Can India Advance Peace in Ukraine?

What actions has India taken to date regarding the war in Ukraine?

Panda: India has pursued a largely neutral stance regarding the war in Ukraine, abstaining from most U.N. resolutions condemning Russia’s actions and emphasizing dialogue and diplomacy.

Despite Western pressure, India has maintained its relationship with Russia. While Modi has occasionally criticized Vladimir Putin’s war, he has also been careful to avoid offensive undertones. The Indian establishment has carefully guarded its “privileged strategic partnership” with Russia and views Russia’s declining fortunes in the global order as a strategically significant and unfavorable shift for India.

Modi has also been interested in peacebuilding efforts and has met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on multiple occasions. while India has significantly increased its imports of discounted Russian oil since the conflict began, it has also sent medical supplies, equipment and relief materials to Ukraine as part of its humanitarian response. India has also made other concrete efforts to support Ukraine, such as pushing to open the Black Sea Grain Corridor and maintaining a direct line with Russia about Ukrainian concerns over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant as well as pushing to boost economic ties.

This approach has contributed to a form of shuttle diplomacy wherein Delhi seeks to maintain communication channels with both Russia and Ukraine, positioning itself as a peacemaker and dialogue facilitator. Modi followed travel to Moscow in July — a symbolic trip as his first overseas travel after being elected to office for a third time — with a historic visit to Kyiv in August, which marked the first time an Indian leader has visited Ukraine since its 1991 independence.

The visit served to not only revitalize bilateral ties but also signal to the West that India is invested in the future of Ukraine. Importantly, the visit led to Zelenskyy proposing a peace summit in India aimed at ending the war; although this is hardly settled as of now as India would like to include Putin in any type of peace summit, it demonstrates the extent to which Modi’s visit was successful in positioning India as a potential peacemaker in the conflict.

What are India’s motivations and aspirations for its diplomacy, and what are potential limitations or obstacles?

Panda: India’s approach to Ukraine reflects a careful balance among its historical ties with Russia, growing strategic partnership with the West, and the principles of “strategic autonomy” central to its foreign policy. As a nuclear power surrounded by nuclear rivals, escalation between Russia and Ukraine has been a genuine cause for India’s unease. India has also been concerned about the war’s continuing impact on the Global South’s food and energy insecurity. Under Modi, India has sought to position itself cautiously as a leader in the Global South, which is emerging quite clearly as a sphere of competition between India and China.

In the emerging multipolar world, strategic autonomy and an independent foreign policy have become cornerstones of India’s foreign policy. This framework envisions India acting as a bridge between competing blocs. Its high-level meetings with both Russia and Ukraine help to reinforce this image.

India is constrained to some degree by its historic and strategic partnership with Russia, which can invite skepticism from other potential partners. Despite diversification, India’s defense sector relies heavily on Russian technology and equipment, and this dependence makes it vital for Delhi to navigate its position on the war delicately.

At the early stages of the war, there were questions over the extent that India’s (neutral) stance would prompt condemnation, particularly from the West. India’s refusal to explicitly criticize Russia could be interpreted by many European countries such as Sweden, Poland, and Nordic and Baltic countries with their own territorial concerns as tacit support for an aggressor, undermining its credibility as a moral leader. Meanwhile India’s increased purchase of discounted Russian oil — while understandable to safeguard its energy security amid global price shocks — could have also appeared self-serving to nations that lack similar opportunities and are disproportionately impacted by rising energy costs. Although in the long-term there is the chance that more visible shuttle diplomacy could draw in renewed scrutiny, thus far India has avoided any major diplomatic fallout.

How receptive are Russia, Ukraine and the European Union to India’s efforts?

Panda: India’s posture on the Ukraine war has been met with varying degrees of receptivity from Russia, Ukraine and the EU.

Russia has welcomed India’s neutral stance, and the increase in Indian imports of discounted Russian oil has built goodwill. However, Russia is aware that India’s engagement is pragmatic rather than ideological. While Moscow carefully monitors India’s growing relations with Western partners, these ties are not seen with any extraordinary sense of suspicion, and India’s role as a bridge suits Russia well enough. India remains an important partner for Russia, especially while the war continues, and Moscow will likely seek to ensure it maintains a positive relationship with Delhi.

Furthermore, Russia likely prefers India in the role of peacemaker, as compared to China. The Kremlin recently stated that it had confidence in Modi as a mediator. The “highly constructive” and “friendly” relations between Modi and Putin, the Kremlin said, meant that Modi would be able to communicate freely with Russia, Ukraine and the United States. India’s insistence that it would merely be a facilitator — and that the decision to talk must come from Ukraine and Russia, and Russia must be at the table to proceed on peace talks with any momentum — gives Moscow greater confidence in India’s peacemaker role.

At the outset, Zelenskyy’s public criticism of India’s Russia stance, including the headline-grabbing Putin-Modi embrace soon after a deadly missile attack on Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital, highlighted Ukraine’s unmistakable frustration with Indian diplomacy. Still, Ukraine recognizes India’s influence with the Global South, India’s humanitarian aid efforts and India’s potential to at least create conditions for a peace deal, including as a possible mediator. For Kyiv, India may be one of the few states capable of playing a peacemaker role. China, for instance, is seen as far from neutral in the conflict, efforts by nations like Saudi Arabia have fallen flat, and Russia’s ties with the U.S. are largely frozen.

Many European states have expressed their frustration and disappointment over India’s neutral stance, particularly its continued trade with Russia. While India’s position is seen with less suspicion than China’s, Delhi’s stance is nevertheless viewed as undermining Western sanctions and the collective effort by democracies to isolate Moscow and protect the liberal international order. Still, European discomfort with India’s position has noticeably reduced since the war’s start two years ago, largely keeping in mind the advantages an economically ascendant India brings to the table. As India has expanded its engagement among EU partners, they may be more confident and agreeable to it taking on a larger peacemaker role.

What would be the plausible next steps if India were to pursue peace talks?

Panda: While India hasn’t officially taken a mediation role, Modi’s high-level meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy, combined with his neutral stance, have positioned India as a potential facilitator for peace talks. If India seeks to enhance its role in the Ukraine conflict, plausible next steps could involve leveraging its diplomatic capital and global positioning to bring both parties to the table. Both Kyiv and Moscow have seemed agreeable to the idea of an India-hosted peace summit.

Expanding humanitarian support for Ukraine, including reconstruction funding, could go a long way to building India’s credibility as a voice for peace. These efforts would need to be complemented with better strategic communication to accentuate that India’s position is pro-peace, and not outrightly pro-Russia. India would also need to emphasize that it supports international law and norms while looking out for its national interests, as any responsible developing country should.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden, and a professor at the University of Warsaw. Dr. Panda is also a senior fellow at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies and the series editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.

The article appeared in the usip