Sajid Farid Shapoo
The SARS-CoV-2 virus has exposed a human vulnerability to new pathogens and served as a shocking reminder about the potential threats that biological weapons can pose in the future. There is no evidence available that suggests that COVID-19 is a human-engineered virus or that its use was with an intent that may bring it under the purview of biological warfare. However, the magnitude of the human, economic, social, and material costs imposed by COVID-19 has laid bare how ill-equipped the countries, even the most prosperous and developed ones, are to deal with the fallout of a new viral pandemic or a biological weapons attack. States can only deter future bio-attacks by shoring up their defences by denying the gains from such attacks to the aggressors.
Biological Weapons could be infectious pathogens or toxins from living organisms that could cause death or disability- both permanent and temporary- in humans, animals, or even plants. Though Bio-weapons are conventionally categorized as Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs), these are clearly distinct from other WMDs. So are the measures involved to stop their manufacture and proliferation. For nuclear weapons, the requirement of plutonium reactors or uranium enrichment makes traditional non-proliferation approaches feasible. For bioweapons, traditional non-proliferation approaches are extremely challenging because the equipment and facilities used to cultivate bioweapon agents could potentially be the same as those employed for commercial production of vaccines, antibiotics, vitamins, biological pesticide, even beer, and yogurt. Moreover, the absence of a monitoring mechanism under the Biological and Toxic Weapons Treaty of 1972 (BWC), unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), make proliferation watch an extremely challenging task.
Having said that, the most robust and effective countermeasures against bioweapons remain similar to what scholars and policymakers have long advocated for nuclear weapons. The concept of conventional deterrence, which has dominated the strategic lexicon since the introduction of nuclear weapons, can be the best defense against biological weapons.
Deterrence in the classical sense involves a threat to keep an adversary from starting something or to prevent her (adversary) from acting by fear of consequences. It involves discouraging the enemy from taking action- military or political- by posing a prospect of cost and risk outweighing its prospective gain. Deterrence is generally categorized into deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment, many scholars believe, has worked remarkably well in the case of nuclear weapons where the threat of a devastating reprisal, a costly punishment, deters the enemy from starting a nuclear attack. On the other hand, deterrence by denial results from the capacity to deny gains, both territorial and political, to the enemy. It involves denying any gains or prospective gains that the enemy may think it can achieve if it attacks. Such deterrence is likely to be seen as more credible by the aggressor because it is less costly for the deterrer and maybe more effective in frustrating the aggressor’s aims by reducing his gains.
Recognizing the potential damage in the event of a biological attack, the Obama administration, in its Nuclear Posture Review in 2010, declared that the U.S. reserved the right to respond against any biological and chemical weapons attack with a nuclear strike. In itself, such a stance would deter any state actor, but given the challenges of attribution, this posture of deterrence by punishment may not be sufficient or credible. The deterrent strategies in the case of biological weapons would differ from those in nuclear weapons. Moreover, as biotechnology becomes increasingly diffused, the low entry barriers to gain leverage and WMD type of effects make bio-weapons extremely attractive for non-state actors.
Unlike nuclear weapons, deterrence by punishment may not be an optimum strategy to deter biological weapons attack. Deterrence is effective only if we know who to deter and what to deter. In the case of biological weapons, the dual-use technologies make it extremely difficult not only to verify the bioweapon production but also to trace the weapon to its originator. Moreover, a state may use foreign nationals, who are completely unaware that they have been infected with a deadly viral pathogen, to attack a third country. Even if we trace the origin to a country, there are challenges to intentional attribution as countries can take the plea that the pathogen was dual-use or used for defense purposes. BWC allows the use of pathogens for defense purposes. The plea can also extend to use in research for peaceful or prophylactic use. Moreover, there is also always a plea of inadvertence that the pathogen escaped the research facilities by accident. The credibility of the threat in the event of states taking the plea of dual-use or even unintentional dissemination is thus suspect.
Any state or non-state actor would be deterred to employ bio-weapons if it calculates that the gain from such an attack would be so negligible and minimal that it would be unworthy to risk retribution in case attribution is established. Thus deterrence by denial, where the gains out of a bio-attack can be denied, seems to be a plausible strategy. The denial measures like surveillance and detection of disease outbreak would be indispensable for denying the enemy the attack’s gains. These measures of deterrence by denial would be similar to state and non-state actors. States should increase investments in surveillance and microbial forensic capacities. Early detection can reduce the number of infected individuals. Improving domestic and international disease surveillance capacities and infrastructure in human and animal health and communication between two communities can be an important step. The spread of COVID-19 demonstrates its importance, as many theories link its origins to animals.
Collaboration and coordination between countries and electronic communication tools like WHO’s Global Public Health Information Network must be augmented to gather disease information and reports of unusual biological incidents. COVID-19 spread has highlighted the need for transnational coordination as global trade and travel contributed to the rapid transmission of disease.
Outbreaks like COVID-19, with long asymptomatic incubation periods during which disease can be transferred, are difficult to contain. Improved epidemiological tools and computer simulation and halting the spread by isolation and quarantine are effective. Better diagnostic screening, human capacity, and laboratory infrastructure are important to ramp up the denial response. Mobilization of the public health sector would deny the enemy its political objectives of causing loss of human life or psychological effects.
Additionally, the state actors may be deterred by strengthening the effects of breach of international agreements like the BWC. The U.S. withdrawal from the BWC compliance regime discussions in 2001 was a big setback to creating compliance protocols. States including the U.S. and India should strongly support Biological Weapons Conventions and other international efforts that would prevent the bio attacks either by state and non-state actors and promote global public health infrastructure development.
Thus, the reliance on deterrent actions like armed reprisal or nuclear response (kind of deterrence by punishment) has limited effectiveness. Denial strategies may work the best; when the enemy sees no gains to be made, their motivation will go down.