

This domestic crisis, compounded by concerns over India’s hydropower projects, puts Pakistan in a precarious situation.

A proactive approach to the IWT renegotiation could thus offer Islamabad a chance to address its immediate water security concerns, while opening doors to a broader, long-needed dialogue with India. More than a water-sharing mechanism, the IWT has proven to be a major platform of continuous communication between the two adversaries. It has survived two major wars and countless diplomatic standoffs.

India’s second notice provides an opportunity for both nations to revisit their commitments under the treaty, addressing each side’s grievances while also fostering a channel for consistent communication. Upon revision of the IWT, “hydro diplomacy” will offer a chance to showcase a mutual willingness to pursue talks on an issue that directly affects millions of lives on each side of the border.

In 2016, Pakistan approached the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to challenge the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects. The dispute had been simmering since 2006 when Islamabad raised serious objections over Kishanganga. This was further escalated when Islamabad displayed concerns over Ratle’s design modifications in 2012. However, refusing to participate in the PCA proceedings in The Hague, India challenged the PCA’s jurisdiction and petitioned the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert under the IWT.

But in April 2023, The Hague court dismissed India’s objections, asserting its “competency” to adjudicate the matter. This decision marked a major shift, reviving a mechanism stalled for years. Pakistan’s appeal was deemed admissible, setting a renewed precedent for navigating future disputes within the Indus River basin through international frameworks. The decision by the PCA, which allowed Pakistan to challenge India’s hydropower projects, raises the potential for third-party mediation in the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms. Rather than treating such international adjudication as a last resort, India and Pakistan could use it to foster a regularized, transparent mechanism that builds mutual trust and clarifies the legal boundaries of treaty obligations.

For decades, water issues between India and Pakistan have been entangled in a web of nationalistic rhetoric, territorial disputes and post-colonial legacy grievances. The prevailing discourse in India has frequently emphasized the country’s upper-riparian advantage, with some voices advocating for a more assertive posture toward Pakistan’s water concerns.

Statements from Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remark that “blood and water cannot flow together,” reflect the emotive nature of the issue. These statements, often made to cater to the emotional needs of a domestic audience, have fueled an atmosphere of animosity that makes genuine dialogue challenging. Yet with Pakistan’s current administration signaling its willingness to engage, there may be an opening for pragmatism.

The possible renewal process is likely to open channels for broader dialogue beyond water, offering a framework for constructive engagement. Historically, on multiple occasions, the IWT has facilitated communication going in ways that other issues often have not. Here, dialogue on water rights could lead to more fruitful discussions on shared environmental challenges, disaster management and even trade.

Beyond immediate water-sharing concerns, “hydro diplomacy” has the potential to reset India-Pakistan relations on a more pragmatic basis.

source : asia.nikkei