Parker Sears is pursuing his Master’s degree in Statecraft and International affairs with a specialization in Conflict Prevention. He graduated from Assumption College with a Bachelor of Arts degree in both Political Science and History. Parker hopes that his paper will shed light on a region of increasing geopolitical importance and will help peacekeepers prevent greater atrocities before they occur. 

Executive Summary

India is the homeland of one of the greatest advocates of peace that this world has ever known. Yet, this does not mean that the Indian people will always follow Mahatma Gandhi’s preaching or continually pursue secular policies. Recent events suggest that a majority of Indians have once again deviated from Gandhi’s secular preaching. The purpose of this research is to investigate the origins of civil and human rights violations that are occurring in India’s Assam district and have the potential to metastasize throughout all of India. This conflict involves two main religions that diverse ethnic groups in India follow. The majority religion that Indians follow is Hinduism, and the second largest is Islam. What makes this conflict ethno-religious is that neither Hinduism nor Islam pertains to one ethnic group; rather, they represent ideas that can be adopted by any human being who finds them attractive.

The conflict between these two factions resides in the confines of India’s boundaries. But geopolitical influences shape this situation and risk escalation between India and her Muslim neighbors. The Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) is a Hindutva nationalist party that seeks to recreate India as a Hindu-dominated state. India is composed of a 79.8% Hindu population, with Muslims making up 14.2%, Christians representing 2.3%, and Sikh as 1.7% of the population. The remaining 2% follow other or unspecified religions.[1] The Hindutva ideology of BJP members emphasizes Muslims as a foreign element needing to be purged from Indian society. With India rising in importance to the United States, this topic must be watched closely so American policymakers know the nature of the BJP and Narendra Modi with whom we ally ourselves.

This paper attempts to explain the complicated relationship between Hindus and Muslims as well as analyze its roots, which date back to before British control. Through this historical lens, one can find the prerequisite for conflict and for peace. Then, the analysis shifts to current events where some of the previous themes manifest themselves in societal violence. Upon completing an analysis of the roots, drivers, and actors within this conflict, the paper then suggests potential paths to deescalate and prevent further violence.

Background

Some historians blame Muslim-Hindu tensions on British colonial rule, which used a divide-and-conquer method to retain its empire. No doubt, the British did not help mend divisions, but they did not create the rift between Hindus and Muslims either. This feud dates back to the eighth century, when Muslims began exploring eastward. As the Islamic empire grew, subsequent invasions of Punjab took place between the tenth and twelfth centuries which “eventually led to the formation of the Delhi Sultanate.”[2] Yet, consolidated Muslim control of Indian territory took place in the fifteenth century with the establishment of the Mughal Empire. As descendants of Genghis Khan, Mughals lived in Turkestan and converted to Islam while “keeping elements of their Far Eastern roots.”[3] After the initial bloodletting that occurred during the Mughal conquest, most rulers enforced a lenient form of Islam that tolerated local religions. This period of relative tolerance then ended when Aurangzeb became Emperor.

Aurangzeb’s rule was known for the implementation of Sharia law and military expansion. With Shariah law came taxes that dhimmi had to pay. The first taxed land and was known as Kharaj, while the second, known as Jizya, taxed per capita income. This deviation from previous Mughal rule sparked widespread discontent while the Hindu majority were treated as second class citizens. Those who did not convert to Islam experienced hardship and oppressive measures. Therefore, when the British and French arrived, Hindu kingdoms often “fought back… supported by the French and the British.”[4] Once Islam imprinted itself on Indian territory and cultural sharing began, the fates of these two ethno-religious groups became intertwined. Some Indians converted because Islam offered a chance to shed class discrimination from the caste system, while some elites converted to retain their wealth and prestige.

Ethnic relations regarding superiority date back to this period. Muslims were initially brutal; however, so were many Hindu people who murdered Muslims indiscriminately. Both sides committed atrocities against each other, like the Nellie Massacre where Hindus murdered thousands of Muslims. Being an ethno-religious conflict, this issue becomes unclear in regard to a group being ethnically superior or more Indian or Muslim than another. Evident when “the Muslim elite of West Pakistan saw the Bengalis of East Pakistan, even when Muslim… to be a culturally and racially inferior group,”[5] ethnicity was of importance, despite sharing similar beliefs. Because of intermarriage with darker-skinned, shorter Hindus, these people are not as clearly connected to the “non-Indian West Asian ancestry common among the post-Mughal Muslim elite.”[6] Indians do not have it any differently, because Hindutva nationalism excludes ethnic Indians if they follow Islam. One could trace their lineage on the Indian peninsula for several generations, yet they could still be viewed as a foreign element needing to be purged.

