R Chowdhury
“Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”–Martin Luther King Jr.
Bangladesh celebrates the Golden Jubilee of Victory on December 16, 2021. Half a century ago on this day, the defeated Pakistan military surrendered, not to the Mukti Bahin, the liberation forces of Bangladesh, but to an alien force that did not recognize the Mukti Juddho, liberation war, in the first place.
The land was still soaked with the blood of the independence fighters, the women were still traumatized from the loss of their honor and the people still wailed for the lost ones.
Indian forces, the last-minute entrant in the frontal action, availed the surrender, maliciously claiming it an Indo-Pak War. Mukti Bahin, which fought the bloody war for nine months, were kept away. Indian history still records it as the Indo-Pak War of 1971.
The question thus arises, whose victory was it, for the Mukti Bahini or the Indian forces? The question continues to haunt the fighters for independence and the people at large, as the current regime–unelected and illegal–continues to obey the dictates of New Delhi.
Genocide and Political Vacuum
Pakistan military commenced a genocide on the unarmed people of East Pakistan on March 25, 1971, aimed at crushing their demands for political and economic rights. Within hours, hundreds of thousands of victims lay bleeding on the ground.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the top Bengali political leader, shied away from the Songram (fight) he passionately called on March 7, 1971. In a collaboration with the killer junta, he quietly surrendered after ensuring befitting hospitality for self and family that included today’s Sheikh Hasina, who delivered son Joy under Pakistan military care and great fanfare. Ostensibly, Mujib’s call of Songram was a calculated bluff. Most hitherto firebrand leaders went into hiding or fled to India.
“We Revolt”
In that political vacuum, Major Ziaur Rahman of the East Bengal Regiment in Chittagong decided to rise and act. “We revolt,” he cried out. He later made the radio announcement that Bangladesh was independent and urged the people to join him to fight the occupation forces of Pakistan until victory. The victory came on December 16, 1971 at a heavy cost–hundreds of thousands of dead, few thousand women defiled, millions suffered and most infrastructures destroyed.
But the freedom fighters were conspicuously left out of the victory lap, the surrender ceremony, held on the land they bitterly fought and won.
Indian Support
India supported the Mukti Juddho, Bangladesh liberation war, from day one, first through the outfits of its Border Security Forces, then with improved military and logistic supplies from August, and finally, entering into direct actions from December 4, 1971. Indian support was not without self-interest, however.
Zoglul Husain, a renowned political analyst, theorizes that in 1971, the people of Bangladesh fought for independence from Pakistan, but India joined the war to divide Pakistan and turn Bangladesh into its vassal state. The New Delhi-installed Sheikh Hasina played the concluding drama to ensure that the Indian dream came true at great national expense.
The Mukti Juddho started on the night of March 25 when the Pakistan military attacked the unarmed Bengalis. With Major Zia’s revolt and declaration of independence, most members of other East Bengal Regiments–1st in Jessore, 2nd in Joydevpur, 3rd in Rangpur, 4th in Comilla and 8th in Chittagong–also revolted. (5th, 6th and 7th East Bengal Regiments were stationed in West Pakistan then). So did most of the Bengali elements of Bangladesh Rifles, Police and Ansars. As the war continued, people from all walks of life– teachers, students, businessmen, farmers, workers–joined the fight. They received a short crash military course before joining the action.
Initial Setback
In the first few months, the MB suffered heavy setbacks due to shortage of trained personnel, inadequate logistics, and most importantly, non-availability of befitting military equipment to cope with the advanced armaments of the opposite side. The commanders kept seeking better weapons and more trained soldiers to fight a well-trained and well-equipped enemy. There was no other avenue than to turn to India for such help. The situation changed for the better from August when improved military wares kept coming. However, in absence of air cover and artillery support, the two essential ingredients of modern warfare, the liberation forces were still not capable of staging large-scale operations or holding grounds, until October. Trained and dedicated groups, however, continued to go inside the country for targeted “commando” operations, earning mixed results.
Government in Exile
The Bangladesh Government-in-Exile was formed in April 1971, first at Meherpur, Kustia and later shifted to Kolkata. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India set her sights on Bangladesh, a lifetime opportunity. She played the game very shrewdly towards her goal. Her first Chanokya Chal was to force Tajuddin to sign a 7-Point Agreement, a virtual slavery, in July 1971 before she committed further military assistance to the MB. Tajuddin perhaps had little choice. Colonel Mohammad Ataul Goni Osmani, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini, resigned in protest but was persuaded to return to the fold. The acentric commander did so a number of times on policy points. Please see the 7 points in the appendix.
(Notably, Osmani, along with Barrister Moinul Hussain, were the two lawmakers who challenged Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on Fourth Amendment that changed the system from Parliamentary to Presidential without debate.)
Indira Gandhi did not stop there. She asked General Sujon Singh Uban, Director General of her pet Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)–Indian CIA– to create alternative forces to control the war and future of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Liberation Forces (BLF), later renamed “Mujib Bahin,” and Kaderia Bahini were the results. Sheikh Moni, ambitious nephew of Mujib, and his associates led the Mujib Bahini, while Kader Siddiqui was in command of his forces. By November, their combined strength was about 10,000 trained and another 20,000 semi-trained or untrained members.
Above political forces operated independently and at times in conflict with the mainstream Mukti Bahini. Tajuddin and Osmani objected to their existence but were ignored by their wartime masters. Moni was said to be so audacious as to seek Tajuddin’s job as the Prime Minister. The bitter rivalry between the two continued and ended with the ouster of Tajuddin from the Mujib cabinet in 1974.
