by Syed Zain Jaffery 27 February 2020
Recently, Lieutenant General (R) Khalid Kidwai gave an opening speech during a workshop titled, “South Asian Strategic Stability: Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control” held by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS). In case of further confrontation between the two hostile neighbors, he further elaborated the current strategic positions of both Pakistan and India. Yet, Lt Gen (R) Kidwai most notably advised India that Pakistan’s nuclear capacity should not be deemed as bluff. Since Pakistan believes that if war is imposed on it will allocate all the means for defending its strategic and ideological interests.
He further clarifies that since after the “Balakot incident” there emerged a great deal of prestigious narrative in the Indian political circles that labeled Pakistan’s nuclear capability a bluff, which is a very weak strategic assumption. Throughout his whole speech, especially, in post-Pulwama and Balakot scenario, he described Indian policy errors because there are people in the political circles of India who drafted seriously incorrect conclusions from such incidents. He cautioned that “it would be a serious professional folly on their (Indian) part to consider that a single air strike, that too conducted most unprofessionally, would render Pakistan’s robust nuclear deterrence a bluff.”
It is critical that the international community takes into account Indian aggressive rhetoric about its recent nuclear offensive stance in the background of recent BJP’s belligerences. Modi has claimed at several previous campaigns to call Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence as “bluff,” and said he would not wait to turn to nuclear capability if attacked again by Pakistan – most particularly in campaign of Barmer, where Modi branded nuclear missiles to not reserved for use on Diwali. Such statements bring up issues as to whether the No First Use (NFU) strategy of India will alter in near future. It also indicates that after Pulwama attack, India would feel further incensed to act violently toward potential freedom fighters’ attacks that it could blame on Pakistan, complacent over Pakistan’s credible nuclear posture. Countering Pakistan focuses more generally on India’s security interests, raising doubts about its stance that it can support a status quo with Pakistan or that it is more involved in China’s related threat perceptions.
The comments by Modi are already reduced as a pure political campaign rush by Indian defense experts, who claim a major security change regarding nuclear policy has not actually occurred. Nevertheless, words count when it comes to nuclear warfare. This strictly controlled trend of verbal irrationality does not suit nuclear threats well. Clear strategy and resources must endorse a threat in order to provide it with legitimacy and India is not in a position to threaten Pakistan a conventional war under nuclear umbrella. It is also highly concerning that threats of nuclear wars are a potential winner of elections in the presumed largest democracy in the world.
Despite the Indian military’s perforated prestige during the Pulwama crisis, PM Modi deliberately expanded and exacerbated tensions with its nuclear neighbour. Pakistan’s strategic restraint escaped the region from a nuclear crisis outbreak because its ruling elite assumes nuclear warfare is impassable, which leads to a global all-out catastrophe. With the introduction of Indian nuclear-capable missiles during the post-Pulwama military confrontation among India and Pakistan, threats of unintended or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in South Asia arose inconceivably. The Indian government, desperate for a war, falsely believes that in a war scenario with Pakistan, it might bring the Cold Start Doctrine into practice, causing military damage to Pakistan in addition to the substantial devastation of our armies and assets without any real response.
The calling of Pakistan’s nuclear capability as so-called nuclear bluff is alarming proportion. This may be strategically expensive on several counts such as Pakistan’s nuclear policy and trigger, sound decision-making problems in a volatile crisis situation and the possibility of a conventional confrontation converting into a nuclear war. In comparison, India’s motives and behavior shows that its NFU policy is always a diplomatic bluff that can be repudiated quickly in critical times. Analysts believe India might still strike first with nuclear weapons, notwithstanding its NFU doctrine. India’s offensive approach of annexing the disputable territories of Kashmir and suggesting the first strike by means of a nuclear capability, has increased the dangers of nuclear warfare. Therefore, Lt Gen (R) Kidwai very aptly said that “Pakistan must shoulder the responsibility of maintaining the vital strategic balance in the conventional and nuclear equation with India as particular determinant of the state of strategic stability in South Asia.”