by Saanjana Goldsmith 10 February 2022
The creation of nuclear weapons has altered the discourse on warfare within the international system. Although, a creation of the Second World War era, it continues to hold prolific importance in the deliberations of global security. Nuclear weapons held a central position within Cold War politics, which received a lot of criticism when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was introduced. The NPT regime was accused of being highly discriminatory in nature for the ‘nuclear have-nots’ as it banned them from ever developing or testing nuclear weapons. Today, there are four nuclear powers who are not signatory to the treaty, of which two are the South Asian states of India and Pakistan.
The story of nuclear weapons in South Asia is an interesting contrary of peaceful development versus military development of India and Pakistan respectively. The Indian Nuclear Weapons Program began under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership. Unlike, all the other states that pursued the weapon first and then focused on atomic energy, India’s nuclear program was an offshoot of the atomic energy program. Perkovich in his article, ‘A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia’ stated that, “no nation has debated more democratically than India whether to acquire or give up nuclear weapons”. Quite contrary to India, the Nuclear Weapons Program in Pakistan was that of an aggressive military development often cited as a retaliation to the 1971 war and the role India played. They began their nuclear ambitions, by citing the nuclear threat from India, which radically changed when A.Q Khan returned to Pakistan to begin working on Uranium-based nuclear weapons through stolen designs of centrifuges.
It was intriguing to understand how two South Asian Nuclear states have continued to survive without using the weapons in spite of the lurking nuclear threat. This article will assess the following questions- Why should India engage with its Nuclear Neighbours? Does this engagement provide regional stability and in turn ensure India’s Strategic Autonomy? How does this engagement bolster India’s vision of nuclear disarmament? The article ends with a discussion on how this engagement will impact Indo-US relations.
In the post-Cold War period, the importance of the region and regional integration has found prominence both within the political scenario and within the intellectual discourses. South Asia as a region has suffered miserably in succeeding to achieve regional integration primarily because of the India-Pakistan conflict, which became even more threatening after both the states declared themselves as nuclear weapons states in 1998. The circumstances around which the nuclear weapons were developed in this region reflect upon the principles of their respective foreign policies. For India, developing nuclear weapons as part of its atomic energy, primarily after the Indo-China war of 1962 and the testing of nuclear weapons by China in 1964. For Pakistan on the other hand, developing nuclear weapons was to counter India’s nuclear progress. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated that “we will eat grass, even go hungry but we will get one of our own…”. This aspect has been vividly dealt with in Feroz H Khan’s book “Eating Grass” which states that the “Pakistani scientific enclave” had achieved success in developing nuclear weapons through the “fruits of self-reliance and creativity”. Another significant issue was the growing friendship between Pakistan and China, whereby, China’s nuclear ambiguity posed as a threat to India. The brinkmanship between India and Pakistan was further propelled by China’s friendship with the latter.
The historical account of the development of nuclear weapons in both India and Pakistan brings us to the first question- Why should India engage with its nuclear neighbours?
Both India and Pakistan tested and declared themselves as nuclear weapons state in 1998. While both the countries had their own explanations for this event, many believed that Pakistan’s action was triggered by India. Samina Ahmed in her article, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program” states that, “Pakistan’s decision to opt for nuclear tests in May 1998 was determined by its regional environment.” There are two ways through which nuclear states can engage themselves- militarily and non-militarily. India should try and ensure that its engagement with both Pakistan and China are conducted at both these levels.
In the military context, the Kargil War of 1999 was the first instance where Pakistan openly nuclear-provoked India, by using the weapons as a means to limit India’s retaliatory actions. Although proxy wars had been going on along the border, the 2019 Pulwama Attack followed by the Balakot airstrike was yet another episode where the nuclear threat erupted. In fact, many questioned Pakistan’s Nuclear verbatim. Militarily, India can engage through deterrence, high-level defense talks, bilateral understandings, and delegate level engagement. Although all these might be to some extent applicable to India’s engagement with Pakistan, the same cannot be said for China.
It is difficult to understand China, its intentions, and its nuclear attributions. The nuclear ambiguity of Chinese doctrine puts India in a difficult position to engage with China. The Galwan attack brought back the discourse on Indo-China Nuclear relations. While India is aware of and recognizes the Chinese nuclear capabilities, the same cannot be said for what China considers. Chinese analyst maintains a dismissive attitude about the relevance of nuclear weapons in Indo-China relations. It is alleged that the Chinese analyst downplayed the possibilities of a nuclear escalation during the Galwan attack given India’s values and principles. In order to engage with China, India should employ the non-military level of negotiations. It can be done through multilateral forums like SCO or BRICS and engage in diplomatic levels by providing a space for civil society and academicians to indulge in discussion to lobby about the issue.
