by Dr. Manoj Kumar Mishra 30 August 2021
No gainsaying the fact that the developing countries are more disposed to non-traditional security threats such as poverty, disease, and insurgencies on account of their weak political and rickety socio-economic institutions compared to developed countries. Covid-19 which has far-reaching security consequences on account of its negative impact on the economy, culture, and political stability of countries could further destabilize the institutions and engender civil war-like situations in the long-term which could, in turn, impinge on international peace and security. A report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2021 pointed to the glaring fact that while the pandemic had a little direct impact on the conduct of armed conflicts in 2020; it led to increases in psychological stress and domestic violence. The pandemic also had major economic and political effects. It led to reduced economic output in all except 20 countries, reversed three decades of progress in poverty reduction, and contributed to widespread deterioration in the quality of democracy. All these effects will in turn have possible future security consequences.[i] Earlier the SIPRI report on the pattern of armed conflict released in 2017 recorded the statistics that out of the 49 active conflicts in 2016, 47 were fought within states and over government (22), territory (24), or both (1) indicating a clear trend toward a sharp rise in the number of intrastate conflicts compared to inter-state ones. The report further noted that Africa was the region with the highest number of conflicts in 2016 (19 active conflicts) followed by Asia (15 conflicts).[ii] The 2021 report of the institute went on to state that just as in preceding years, most conflicts took place within a single country (intrastate), between government forces and one or more armed non-state group(s).
While Europe is overrepresented in the UN Security Council by the presence of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, other geographical regions comprising mostly developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are underrepresented. China as the only permanent member from the Asian continent was supposed to have been representing developing countries’ security concerns.
Whereas it will be premature to lay blame at the Chinese door for the origin and spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, the first cases of the virus-infected persons found on the Chinese soil and the Chinese secrecy in managing the public reporting of the pandemic ranging from its outbreak to total cases affected by and deaths resulted from it demonstrated the Chinese preference for age-old insularity more than its desire for engagement with the international community. Even while the country has been fiercely contesting the Wuhan lab leak theory and insisting on the theory of natural origin, it has failed to offer any evidence in support of this. To be a genuine representative of the security concerns of the developing world, China should have brought in more transparency in its actions that could have implications for the broadly defined security concerns of developing countries.
For the most part of its evolution as a prominent economic and military power, China was barely inclined to identify itself formally with the largest multilateral bodies of the developing world such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77. China’s contentment with observer status within the NAM and major statements being issued as position papers on behalf of “G77 and China” point to this fact.
The letter and spirit of what Deng Xiaoping said to his party cadre way back in 1990 pointed to China’s individualistic aspirations at the time. He said: “Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that – this is one of our basic state policies. We cannot afford to do it, and besides, we are not strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role. We would only lose most of our initiatives.”[iii]
These remarks were at odds with the developing countries’ expectations of the most populous country of the world representing the largest landmass of the developing world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. For the most part, China during that period considered UN peacekeeping operations interference with national sovereignty and disparaged them.
In the first decade of this century, while Beijing’s contribution to peacekeeping operations surpassed that of most Western countries, it still lagged far behind other developing countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh or Nigeria. For instance, China committed 2,200 peacekeepers while it maintained a standing army of more than 2 million in 2009.
Meanwhile China was transforming its image, as it not only significantly enhanced its contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget from 3% in 2013 to 10.25% by 2018, it maintained a standing peacekeeping force of 8,000, comprising six infantry battalions, three companies of engineers, two transport companies, four second-grade hospitals, four security companies, three fast-reaction companies, two medium-sized multipurpose helicopter units, two transport aircraft units, one drone unit, and one surface naval ship, which make it the largest troop contributor of the five permanent members of the Security Council.[iv]
It has not only contributed to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) worldwide, according to a UN Development Program report, it has offered its mediating role in the Afghan peace process as well as the settlement of the Rohingya refugee issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar as a regional peace broker. Beijing also announced a new package of aid and loans to more than 50 African leaders visiting Beijing for the seventh Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
China’s ability to establish alternative financial institutions free from US influence, enhanced participation in the UN and other multilateral initiatives, growing diplomatic network, and ability to shape norms and discourse in wider regions accompanied by a relative decline of American power engendered more speculation about the global reach and potential of China. However, the Chinese insularity in the past and a sudden upsurge in engagements with the international community only helped arouse skepticism about its interests and role in several quarters. Chinese assertion of indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea at the expense of the territorial claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other developing countries breaching international laws and the inherent limitations of the Belt and Road Initiative – the mega connectivity project, for its lack of transparency, an open and inclusive approach, sustainable financing and thrust on building heavy infrastructure fail to dispel doubts whether China did not have any ulterior strategic motives and it could be a true representative of the developing countries’ security interests.
While Beijing’s far-reaching influence in the African continent has been acclaimed as benign in China and among many African countries, its declaration of aid without any strings attached has aroused suspicion among many other countries and observers. There have been allegations that Chinese aid has been channeled to realize various political objectives, such as gaining continued legitimacy for its Communist Party leadership and support for its one-China policy. Rather than concentrating more on building human-resource capacity in Africa, China allegedly directed its engagement in building heavy infrastructure, which engendered perceptions that these might be used for strategic purposes.
Beijing’s claim that its deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean was targeted at anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and the establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, further corroborated such suspicions over Chinese intentions. Even while China has taken up an enhanced peacekeeping role as evidenced in Mali, South Sudan, and Darfur, Chinese state media chose to project it as a Chinese achievement, showing a tinge of nationalistic pride. China’s embrace of a larger role in UN peacekeeping has raised suspicions that it might be training and preparing its troops by “providing them opportunities to improve its military operations other than war (MOOTW) and modernize its security forces.”[v]
While the whole world is viewing the Afghan turmoil which ensued soon after the Biden administration withdrew most of the American troops from Afghanistan leading to a quick takeover of Kabul in August this year in awe, China may see this as an opportunity to ensure Kabul’s full participation in the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) which could not take off earlier due to the close relationship between the United States and the Afghan government. Further, the Taliban has already assured Beijing that it will not allow the Uyghurs to use Afghanistan in any way that would endanger China’s security. However, China as a representative of the developing world is expected to address the Afghan turmoil by looking at the humanitarian consequences.
[i] SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Available at https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021.
[ii] Armed Conflict and Peace Processes”, SIPRI Yearbook 2017, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2017/02.
[iii] Yang, L. “China-India Relations in the Contemporary World: Dynamics of national Identity and Interest”, Routledge, 2016, p. 59.
[iv] Chirstoph, Z. “China and UN Peacekeeping”, Centre for Internal Policy Studies, Available at https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2019/01/14/china-and-un-peacekeeping/
[v] Pauley, L. “China Takes the Lead in UN Peacekeeping”, The Diplomat, April 17, 2018, Available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/china-takes-the-lead-in-un-peacekeeping/