Combat Strategy
At a Sector Commanders’ Conference in July, it was thought essential to have conventional forces with modern weapons to fight the enemy effectively. Thus, three brigade-strength, known as Z, S and K Forces, taking the initials of their commanders–Colonels Ziaur Rahman, Safiullah and Khaled Mosharraf–were formed. Available Bengal Regiments to form the core for each group. By then, a number of senior military officers and men escaped from West Pakistan and joined the war, providing the much-needed fillip to the liberation forces.
From that time, MB was known by two components. The three forces of Z, S and K were known as the Niyomito Bahini, the regular or conventional forces. Fighters under the 11 sectors, commanded by senior military officers, became the Oniyomito Bahini, irregular forces. The irregular fighters continued their operations within their area of responsibility. A small but well-trained part of these forces, also called guerrillas or commandos, conducted targeted operations deep inside the country.
A humble beginning was made in aerial combat when one obsolete Dakota and two half-operational helicopters were received from the host. Group Captain A K Khandakar as the chief and a few former air force pilots and engineers quickly made them operational. They conducted a few missions in Narayanganj and Chittagong during the closing days of the war. There was no naval officer but a few seamen conducted marine operations in Khulna and Mangla ports under Sector 10, one of them earning Bir Srestho, the highest gallantry award.
Final Thrust
During the July conference, Indian support was strengthened and streamlined. From October, the regular forces commenced their thrusts, holding the ground they liberated. India provided limited artillery support from its own territory. (In absence of a formal declaration of war, India could not come into open conflict. However, violations of border protocol have not been uncommon). True to the nature of operations, casualties were very high for the advancing forces of MB.
(This writer is a witness to how 8 Bengal and 2 Field Artillery badly suffered while capturing Moulvi Bazar and later crossing the Kushiara/Manu River during the first week of December. Trusting (mis)information that the enemy vacated their positions on the other side, our weary columns became somewhat careless. We had to pay a heavy price. A few days later, when the war was almost over, a truck full of 8 Bengal troops was blown off by a heavy landmine near Fenchuganj. About a dozen men were torn apart. These are just a few examples of how the Mukti Bahini fought and suffered in the war, contrary to the alternative notion held by some.)
After Pakistan attacked India in its western sectors on December 3, New Delhi declared war the next day and entered into open conflict on December 4.
On December 3, Indira Gandhi formalized the Joint Command for Bangladesh War, with Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Arora and General Oamani as Joint Commanders. (Osmani was given the rank of a general for propriety).
For Indian forces in the eastern fronts, it was a cakewalk as the enemy by then had already been crippled and became sitting ducks after sustaining battles of attrition, facing commando actions and public hostility since March. While MB continued its actions, the Indian war came to a lull by December 13/14 when it started a psychological campaign with Sam Manekshaw Ka Paigham (Message from Sam Manekshaw) offering safety and security if the Pakistani forces surrendered. Manekshaw was the Chief of the Indian Army Staff in 1971. The beleaguered Pakistani forces had little choice but to comply on December 16.
As part of a vicious plan, Osmani was kept out of the surrender ceremony. India staged it as their victory, a victory of a thousand years. They term it as the India-Pakistan War; no mention of the Mukti Juddho or Mukti Bahini.
The Awami League, the India lackeys–from Tajuddin to Sheikh Mujib and now Hasina–acknowledge the Indian version of war at the cost of a sea of blood of Bangladeshi freedom fighters. AL’s much hyped Mukti Juddher Chetona (Spirit of the Liberation War) is in fact the Indian Chetona. Hasina and her cohorts never tire of praising India, even as it continues to loot Bangladesh. They never challenge why Indian history records Bangladesh liberation war as the Indo-Pak War of 1971, in denial of the Mukti Juddho.
Next in Gandhi’s act was to grab the sophisticated weapons of 4 plus Pakistani Divisions, valued at the time at $2 billion. (Please read more at https://southasiajournal.net/by-r-chowdhury-16-december-2019/).
A fraction of the stolen Pakistani weapons worth $2 billion in 1971.
In March 1972, she entered with Mujib a 12-Point agreement, styled as “Treaty of Friendship,” but subtly kept most provisions of the seven points done with Tajuddin eight months ago.
(Interestingly, Indira Gandhi was quick to recognize Khandakar Mushtaque after the fall of Mujib on August 15, 1975.)
Ironically, we see some intellectuals and scholars siding with the Indian and Awami version that India liberated Bangladesh. True, India supported the liberation war for nine months and gave the finishing touch, but the sacrifices of the freedom fighters could not be dismissed. The Mukti Bahini did not just mark times in the war fronts for nine months. Nor were the hundreds of gallantry awards–including seven posthumous Bir Srestho, the highest–bestowed for doing nothing. These analysts saw the last nine days, but not the nine months. They cannot see the forest for trees.
Oblivious of the game in Dhaka, this boy enjoys his freedom.
“No one outside ourselves can rule us inwardly. When we know this, we become free.”– Buddha
The writer is a decorated fighter for the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 and authored a few books, in addition to writing regularly on contemporary issues of Bangladesh
Appendix
The salient points of the 7-Point Agreement between Tajuddin Ahmad, wartime Prime Minister of Bangladesh and Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.
- Bangladesh will have a paramilitary force, to be organized, equipped and supervised by India.
- Bangladesh will procure all its military requirements from India.
- Bangladesh’s foreign trade will be controlled by India.
- Bangladesh’s development plans shall be approved by India.
- Bangladesh’s foreign relations shall be guided by India.
- Bangladesh cannot rescind any part of these agreements without prior approval of India.
- The Indian force shall enter into Bangladesh at any time to crush resistance or uprising.