LT GENERAL PRAKASH MENON
china’s influence in India’s neighbourhood has been steadily growing for several years. Influence is a strategic tool, and the means to achieve it is dependence. Dependence on China is gathering pace in nearly all of India’s neighbours, including Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. On the other hand, India’s importance and influence in these countries have been on the wane. Pakistan, of course, tops this unsolicited list.
For China, increasing its influence serves several strategic purposes. Notably, it strengthens its efforts to contain India within the subcontinent. This containment is tied to the deepening geopolitical rivalry between the US and China.
For China, a weakened India can dilute any role New Delhi plays by teaming up with Washington, especially in the maritime domain of the Asia-Pacific, which is crucial for China’s trade operations.
China’s influence in Pakistan: The CPEC factor
China’s influence in Pakistan has grown substantially, especially in the practical absence of the US from the region following its withdrawal from Afghanistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), coupled with the provision of Chinese arms, remains the sheath anchor of this dependence. The development of Gwadar Port, once fully operational, provides an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean.
India’s relations with Pakistan have remained frozen for nearly a decade, while Pakistan continues to orchestrate infiltration and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. In October 2024 India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in Islamabad. At the time, former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif told the press that India and Pakistan must bury the past and improve relations. However, such a prospect currently seems dim. Strategically, China could utilise Pakistan to escalate terrorist activities while simultaneously maintaining pressure on India’s northern borders.
- China’s influence is rising across South Asia, reducing India’s regional sway.
- Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan are increasingly aligning with Beijing.
- China’s investments and diplomacy are reshaping India’s strategic landscape.
- India must adopt a strong diplomatic approach to counter China’s expansion.
Beijing’s strategic moves in Nepal and Bhutan
China’s growing influence in Nepal can be gauged by its role in uniting leftist political parties to form a government. China succeeded in getting the CPN-UML and the Maoist Centre to form a new coalition government by persuading the Maoist-Centre to sever its 15 month alliance with the Nepali Congress, which was the single largest party. China has long been Nepal’s largest source of FDI, funding several projects such as airports, hydropower plants, and dams, which are at various stages of construction.
China’s growing influence has come at India’s expense and is unlikely to change. India’s historic ties with Nepal have also been affected by the introduction of the Agniveer recruitment scheme for the Army. Strategically, India’s waning influence in Nepal—while China gains the ability to steer Nepal’s actions against Indian interests—could become a major factor if India-China relations worsen further. The specific form this could take remains unpredictable.
Bhutan has long been considered India’s closest ally in the region. The 1949 India-Bhutan treaty granted India control over Bhutan’s foreign affairs, though a revised version in 2007 reduced India’s role. Over time, China has expanded its territorial claims in Bhutan, including north-central Bhutan, the western Doklam Plateau, and, in 2020, the Sakteng area in the east. For India, the Doklam Plateau is critical, as it is co-located with the Jampheri Ridge, which provides strategic oversight of India’s main access route to its northeastern states. While China vacated the confrontation site after the 2017 standoff, it has since militarised the Doklam Plateau and built infrastructure to support military occupations. China-Bhutan boundary talks have continued for over four decades, with indications that China could give up some claims in north-central and eastern Bhutan.
China’s bargaining ploy is obvious and reflects its actual intentions: securing strategic dominance over India’s connectivity with its northeastern states. Bhutan has maintained that it will not violate India’s interests in any agreement. However, Bhutan seems to have shifted its stance toward China, which could change India’s traditional confidence in Thimphu. As long as Bhutan does not adversely affect India’s interests in the west, especially concerning the Jampheri Ridge, India could live with the outcome of the talks.
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka: The next frontiers
Myanmar has been experiencing internal strife for several years, with China backing the military government. Armed groups fighting the military have recently achieved some success, raising concerns over the security of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. India’s relations with Myanmar remain overshadowed by China’s influence. As and when there is reasonable internal stability, China could potentially use Myanmar-India border to foment instability in India’s northeastern states.
Bangladesh’s relations with India have considerably worsened the most. (For further details, see my article in ThePrint.)
India’s relations with Sri Lanka have shown some improvement. The new Sri Lankan President, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, visited India for his first overseas trip since assuming the office. China has several old projects ongoing, but has not embarked on any new ones. Moreover, China hesitated to support Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring efforts in the, whereas India provided financial relief during the economic crisis. China’s strategic interest in utilising Sri Lanka to dominate the Indian Ocean seems peripheral for now.
The Maldives remains a concern, although there has been a shift for the better despite the Muizzu government’s “India Out” electoral stance. Muizzu first visited China and signed a Free Trade Agreement, but later visited India in October 2024. The list of agreements released by the MEA indicates that relations have turned more positive. Still, China’s expanding activities in the Maldives remain a worry. Considering its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, China’s influence in the Maldives is expected to grow.
Can India counter China’s growing presence?
India cannot match China’s economic clout in its neighbourhood. Diplomacy will have to be India’s primary tool. At present, Bangladesh is the biggest concern. Its internal politics and pending elections, as and when held, will provide further insight into China’s span of influence. India must brace for the worst, including the potential use of its territory by Pakistan and China for inimical activities.
Bhutan remains a concern due to increasing Chinese pressure to reach a boundary agreement. So far, Bhutan’s assurances of safeguarding India’s interest seem to suffice, but China could switch from diplomacy to coercion, considering its quest to take over the Jampheri Ridge.
In the Maldives, the possibility of China building bases and installing surveillance equipment is bound to increase as the contestation in the Indo-Pacific deepens. The Maldives’ economic dependency on China could be weaponised for strategic purposes.
China could also exploit India’s frozen relations with Pakistan to incite trouble along India’s western border. Considering Pakistan’s internal turmoil and economic woes, China is in a position to push it toward escalation beyond Jammu and Kashmir. A terrorist act on a religious site or mass gathering remains a potent tool to create widespread internal instability in India. There is a case for India to re-examine its approach to engaging Pakistan in dialogue.
The picture painted here of India’s relations with its neighbours is bleak—but that is the reality. India knows from the past only too well that it cannot expect any help from external powers in dealing with its neighbours. India must put in concerted diplomatic efforts to clearly improve the prevailing state of relations with its neighbours. Without such improvement, India’s prime strategic threats will only pose greater security risks.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
source : theprint