Drivers of Conflict

When the British arrived in India, they found the contextual precursor needed for their divide-and-rule strategy. There was a rift ready to be exploited, and exploit it they did. Evidently, when the British left India in 1947 and partition of territory commenced, these very same tensions escalated from “a squabble about the division of assets after partition… to bitter conflict over the future of disputed princely states such as Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir, [to] the struggle for limited, precious irrigation water.”[7] The drivers of conflict resided not only in historic disputes, but in the practical implications that arose from Indian independence. Upon rumors of partition, ethnic cleansing became a force used to create majority populations in areas where boundaries were to be set. Unsurprisingly, it was “the Muslim League National Guard (associated with the Muslim League) and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (a voluntary Hindu nationalist group), who instigated violence and persecution of other religious communities.”[8] These instigative groups were then astonished by the scale and brutality that occurred when people used this opportunity to settle old scores, rob, rape, and destroy property.

As time pressed forward, new disputes arose, while old ones persisted. Much of the conflict in the Assam district is influenced by geopolitical factors such as the conflict in Kashmir or the refugee crisis in Myanmar. These issues influence Hindu nationalist policies and provide a path for further conflict and violence, as well as continual destruction of civil rights. Thus, it is important to analyze the origins of conflict in Kashmir and how it affects ethno-religious tensions in India.

Kashmir and Jammu have a Muslim majority population, where territorial claims extend from both Pakistan and India. For a while, this territory acted semi-autonomously under “Article 370— [which,] for the past seventy years allowed the state to make its own laws.”[9] Unfortunately, in 2019, India removed article 370, thereby revoking Kashmir and Jammu of their special status. Narendra Modi then moved paramilitary forces into this area while “detain[ing] at least two influential politicians and cut[ting] off internet access.”[10]

This move follows another aggressive move by the BJP party in 2018 when it attempted to pursue a legal path of deporting 1.9 million Muslims in the Assam district. The BJP has made illegal immigration a core issue to rally nationalist sentiment. This particularly vitriolic form of nationalism caters exclusively to majoritarian politics rather than acknowledging the existence of ethnic Indians who have followed Islam since the Mughal empire. Democracies tend to avoid mass murder or ethnic cleansing; however, majoritarian tyranny can be just as destructive as ideological authoritarianism. A constant struggle in democracy is to cultivate a societal and governmental structure that forces majority and minority parties to respect the rights of each other. If a democracy fails, one can expect violations of property rights, citizenship status, and, in extremes, deportation or mass terror. As stated earlier, both Muslims and Hindus practiced ethnic cleansing upon Indian independence.

Currently, the BJP relies heavily on using legal means to deport or cleanse an area of Muslims. Its strategy uses the National Register of Citizens, which “is a list of people who can prove they came to the state by 24 March 1971”[11] combined with the Citizen Amendment Act, which grants a path to citizenship for Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Hindus who entered the state before December of 2014. The consequence of this nefarious combination is that “Muslims would primarily bear the punitive consequences of exclusion from the NRC which could include ‘statelessness, deportation, or prolonged detention.’”[12] The first iteration of this list excluded Bengali Hindus; however, the Bharatiya Janata Party was quick to revise this list by allowing non-Muslims to avoid detention and a path towards citizenship.

Since the implementation of the CAA and the NRC, there have been widespread protests and civil unrest. The National Commission for Minorities lists complaints received on a community and subject-based level. Its findings illuminate an increase in complaints from 2017 to 2020 from the Muslim community. In comparison to other minority religions, Muslim complaints outweigh all of the other minority communities combined. More specifically, from 2019 to 2020, the National Commission for Minorities recorded 1,233 Muslim complaints, 129 Christian, 106 Sikh, 44 Buddhist, 5 Parsi, and 51 Jain complaints. Other religious groups tallied 104 complaints.[13] The National Commission for Minorities does not specify the nature of these complaints, nor does it provide information on how these complaints have been managed. On the “Status of Complaints” page of its website, it lists the number of new complaints, along with the number of complaints disposed of, and then the number of pending complaints. Not knowing whether the root of these issues have been solved or what action was taken to resolve them, the generic term “disposed off [sic]” leaves much to be desired.