It is extremely crucial for India to engage with China and Pakistan on nuclear issues to ensure balance, absence of threat, and regional stability. Further, this engagement will prove beneficial to fight against issues like Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Black Markets. While the idea of this engagement might seem to be idealistic, in reality, this engagement would also bring in the issue of small arms exchange, nuclear material security, and arms control mechanism through a trilateral discussion. This brings us to the second question- Does this engagement provide regional stability and in turn ensure India’s Strategic Autonomy?
The nuclearization of South Asia has made the nuclear pessimists believe that this region has doubled the trouble of escalating war. Sumit Ganguly in his article, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia” assess that the debate between nuclear optimist and proliferation pessimist, cannot eliminate the historical events of conflict India and Pakistan has faced. Within the same article, he refers to Timothy Hoyt’s idea of ‘strategic myopia’ and states that the real problem in achieving stability in this region is because the officers make poor judgments about their adversaries based on pre-conceived notions. However, in spite of the presence of nuclear weapons, both countries have been able to indulge in nuclear deterrence. India’s ‘no first use policy’ versus Pakistan’s ‘first use policy’, has been able to build up some sort of balance in the region. Moreover, Pakistan has been constantly provoking India since 1998, but the latter has maintained significant nuclear restraint. Nuclear deterrence should remain robust in the region and this can be achieved through engagement.
Some scholars are of the view that the presence of nuclear weapons in the region has limited the level of retaliatory attacks and reduced conventional war. Although Pakistan was provoked, India displayed considerable restraint and tried to reduce Pakistan’s fear of nuclear attack from India. The same perhaps can be said for China as well but within a different context. Whereas in Indo-Pak relations both countries acknowledge the nuclear strength and capabilities of each other, in the case of India and China, the latter does not consider India’s nuclear capabilities as similar to theirs. In spite of India testing multiple missiles, while the Galwan episode was going on, the Chinese analyst believes that nuclear weapons are a “stabilizing” factor in the Indo-China bilateral relations.
Engaging with the nuclear neighbours provides for regional stability and reduces massive conventional war although Galwan is an exception. Regional stability allows for better economic cooperation, avoiding external power intervention, and avoiding sanctions and international isolations. The current regime should work towards maintaining this regional stability especially as they rely more on rhetoric, so taking the initial step in trying to engage with the nuclear neighbours would prove beneficial in upholding India’s values and principles. These engagements can be promoted through multilateral institutions, global forums, informal regimes like NSG, Australia Group, trilateral military exercises, and trilateral dialogues between India, China, and Pakistan through different track-level diplomacy.
Whether engaging with the neighbours provide for strategic autonomy to India is a matter of debate. While engaging with Pakistan and China strengthens India’s national security and enhances its national interests, it is difficult to achieve; since only a supreme power manages to enjoy strategic autonomy. India’s ambitions of enjoying strategic autonomy are relative to the pressures exerted by its peers. Moreover, regional powers like India, cannot absolutely eliminate the external pressure from big powers like the US and individually follow their preferred foreign policies. In a multipolar world it is difficult for states to be fully independent of their policies and as such although strategic ambitions are ideal but indulging in it might prove to be more harmful than beneficial. So, while the engagement with the nuclear neighbours provides regional stability, they might not be very successful in ensuring India’s strategic autonomy, especially within the current regional politico-military dynamics.
So, if there is no strategic autonomy enjoyed through this engagement then, how does this engagement bolster India’s vision of nuclear disarmament?
In spite of India’s nuclear ambitions, it has always been a supporter of non-proliferation and global disarmament. Even though it tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and received massive criticism, India did not stop voicing for nuclear disarmament. In 1988, under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, it presented an Action Plan to campaign for a nuclear weapon’s free world. Engaging with Pakistan and China can eventually lead to a conscious reduction in nuclear weapons. The issue is that of trust. If constant engagement is being built among the neighbours, it will help in reducing the nuclear threat by reducing nuclear arsenals and this will eventually help in achieving nuclear disarmament. The success of this aspect of the engagement revolves around the ‘cultural aspect of the bomb’ as stated by Itty Abraham, who believes that the role of the press in treating the bomb, the discussions of the ‘nuclear elites’, the civil society, academicians and civilian leaders can create an environment to propagate nuclear disarmament.
Scott Sagen in his seminal work “Why do States build Nuclear Weapons” argues that nuclear nascent states can curtail nuclear threats better through civilian control than a military approach. India’s nuclear program began as a civilian atomic work and has continued to uphold its moratorium to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, it will be interesting to assess how India’s engagement with her nuclear neighbours impacts its relations with the US. The adversarial nature of US-China relations in the contemporary world versus growing US-Pak relations due to Afghanistan will have a direct impact on India’s relations with the US if it engages with its neighbours. However, this engagement is extremely important not only for regional stability but also to counter the issue of nuclear terrorism and nuclear black markets. This can be undertaken through simulations, intellectual level discussion, and awareness building among those concerned in these fields.