Afghanistan’s push to construct dams over the Kunar and Kabul Rivers is raising concerns of a potential hydropolitical fault line in South Asia. For Pakistan, a lower riparian neighbouring state already coping with climate stress and water scarcity, these developments carry significant repercussions not only for the country’s agriculture and water security, but also for regional stability. While Kabul frames the dam projects as an assertion of sovereign rights, Islamabad sees them as a potential strategic threat, one that mirrors India’s longstanding efforts to leverage upstream control. In the absence of a formal water-sharing treaty, the Chitral-Kabul River system is fast becoming a litmus test for whether Pakistan and Afghanistan can navigate competition and cooperation over their most vital shared resource: water. According to the Taliban Energy and Water Minister, Abdul Latif Mansoor, the Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada has instructed the ministry to proceed with dam construction using domestic firms, bypassing foreign contractors. Mansoor quoted him “Afghans have the right to manage their own waters.” From Pakistan’s perspective, such unilateral measures risk disrupting the hydrological balance and threaten the livelihoods of millions dependent on the Chitral–Kabul River system. The unfolding situation is not merely a technical or developmental matter; it is a strategic test of cooperation, negotiation, and regional water diplomacy between the two neighbors. Hydrological Context Afghanistan comprises five major river basins including the Amu Darya, Indus-Kabul, Northern, Harirod-Murghab, and Helmand basins. Among these, the Indus–Kabul Basin holds the greatest strategic significance for Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan share nine transboundary rivers; three flowing through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and six through Balochistan. The annual total average water inflow from Afghanistan to Pakistan is close to 23 million acre-feet (MAF), with 17.5 MAF coming exclusively from the Kabul River. The Chitral River, which has a flow of about 8 MAF, flowing from Pakistan towards Afghanistan, joins the Kabul River then re-enters to Pakistan, thus making a very important hydrological loop that sustains millions of people living downstream. Almost 80% of the agriculture in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa relies on this river system, therefore, its continuous flow is crucial for the province's food security and people's livelihoods. At present, Afghanistan ‘s water utilization is 1.8 million acre-feet from the shared river system, but it is expected to reach 3.6 million acre-feet by 2030, through new dam and hydropower projects. The Kabul government presently has 21 dams under its control, including 11 are situated in the Indus-Kabul Basin, and it plans to build 12 new dams and carry out almost 200 hydropower projects with an estimated $3 billion investment. New Delhi pledged $ 2 billion in 2011 for 12 new dam projects, which has mostly been restricted to feasibility studies, continues to be a major sign of New Delhi’s commitment to Afghanistan's upstream water infrastructure. If Afghanistan constructs new upstream dams, it will reduce Pakistan’s Indus Basin flow by approximately 5%. Reduction for agriculture will be Rabi (0.75 MAF) and Kharif (3.7 MAF). A blow to Pakistan’s agrarian economy and food security. Pakistan’s Strategic Perspective From Pakistan’s perspective, the renewed claims of dam construction by Afghanistan should be analyzed both technically and geopolitically. The Taliban government, which is still facing international sanctions, has frozen assets and is under limited financial capacity, so it cannot independently fund such huge infrastructure. Therefore, the "self-reliance" story in the construction of the dams becomes a controversy about the external support and the facilitation-especially from those actors who would like to destabilize Pakistan’s strategic stability. The timing of these announcements has caught the attention of various geopolitical analysts, who also see it as an important factor in India's wider regional reassessment after its military and diplomatic setback in May 2025 standoff. Through its support of the hydropower ambitions of Afghanistan, the Indian government seems to be adopting a proxy strategy of applying indirect pressure on Pakistan-similar to its earlier efforts to make the Indus Waters Treaty a political issue. Kabul's sudden assertiveness is interpreted by Islamabad as a coordinated political design aimed at creating leverage. This perception is further strengthened by the fact that Afghanistan has reached out to India and has been reluctant to take strong actions against TTP and BLA militants who are operating from its territory. In this scenario, water is seen as a new tool of coercion, Afghanistan being the secondary front in India's ongoing campaign of hydro-diplomatic containment against its neighbor. Any attempt to alter or restrict transboundary water flows without mutual consent not only threatens to destabilize the Indus Basin ecosystem but also possibly lead to wider regional confrontation. Historical precedents such as Egypt’s response to Ethiopia’s Nile dam construction illustrate how unilateral upstream actions can escalate into crises of national survival.  Legal and Diplomatic Dimensions Being a lower riparian nation, Pakistan enjoys certain rights under international water law, among them, equitable and reasonable utilization, protection from significant harm, upstream project prior notification, and transparent data exchange. However, the absence of a formal bilateral agreement between Islamabad and Kabul makes these rights vulnerable to interpretation and neglect. Previous negotiations conducted between 2003 and 2014 did not reach any agreement on flow-sharing methods mainly because of the political instability in Afghanistan and the absence of sustain technical involvement. On the other hand, the International Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 between Pakistan and India, has always been recognized as a model of good practice in the management of transboundary water resources by the international community. The IWT has been a structured communication and data-sharing channel for more than sixty years despite the hostilities; thus, it is a winning example that could be applied to the situation of water disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Way Forward Pakistan recognizes and acknowledges that Afghanistan has the right to use the water of the rivers they both share for its developmental requirements. Nevertheless, this has to be carried out under the condition of mutual consultation and fair allocation of the water without neglecting the downstream interests. Moving forward, Islamabad advocates: -
  • The establishment of a bilateral water commission for data sharing, joint monitoring, and project evaluation.
  • Inclusion of the water-sharing agenda within multilateral platforms such as the Moscow Format, Quadrilateral (Russia–China–Pakistan–Afghanistan), and Trilateral (China–Pakistan–Afghanistan) dialogues.
  • Engagement of international mediators or neutral technical bodies to ensure transparency and confidence-building.
In a nutshell, the Cooperative management of the Chitral-Kabul River System is not merely a matter of governing resources; it is an essential component for peaceful relations between two neighbouring states, ensuring food security, and achieving long-lasting stability in the region. The river should be seen as a shared lifeline connecting two rival states which must learn to coexist in peace rather than in division. Therefore, dialogue, not division, is the way forward.