Goals and Means of the Bharatya Party

The aspirations of the BJP are not limited; rather, its goals extend from the Assam district to India as a whole. Although the NRC targets Muslim refugees in eastern India, BJP officials have hinted at a nationwide expulsion of foreign entities. The ideological context of Hindutva nationalism “views India as a Hindu state (with its definition of Hinduism inclusive of Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) and Islam as a foreign and invading religion.”[14] The ideological framework denies legitimacy to Muslims who have lived in India for generations or have intermarried. Any effort to expel the entire Muslim population from India would result in deporting or detaining those who have had ancestors in India for generations. Although the NRC targeting sets 1971 as its target date, “the BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (UP) Yogi Adityanath… promised in 2005 to cleanse India of other religions, calling this the ‘century of Hindutva.’”[15] The aspirations of the BJP party were clearly articulated when “A BJP member of the UP Legislative Assembly further argued… that India will become a purely Hindu nation by 2024 and all Muslims who do not assimilate to Hindu culture will need to leave the country.”[16]

What started as a predominantly legal attack on the rights of Muslims living in India transformed into the use of violence as a means of expelling Muslims. Bharatya Janata Party members often used dehumanizing rhetoric and hate speech to incite violence from the general population. Whereas some violence was provoked without the government’s heavy hand, other cases arose directly from government-sponsored action or lack thereof. In one example, the stark difference was evident when protestors in front of Jamia Millia Islamia University suffered from “police… us[age] [of] teargas to disperse protesters at the university, [they] even enter[ed] the library and hostels, beating students and some staff.”[17] This followed a case where “the police did not take action when a government supporter shot at students protesting outside the [same] University in Delhi.”[18] The use of terror comes at the behest of BJP members, like Kapil Mishra, who in a demonstration called for the police “to ‘shoot’ the protesters, [and] posted a video in which he gave an ultimatum to the police, threatening to take the matter into his own hands if the police did not clear the roads of protesters.”[19] Much of this violence results from the ideology that emphasizes the foreign insurrection of Islam in India.

Hindutva ideology uses radical Islamic terrorism as a means to demonize the entire Muslim community and provide an impetus for reciprocal violent action. The geopolitical struggle over the special status of Jammu and Kashmir provides ample propaganda for the BJP to use. As seen recently in November of 2020, the Hindustan Times reported “it… found that terrorists were planning a ‘major attack’ on the anniversary of the 26/11 terror attack”[20] in which four terrorists were neutralized by government forces. Without question as to whether their cause is just or not, it is clear that violence is used to perpetuate more violence. To break the cycle of violence, there must be a nuanced discussion that attacks the generalization of total evil belonging to the other side. Peacekeeping must describe the history of oppression as antithetical to Indian values, be it Muslim or Hindu. Statements made by radical leaders on both sides must be undermined, like such statements where a “BJP leader described some protesters as ‘rabidly indoctrinated Islamists,’ an assertion that can lead to arbitrary arrests and terrorism allegations.”[21] The BJP uses this rhetoric as a means to pursue ethnic cleansing on the Indian peninsula.

As alluded to earlier, the long-term goal of the BJP is to cleanse India of its Muslim element by the year 2024. The dual use of terror and “a nationwide NRC, which… would be implemented before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections promised that… the government would ‘selectively throw out all infiltrators.’”[22] If the premise of re-election resides on that promise, then one must watch for an increase in state-sponsored violence towards Muslim communities in the months leading up to the election. The BJP has received international criticism for its actions; however, it claims that “immigration issues” are subject to domestic jurisdiction.

Prevention of Atrocities and Process Towards Peace

The path to peace is not without grief and strife. Trauma already exists where atrocities were committed, and this trauma has to be confronted and resolved if peace is to reach both communities. When the usage of terror tactics incited “mobs chanting nationalist slogans, armed with swords, sticks, metal pipes, and bottles filled with petrol, rampaging through several neighborhoods in northeast Delhi, killing Muslims and burning their homes, shops, mosques, and property,”[23] it becomes difficult to rectify these acts of barbarism. Currently, tensions show no sign of disbanding any time soon. However, there are promising paths that those who seek to prevent further escalation can follow.

