Chinese Ambition
China strongly desires to be given the same recognition as the US in the global community. The Grand Strategy espoused by China in the wake of its economic liberalization in the 70s contains three elements: first and foremost, the preservation of the authority of the Chinese Communist Party without entertaining the virtues of liberal democracy; second the defence against external threats to the national sovereignty and third, the complete attainment of key geopolitical influence a major state. By driving beyond the orthodox Westphalian sense of statehood, China perceives itself as a civilizational state with an unblemished history where China was the middle kingdom until the century of humiliation. Against the backdrop of accomplishing the great Chinese dream, the centrality of sea power comes into the picture with its perennial value in making global powers. China is well aware of its hobnobbing with the sea power due to its historical legacy, which dates back to the epoch of the Ming dynasty.
International Order with Chinese Characteristics
Viewed from the perspective of modern world picture, the Chinese rivalry with the exiting norms prevailed in the liberal international order is akin to a clash between the different world views, in which one tries to commit to the ideals espoused by the Atlantic Charter such as self-governance, economic prosperity, free trade, the preservation of the global commons and other hesitates its legitimacy. China’s abhorrence to the Western dominant international order traces to its own world view that differed from the West. The historical encounter between China and the West that reached its zenith in the Opium War (1839-1842) is depicted as a cultural misunderstanding by the Chinese as it ended China’s pride.
The ongoing geopolitical rivalries based on the Indo-Pacific region denote China’s yearning to overcome the primacy of India, which is a state that adhered to the rule-based international order and US ally. China’s entry into the Indian Ocean forges the security cooperation between India and the West as it created various alliances such as QUOD and I2U2. Despite the security vulnerabilities, which alter the equilibrium of the Indian Ocean, China tends to seize the opportunities arising out of the fragile conditions of the region. The fragility of the political and economic discontents that prevailed in South Asia seemed to have generated an apt path for Beijing to exploit the situation. It may not be an exaggeration to remark most of India’s neighbors in the region do not maintain a candid relationship with New Delhi based on India’s own dubious history of interventions in the internal matters of the countries. Given the anti-Indian stances remaining beneath the highest echelons of powers in South Asia, Beijing uses its unconventional methods to get to the strides. The use of methods denied by the rule-based international order is quite a distinctive feature of the Chinese policy towards the fragile states in South Asia.
China’s gaze towards Sri Lanka and Maldives
The ongoing geopolitical rivalries based on the Indo-Pacific region denote China’s yearning to overcome the primacy of India, which is a state that adhered to the rule-based international order and US ally. China’s entry into the Indian Ocean forges the security cooperation between India and the West as it created various alliances such as QUOD and I2U2. Despite the security vulnerabilities, which alter the equilibrium of the Indian Ocean, China tends to seize the opportunities arising out of the fragile conditions of the region.
When Chinese influence began to soar in Sri Lanka, then Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa pretended to depict it as another strong friendship derived historically which would not undermine Lanka’s affinity with India at any cost. Gradually China penetrated the higher pillars of the state apparatus of the country as China sought a mechanism to leverage its presence. In many instances, the Chinese generously supported the political campaign of Mahinda Rajapaksa and during the 2015 Presidential Election, one Chinese company paid $ 7.7 Million to his election campaign. Chinese interest in Maldives came much later compared to its hobnobbing with Sri Lanka. The fragility of Maldives as a small state depending on the stronger powers has been a historical anemology that dates back to the British era. After the departure of the British, Maldives gradually fell into the orbit of India and it maintained stronger security ties with New Delhi. By virtue of its strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, China has accelerated its ties with Maldives recently by becoming a stronger economic partner, which has overcome the traditional dominant position held by India. As per the Maldives customs service, China exported goods and services worth approximately $488 Million to Maldives in 2018 compared to the Indian exports that totalled $ 287 Million.
While examining the impetuses that bolster China to enhance its interest towards the Maldives, it is imperative to revisit China’s specific Indian Ocean strategy as it reflects the benign vision of Beijing in reshaping the 21st-century world order. Chinese national defence policy adopted in 2004 and revised in 2015 epitomizes the overarching security interests of China entangled by its own strategic dilemma. The novel concept introduced by the national defence policy called “frontier defence” invoked the robust expansion of PLAN beyond the traditional Chinese geographic boundaries to the new open-ended frontiers of national and economic interests. The departure of PLAN’s conventional continental security mentality marked the advent of Bejing’s tectonic shift to the high seas. Like Sri Lanka, the perennial strategic value imbued with Maldives is a catalyst factor for the Chinese interest in the chain of islands.
However, the change of the domestic political trajectories in Maldives recently was duly utilized by China in the same unprecedented manner they followed in Sri Lanka. Having realized Maldives’ geographical positioning near the maritime chain, which is crucial to China’s energy supply, Beijing began to leverage its economic grip over the administration in Maldives. The first few years of China’s efforts to consolidate its presence in Maldives lacked static results as the governments in Maldives continued its revered pro-Indian foreign policy. Given this context, the emergence of President Ibrahim Solih in 2018, who advocated for “India Foreign Policy” was widely interpreted as a loss for China and a victory for India. Under the Solih administration, India made significant progress in establishing a presence in the Maldives, in line with its military strategy of making the Maldives as its “First line of defence”. The Maldivian government signed an undisclosed pact with India called the UTF agreement without parliamentary authorization. The deal sparked considerable debate among both the parliament (Peoples Majlis) and the general public. Notwithstanding the numerous demands from the opposition and the general public, the government refrained from revealing the specifics of the agreement.
What lies next?
To confront the challenges looming before Beijing from the continuous US naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, Chinese have clung to a more nuanced mechanism by increasing its gaze over Sri Lanka and Maldives. Delhi’s consistent efforts to stave off China’s presence in its backyard has not been completely successful regardless of some clandestine operations carried out by RAW in Sri Lanka and Maldives. For instance, when the current president Ranil Wickremasinghe came to power after the culmination of “ Aragalaya” in 2022, which ousted the then president Gotabaya Rajapaksa, many of the commentators projected it as a favorable situation for Indian interests as Ranil Wickreamsinghe is widely known for his pro-Indian-Western stances. Notwithstanding the significant changes that have taken place in the echelons of political powers in Sri Lanka, China still continues its key projects in Sri Lanka. The situation in Maldives is a contrast to Sri Lanka as the current Maldivian ruling party including the President vociferates anti-Indian rhetoric by exposing the island nation to the deeper influence of China. In that context, China is likely to leverage its influence more in Maldives, which will eventually alter the geopolitical nexus of the region. Also, the results of the Presidential Election in Sri Lanka on the 21st of September will become pivotal in changing the dynamics.