by Kazi Emdadul Haq 30 May 2021
While speaking at a virtual event, China’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming, suggested quite persuasively that Bangladesh should not join the “Quad” initiative; further, he added, Dhaka’s relations with Beijing will ‘substantially get damaged’ if it does so. Chinese ambassador’s uncalled-for advice gave rise to vast controversies among the interlocutors, not only in Bangladesh but also in the whole world.
Chinese diplomats are no more with naïve attitude. Instead, they appear aggressive in the diplomatic arena. Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s policy began to contradict former premier Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘hide your strength, bide your time….’. Their recent assertive diplomatic endeavours started to showdown since the Covid-19 engulfed the world. However, it had started long ago, immediately after Xi became General Secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of Central Military Commission in 2012.
In 2012, when Philippine naval ships intercepted Chinese fishing boats in the disputed South China Sea (SCS), China retaliated by stopping accepting Pilipino bananas, showing excuses of ‘not meeting the Chinese standard.’ Again, when Seoul installed the US missile system in 2016, China’s economic retaliation cost Seoul at least $7.5 billion business loss. China claims 1.3 million square miles, almost all SCS, by drawing a 9-dash line that overlaps most of the EEZs of ASEAN countries. China’s brazen attitude made relations sour with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN counties. Both Vietnam and the Philippines sought international arbitration. When the verdict was delivered, China was not ready to accept the decision of arbitration, saying it was “ill-founded” and China would not be bound by it.
Chinese diplomats’ rhetoric with most western countries is also seen as assertive on various issues, bringing China’s relations to a nadir. To cite few examples: China is already at economic war with the US; China warned the UK on the issue of 3 million Hongkongers holding British National Overseas’ passports; the EU also invoked limited sanction over China for the oppression of Uyghur Muslim; at the outbreak of Covid-19, Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origin of Covid-19, which was considered as a legitimate right to ask for, China elicited fiercely with economic retaliation and stopped importing Australian coal, beef, barley, wine, seafood, timber, cotton, etc.
China’s assertive action puts most of its economic allies into queasiness, but they cannot express direct disagreement due to fear of the former’s economic intimidation. On the other hand, China is equally afraid of losing financial partners. Amidst this trepidation, China and Russia’s cooperation has become a feasible option, despite their many differences. China also started to grow its economic engagement with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), raising the eyebrows of the US strategists. When the US withdrew from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on the contrary, China became the influential partner by signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 10 ASEAN countries and five others– Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand in November 2020 – world’s largest trading bloc, covering almost one-third of the global economy. China’s economic leverage casts a blow to India from investing in Iranian Chabahar rail and US$ 1.78 billion Persian Gulf gas field projects.
Both Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) are led by the US, although Quad idea was presented by the then Japan PM Shinzo Abe in 2007. He, possibly, wanted to ensure a bigger security umbrella sensing future threats coming from China. Albeit great initiatives covering the whole of Indo-Pacific, both are still at an informal level without any factual statement and clear charter; thus, their objectives are still in infancy to many strategists, for which the interlocutors interpret them as deemed necessary. None of them is laid for signing or have asked countries to participate instead of the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). ‘Quad plus’ concept was floated to include South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand, but not Bangladesh. Until now, only the first-ever Quad virtual meeting was held at the leaders level on 12 March 2021 to discuss a wide range of issues, mainly to combat Covid-19 (Quad leaders’ joint statement).
Bangladesh is significantly engaged with China, where most of the daily commodities coming from China. Bilateral trade between Bangladesh and China is around $14.68 billion in the 2018-19 fiscal year (import trade of $13.86 billion and export of $831 million). Since last year, China incredibly has announced huge economic commitments towards Bangladesh – China to import 97% of Bangladeshi duty-free goods declared just after the India-China Ladakh incident on 15 June 2021, proposed to build ‘sister cities’ in Bangladesh, proposed to construct “Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project” costing nearly US$ One billion amid Indian dilly-dally to sign Teesta water-sharing agreement, 40-50 million Covid-19 vaccine doses to get from China, etc. The timing of these investment proposals naturally irks India that led to the sudden visit of the Indian foreign secretary to Bangladesh on 18 August 2020 to convey the Indian support towards the development of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has been maintaining balanced relationships with China and India, including the US. India’s downtrend economy perfectly favoured China to invest in South and Southeast Asian countries. Bangladesh has consistently reiterated that the relationship with China is economical. Taking the leverage of investment, if China desires to influence internal affairs, it would be ‘very unfortunate’ and ‘aggressive’ as mentioned by the foreign minister of Bangladesh.
Malacca’s dilemma puts China to seek alternative connectivity to the Indian Ocean through this region; thus, China started China’s Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). China also endorsed the February’21 putsch by Myanmar military junta. As Myanmar is moving towards civil war, the strategic importance of Bangladesh gets more perennial to China.
Amid economic war, China appears not to lose any partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Massive remodelling of strategic calculations to win the economic war, China’s aggressiveness cannot be overlooked at the diplomatic level. Being a littoral to the Indian Ocean and its geostrategic location, Bangladesh, including other littorals, will be highly affected by Chinese economic leverage, putting all the countries in a challenging situation to avert China’s rising influence. The main goal of Bangladesh is to achieve economic emancipation and evolve as an economic giant in the region by 2041. To achieve such a goal, Bangladesh aims at doing whatever it deems to be the best for the country, coalescing into regional harmony.