First and foremost, one must start deconstructing Hindutva ideology and combat the notion that India must be a Hindu nation. As previously stated, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains face minimal persecution and are allowed to exist within the Hindutva paradigm. If Muslims are truly “infiltrators” and foreign agents, then why was the Taj Mahal built during the Mughal Empire by Muslims? If Islam is a foreign element, then why was the most iconic structure in India built by Muslims during a time of peaceful coexistence? Peace seekers should emphasize the communal peaceful cohabitation that took place between the Muslim and Hindu populations during some stages of the Mughal empire. Up until the rule of Aurangzeb, these two peoples meshed in a relatively peaceful manner that allowed for each to practice their own beliefs freely without facing persecution, violence, or intrusion.

Combining this argument with an alternative form of Indian nationalism could produce promising results. Thanks to the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, there exists an alternative peaceful form of nationalism that can be exalted. Currently, some call Modi the “father of India,” which juxtaposes Gandhi as the “father of India.” By comparing the two leaders, one can disparage Modi because of the pure nature of Mahatma Gandhi’s movement. Whereas one group promotes violence and religious superiority, the other uses religious arguments that emphasize the connection between all religions of the world. Mahatma Gandhi studied comparative religious studies and argued “that all religions were true and yet every one of them was imperfect because they were ‘interpreted with poor intellects, sometimes with poor hearts, and more often misinterpreted.’”[24] This helps undermine Modi’s religious credibility by emphasizing that true sons and daughters of India follow Gandhi’s religious preaching. Indian nationalism has these aspects existent in society, but they need to be emphasized, argued, and heard.

Twitter and social media spread information faster and to a wider audience than newspapers have in the past. On Twitter, there was a speech by Tejasvi Surya, who is the National President of the Bharatya Janata Party Youth movement (or Yuva Morcha), in which he argued “We will not let this Islamisation happen, this is our resolve… This is the time of Hindu Hruday Samrat Narendra Modi. [Muslims] will be nothing here.”[25] This speech largely targets Asaduddin Owaisi, who is a member of the Lukh Sabha or Indian lower house, as well as belonging to the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen party. This party does not support Jihadist terrorism. Regardless, Owaisi has been targeted as a separatist who is the avatar of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the nationalist who established Pakistan. In response, Kavitha Kalvakuntla (@RaoKavitha) a member of Telangana Rashtra Samithi party, responded by saying, “Hyderabadis love Biryani, we don’t care about religion.”[26] Biryani is an Indian dish brought by Muslim Mughal traders which further emphasizes the unremovable cultural ties that only occur through consensual cultural assimilation. Peacekeepers must find politicians on both sides who preach tolerance and provide a feasible counteroffer to radical groups. By discouraging terrorism and hate speech on Twitter and promoting aspects of culture that already exist, one can start to work away from violence and towards peace.

The refugee crisis in Myanmar gives reasonable doubt towards the ill intentions of the BJP, as illegal immigration is a legitimate issue for modern states. Yet, there are many ways to combat illegal immigration that fall short of outright deportation of all refugees. The Bharatya Janata Party currently uses the NRC and the CAA to oust undesirable refugees and claims that this is the best way to approach this issue. A different, humane, and ordinary policy that nations use is to set quotas and limits on how many refugees a country will accept from neighboring nations. These policies should be free from religious or ethnic discrimination and pursue equal opportunity for each refugee chosen to receive asylum benefits. To circumvent solving this driver of conflict would be detrimental to the peace process. Peacekeepers should engage local politicians on these issues and help promote this policy.

In addition, peacekeepers should emphasize the fratricidal nature of Hindutva nationalism. As alluded to, some Indians converted to Islam between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries. Through pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing, many ancestral Indians will be harmed, lose property, and lose their ties to the homeland. What is called Hindutva, therefore, is not Indian nationalism but a form of Hindu fascism derived from a perception of superiority, irrational xenophobia, or fear of foreign contamination. In reality, these so-called foreign elements are the opposite of what the Hindutva ideology claims them to be.

