The massacre of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir on April 22 was unique for its target – visitors/civilians but it is one of many serious attacks on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity which occurred, in first place, due to India’s intelligence failure, security lapses, weak surveillance and inadequate fencing at the border. Amid the success story of ‘Operation Sindoor’ in the Indian media what was sent to the oblivion were hard and glaring facts about lapses of security and intelligence failure on India’s part leading to the massacre.
While India officially boasts the success of the ‘Operation Sindoor’ as the one setting a new normal for its precision and massive toll on terrorist lives and infrastructure, what is shoved away from notice is that more precise and detailed information could have been obtained through effective and alert intelligence mechanism about the already available information on the attack beforehand while being planned even as more information about it as regards the place, time and target were not available. Security lapses were evident from the home ministry’s sheer negligence in reinstating the Central Reserve Police Force post that was removed in January 2025 the presence of which possibly could have prevented the attacks in the Baisaran meadow. Weak surveillance and inadequate fencing are evident from the reports that the Pahalgam terrorists infiltrated the border from Kishtwar in Jammu and then Baisaran via Kokernag in south Kashmir.
On February 14, 2019 at least 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel (Indian paramilitaries) were killed in a suicide car bombing by an operative of the JeM group (Jaish-e-Mohammad) which claimed responsibility for the attack. The suicide bomber rammed a car carrying more than 350 kg of explosives into a convoy of the CRPF at Awantipora town of Pulwama district in Jammu and Kashmir (on the Srinagar-Jammu Highway). This has been the worst ever attack on Indian security forces and the second ‘suicide’ car bomb attack in the valley after May 2000. The attack became possible prima facie because the militants gained the information about the exact movement of the convoy. Intelligence failure and security lapses were glaringly evident which remain shrouded till now – how the classified information was leaked and RDX reached the place without detection.
The region’s difficult terrain characterised by hilly, inaccessible, forest and uneven areas facilitates incursion of militants from across the border. However, these factors necessitate more alert, cautious and precise intelligence and security operations to avert such kind of attacks in future. Effective surveillance over the militants’ use of tools information and technology including social media can be a source of cautious intelligence.
Terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Gurdaspur attack in Punjab in 2015 and Pathankot terror attack in January 2016 and attacks on Uri military camp in September 2016 apart from other attacks finding lesser media attention pointed to ceaseless challenges posed by non-state actors on the territorial integrity of India primarily targeting army and air bases, railways, bus-stands and police stations particularly demonstrating India’s security vulnerabilities and arouse public fear are innumerable instances of India’s deficiencies at working on the key areas of intelligence, surveillance and security.
Core Security Concerns
Successful attacks on defence bases, convoys and legislature – supposed to be most secured and confidential places imply serious vulnerabilities to Indian security. India’s foreign policy makers as well as strategic experts must shift their focus more toward tightening intelligence operations and get over security lapses as their present priority seems to be on the modernization of defence and purchase of conventional weapon systems. India is the world’s fourth-largest military spender now allocating a disproportionate and whopping sum of $75 billion to defence outstripping every other sector in the Union Budget and consuming 13.45 per cent of total government expenditure.
Denying a threat by gathering credible intelligence inputs and tightening defence mechanisms by working on current security lapses would go a long way in containing the menace of terrorism than mounting offensive strategies which most of the times do not work and chances of backfiring cannot be ruled out. At the same time, India must aim at mustering more diplomatic capital by continuously engaging itself with countries sharing similar concerns on cross-border militancy and terrorism.
The debate over these issues of long-term security should not lead to politicization of the attack and divert attention away from core security concerns. Apart from the success stories of ‘Operation Sindoor’ running the headlines in mainstream media, the aftermath of the massacre has in some places reportedly led to cases of oppression against ordinary Muslims unrelated to the violence in Pahalgam in a bid to promote narrow nationalist narratives and obscure rational debates on intelligence, surveillance and security issues. To celebrate the success of ‘Operation Sindoor’ and raise the morale of soldiers, Tiranga marches are being organized throughout the country. However, such nationalist gesture needs to stand on the premise of plurality and diversity that India is all about. Paradoxically, the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre witnessed a steep rise in cases of rhetoric against and arrest of Muslims on grounds of suspicion – in many cases labeling them “illegal Bangladeshis” and Rohingya. While reports of devastation of slums inhabited by Muslims and their property getting destroyed in certain parts of India made their way, reports of violence and harassment of Kashmiris in certain parts of the country demonstrated the dark side of the symbolic nationalist fervor which could cloak more serious issues pertaining to the country’s long-term security.