By Salil Tripathi :
At least two world leaders were delighted by the outcome of Bangladesh’s elections on Jan. 7. One is, of course, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who surged to a fourth consecutive term, and the other is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for whom Hasina represents a rare friend in the neighborhood. The rest of the world is either disinterested or dismayed by Dhaka’s democratic backsliding, but the global disapproval is relatively mild.
Hasina’s ruling Awami League party won 222 of 298 seats in Bangladesh’s parliament, down from 257 in the 2018 elections. It helped that the main opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the elections—as did many others—and that many BNP leaders and opposition activists were in jail. Several constituencies had so-called dummy candidates on their ballots: politicians put up by the ruling party to create the semblance of a contest who were running as independent or nominally representing other parties.
With the world focused on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, perhaps Hasina knew that no one would pay much attention to Bangladesh’s elections. Voters faced threats of intimidation: Regional leaders for the Awami League reportedly warned people reliant on state welfare that they would lose their benefits if they did not cast their votes. In 2018, the political opposition participated in the elections and fielded credible candidates, but due to widespread electoral malpractices—as well as the refusal of the Awami League to pass government control to a caretaker administration—they decided to sit out this year’s vote.
Although the Awami League appears strong, voter turnout for the election was just around 40 percent—half of what it was in 2018, and among the lowest in the last three decades. Observers doubt even these figures. One source, who requested anonymity out of concern of retaliation, went to several booths on Jan. 7 as votes were being cast and reported that some booths had only a handful of voters until 2 p.m. and that the turnout at some locations was between 5 percent and 10 percent. At 3 p.m., Bangladesh’s Election Commission said the turnout was 27 percent, then said it rose to 40 percent in the hour before polls closed at 4 p.m.
As Jan. 7 approached, Hasina’s government continued to crack down on opponents. Just before the election, a local court convicted Bangladesh’s only Nobel laureate, microfinance pioneer Mohammed Yunus, for violating labor laws and sentenced him to a six-month jail term, which Yunus can now appeal. Yunus once toyed with the idea of joining politics and starting an opposition party; Hasina has called him a “bloodsucker of the poor.” Former Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan, who is Bangladeshi, said the verdict was a “travesty of justice.”
Months before the elections, the United States imposed visa restrictions on unnamed Bangladeshis who it said were responsible for or complicit in undermining democracy, including members of law enforcement, the ruling party, and the opposition. After the vote, the U.S. State Department concluded that the elections weren’t free or fair. The United States faces a dilemma going forward. It must reckon with the fact that Bangladesh’s government is helmed by a leader elected by a vote its own diplomats have criticized—even as Washington appreciates Dhaka’s support in curbing Islamist militancy.
Meanwhile, India’s Modi is likely pleased by the outcome of the election. He needs regional partners, especially facing competition with China. Since the Pulwama attack in 2019 that killed more than 40 Indian soldiers, ties with Pakistan are as bad as they can get short of armed conflict. To start the year, India ended up in a diplomatic spat with the Maldives over Modi’s holiday on an Indian archipelago, which led his supporters to praise India’s beaches over the Maldives’ and sent the Maldives more firmly into China’s camp. Finally, a potential rupture over an Indian company’s green energy project in Sri Lanka has cast a shadow over ties with Colombo.
Hasina has always reciprocated Modi’s support. Over the years, Bangladesh has aided India’s strategic needs by curbing the activities of Indian separatists who sought sanctuary in Bangladesh and cooperating with India on counterterrorism operations. Dhaka has also engaged with New Delhi on a major economic initiative in the Bay of Bengal. The initiative, known as BIMSTEC, aims to bring together states in the region to work on trade and investment, energy, tourism, technology, and fisheries and agriculture, among other key areas.
Contentious issues—including that India’s trigger-happy border guards are accused of killing undocumented Bangladeshis among others attempting to enter India—have so far not adversely affected bilateral ties. The border issue, however, goes to the heart of India’s internal dilemma: Domestic politics compel India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to portray Bangladesh as full of Islamist militants threatening India and work-seeking migrants overrunning the border. (Bengali-speaking people in India, particularly Muslims, are sometimes assumed to be Bangladeshis and called “illegals,” even if they may be Indian Muslims or legitimate immigrants.)
India has cast its lot with Hasina because New Delhi remains skeptical of the BNP—and by implication, its sometimes ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami party. New Delhi’s partisanship in Dhaka is beginning to alienate more Bangladeshis, including those who fondly remember India’s active support for Bangladesh’s war of independence. During the conflict, India offered refuge to 10 million displaced people and joined military operations in December 1971 after Pakistan attacked India; in two weeks, Bangladesh was liberated. Much of that goodwill has splintered.
Ultimately, India wants it both ways: It seeks Hasina’s help to stop insurgents and her support in international forums, while casting Bangladesh in a poor light for domestic political gains. In return, it is willing to lobby for Bangladesh and overlook its human rights record so that it does not slip further under Chinese influence. This approach has worked so far, but it relies on Hasina’s tenure; a future Bangladesh government not led by the Awami League and not loyal to Hasina may take a dimmer view toward relations with India.
The workers who keep Bangladesh’s garment factories humming—a $45 billion industry—and the migrant laborers who send home significant remittances after doing backbreaking labor in harsh climates have made sure that Bangladesh’s economy is growing at a faster clip than any of its South Asian neighbors. On some socioeconomic indicators, Bangladesh now surpasses the region’s usual front-runner, Sri Lanka, and it has left India behind. Bangladesh has made significant public investments through international aid and domestic resources for social protection, but there is much room for improvement, and much of the credit for its economic success goes to its enterprising people.
The reality is that Bangladesh is an unsafe place for political opponents: Detention without trial and torture are ongoing concerns, extrajudicial killings take place, and the country’s Digital Security Act has sparked fears among rights advocates. The government is able to act with impunity as long as the likelihood of an electoral defeat is low. Between 1996 and 2008, independent caretaker governments ensured the relative peaceful transfer of power between political parties, and in each election during those years, the ruling party lost; that system is now long gone, scrapped by the Awami League.
Bangladesh deserves better than a government that does not represent the will of its people. For a while, Bangladeshi intellectuals in Dhaka and beyond spoke approvingly of what some generals have called the minus-two solution floated during the mid-2000s that rules out both Hasina, and her rival, Khaleda Zia, a former prime minister and the widow of former Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman. But if such a solution exists, it is for Bangladeshis to decide. The next elections should ideally include all parties; Dhaka must find a way for the vote to be held credibly with a level playing field to ensure that the leadership at least has legitimacy.
The BNP boycotted the elections in 2014, participated in 2018, and returned to its boycott in 2024. None of this serves Bangladeshis well. The country’s nongovernmental sector has earned praise for its development work at home, and one Bangladeshi NGO operates in several African and Asian countries as well. Domestic NGOs’ development initiatives promoting public health and women’s empowerment are outstanding, and many socioeconomic achievements have taken place because of these volunteers. But its citizens now feel helpless: They live in a country that has the appearance of democracy but has been drained of its spirit. If Bangladesh’s progress continues, once again, it will be despite its government and not because of it.