Finally, one must bring those officials who stir up hate speech for political purposes to justice and put them on trial. The problem with India’s independence is that many of the elite on both sides who incited violence then were elected into office or kept positions of power or influence. Without putting them and those who committed atrocities on trial, the scars stay open. These scars in particular have been open since the Muslim invasion and have been perpetuated by violence on both sides. A historic study incriminates both Hindus and Muslims of wrongs towards each other but also shows time periods where communal existence did not allow violence and persecution. Clearly, existence does not have to include ethnic cleansing and mass murder.

Warning Signs of Further Escalation

War tends to expedite or hasten ethnic cleansing attempts. Whether it be war with China or war with Pakistan, both of these scenarios can fast track the expulsion and killing of Muslims. Currently, the state’s role in violence is to encourage and incite ethno-religious conflict. The scale and type of violence being committed indicate a lack of a structured state plan of exacting violent measures. If the Indian government were to use its full capabilities, then violence would be far more coherent, structured, and deadly. Yet, this does not mean that there is no state hand in this matter, as there is guilt in being silent and abetting these crimes. Being a democratic society, an event like war can provide a path for the State to play a larger role in ethnic cleansing. During war, the state can increasingly act with fewer consequences and in a planned manner, making violence far more efficient and widespread.

If war were to break out between Pakistan and India, the greater Muslim population can face immense persecution as they become more clearly defined as “enemies of the State.” Fear of insurrection, sabotage, terrorism, and other actions could offer an incentive to remove Muslims from office and further attack their communities or detain Muslims in general. An example from history is when America, a democracy bound by the rule of law and restrictions on power, still succumbed to detaining Japanese prisoners during World War II. In this case, however, these camps and restrictions resulted in small civil rights abuses and not mass murder. In a country like India where there is a majority who share a border with the adversary, one could find little moderation, influenced by the resurgence of historic hatred. In the frenzy of war, civil protections tend to fade, whereas any solution that leads to total victory preoccupies the minds of civilians and leaders. The choice to detain or expel a group of people seems easier than to debate the nuance of civil protections for a population that is viewed as foreign and capable of spying for the enemy.

War with China could remove factors that inhibit the BJP’s capability to pursue state-ordered ethnic cleansing. In this case, the dependent factor would be India’s allies, namely the United States. With President elect-Joseph Biden coming into office, it is rumored that U.S. values such as human rights may rise to the surface of the international agenda. However, this topic must be balanced by U.S. security risks, which raises into question whether the U.S. will stay silent during the ethnic cleansing of Muslims to retain a defense alliance against China. Typically, the United States jettisons idealism in times when national security is at risk. Yet, to ignore it could result in losing the moral high ground, which is an important battlespace against rising revisionist powers like China and Russia. If India feels confident that there will be little international scrutiny for its actions, then this state could pursue aggressive measures to achieve its nationalist goal.

Another event to watch attentively is the 2024 parliamentary elections. If the BJP finds itself losing popularity, then the party could amplify its measures to follow through with its campaign promise. Hindutva nationalism plays a large factor in the BJP’s electoral success. Since elections bring an upswell in human passion, a political leader can seize this fervor and use it to inflict damage on party enemies or groups of people. History has shown that elections can ignite conflict, such as when the south seceded upon Abraham Lincoln’s election, which sparked the American Civil war.

Whether it be the 2024 elections, a potential war with either Pakistan or China, peacekeepers must watch India closely. It takes one catalyst to allow greater implementation of ethnic cleansing where the State has a significant role. Even the children of a saint-like Gandhi can succumb to the worst aspects of human nature (and have). It is well-documented that humans have two faces: humans are capable of being both virtuous and malevolent.

Endnotes

[1] “South Asia: India” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 28 November.

[2] “Religions – Islam: Mughal Empire (1500s, 1600s).” BBC, BBC, 7 Sept. 2009.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Khan, Razib. “The Blood on Brown Hands Is a Legacy of All of History.” Gene Expression, WordPress, 2 Mar. 2019.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bennett, Frederic M. “Muslim and Hindu.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 1 Feb. 1958.

[8] World Peace Foundation. “India: Partition.” Mass Atrocity Endings, Tufts University, 7 Aug. 2015.

[9] Maizland, Lindsay. “Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 Aug. 2019.

[10] Lawler, Dave. “India Leaves Kashmir in the Dark as It Erases Special Status.” Axios, 6 Aug. 2019.

[11] “Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s New ‘Anti-Muslim’ Law Explained.” BBC News, BBC, 11 Dec. 2019.

[12] Akins, Harrison. “Legislation Factsheet: The Citizenship Amendment Act in India.” USCIRF, U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2020.

[13] National Commission for Minorities, (Ministry of Minority Affairs), Government of India.

[14] Akins, Harrison. “Legislation Factsheet: The Citizenship Amendment Act in India.” USCIRF, U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2020.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Bajoria, Jayshree. “‘Shoot the Traitors.’” Human Rights Watch, 16 June 2020.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Sarkar, Shankhyaneel. “Nagrota Encounter: Terrorists Were Planning Major Attack on 26/11 Anniversary.” Hindustan Times, 20 Nov. 2020.

[21] Bajoria, Jayshree. “‘Shoot the Traitors.’” Human Rights Watch, 16 June 2020.

[22] Akins, Harrison. “Legislation Factsheet: The Citizenship Amendment Act in India.” USCIRF, U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2020.

[23] Bajoria, Jayshree. “‘Shoot the Traitors.’” Human Rights Watch, 16 June 2020.

[24] Nanda, B.R. “Resistance and Results.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., Sept. 2020.

[25] Sudhir, Uma, and Deepshikha Ghosh. “Every Vote For Asaduddin Owaisi A Vote Against India: BJP MP Tejasvi Surya.” NDTV.com, NDTV, 23 Nov. 2020.

[26] Sajjad Ahmad Khan INC (@SajjadA06226593), 23 November, 2020.

Works Cited

Akins, Harrison. “Legislation Factsheet: The Citizenship Amendment Act in India.” USCIRF, U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2020, www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20India_0_0.pdf.

Bajoria, Jayshree. “‘Shoot the Traitors.’” Human Rights Watch, 16 June 2020, www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy.

Bennett, Frederic M. “Muslim and Hindu.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 1 Feb. 1958, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1958/02/muslim-and-hindu/305462/.

“Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s New ‘Anti-Muslim’ Law Explained.” BBC News, BBC, 11 Dec. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393.

Khan, Razib. “The Blood on Brown Hands Is a Legacy of All of History.” Gene Expression, WordPress, 2 Mar. 2019, www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2019/03/01/the-blood-on-brown-hands-is-a-legacy-of-all-of-history/.

Lawler, Dave. “India Leaves Kashmir in the Dark as It Erases Special Status.” Axios, 6 Aug. 2019, www.axios.com/kashmir-constitution-article-370-india-modi-bjp-ddcb5b9f-c51b-4fe9-8b90-35cdcadbff51.html.

Maizland, Lindsay. “Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 Aug. 2019, www.cfr.org/in-brief/kashmir-what-know-about-disputed-region.

Nanda, B.R. “Resistance and Results.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., Sept. 2020, www.britannica.com/biography/Mahatma-Gandhi/Resistance-and-results.

“Religions – Islam: Mughal Empire (1500s, 1600s).” BBC, BBC, 7 Sept. 2009, www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/mughalempire_1.shtml.

Sajjad Ahmad Khan INC (@SajjadA06226593), 23 November, 2020. https://twitter.com/SajjadA06226593/status/1330876455778095104

Sarkar, Shankhyaneel. “Nagrota Encounter: Terrorists Were Planning Major Attack on 26/11 Anniversary.” Hindustan Times, 20 Nov. 2020, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nagrota-encounter-terrorists-were-planning-major-attack-on-26-11-anniversary-pm-holds-review-meet-reports-ani/story-0EZnI11aKKtEmERc9XBSfO.html.

“South Asia: India” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 28 November.

Sudhir, Uma, and Deepshikha Ghosh. “Every Vote For Asaduddin Owaisi A Vote Against India: BJP MP Tejasvi Surya.” NDTV.com, NDTV, 23 Nov. 2020, www.ndtv.com/india-news/every-vote-for-asaduddin-owaisi-a-vote-against-india-bjp-mp-tejasvi-surya-2329171.

World Peace Foundation. “India: Partition.” Mass Atrocity Endings, Tufts University, 7 Aug. 2015, sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/india-partition/.