During his visit to Chatham House this week, Professor Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government, said that Bangladesh is ‘reaching out to everybody’ in its foreign policy.
Yet the indications are that a decisive foreign policy shift is taking place under his leadership, one that signals a break from the India-centric orientation of his predecessor, Sheikh Hasina – who was overthrown in July 2024’s revolution.
Yunus is seeking to reduce reliance on Indian trade in favour of a new strategic alignment with Beijing, and other regional partners like Pakistan and Turkey. This is not merely diplomacy; it is part of an effort to redraw Bangladesh’s regional alliances – a move that may lead to a broader geopolitical shift in South Asia.
But the long-term future for Yunus’s strategy will be tested over the coming year – by the reaction of New Delhi, and by elections now scheduled for April 2026.
Reaching out to China
Yunus made a landmark visit to China in March – his first significant bilateral visit abroad. The visit included talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the signing of major cooperation agreements across robotics, cultural exchange military technology, and healthcare infrastructure. Yunus also expressed his interest in learning from China’s advances in artificial intelligence.
Beijing was a welcoming host, granting Bangladesh duty-free access to China’s market until 2028, and committing to relocating some of its light manufacturing operations to Bangladeshi industrial zones.
Both countries are keeping up the diplomatic and cultural engagement. In April, China hosted a 2,600-drone light show in Dhaka on Bengali New Year, marking 50 years of bilateral relations. In May, China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao visited Bangladesh with 250 investors – China’s largest-ever business delegation to the country.
Shifts throughout the region
Arguably, the Hasina government also pursued good relations with China: more than 70 per cent of Bangladesh’s arms imports came from China between 2019 and 2023.
However, under Hasina, Bangladesh consistently aligned with India on regional security and counterterrorism, including joint military exercises and intelligence sharing which helped her maintain her authoritarian regime. Hasina also sided with India in regional forums like SAARC, notably boycotting the 2016 Islamabad summit, aligning with India’s diplomatic isolation of Pakistan.
Yunus’s diplomatic moves are rewiring this approach, forging connections to and beyond Beijing. In December 2024, Yunus met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, agreeing to improve relations after decades of lingering mistrust (Bangladesh fought a war to gain independence from Pakistan in 1971). Besides establishing direct sea links and lifting restrictions on Pakistani imports, Yunus agreed to improve military cooperation. In February Bangladesh participated alongside Chinese vessels in Pakistan’s AMAN25 maritime exercises.
Meanwhile reports claim that Bangladesh is making inquiries about buying Chinese J10 and JF17 fighter jets – the same aircraft that Pakistan’s Air Force deployed in May’s clashes with India (Pakistani claims and other reports suggest these Chinese fighters outmatched India’s).
Yunus unequivocally condemned April’s terrorist attacks in Kashmir (the event that triggered the India-Pakistan clashes) and reiterated Dhaka’s firm stance against terrorism.
But India will not be pleased to see another bordering country acquiring Chinese-built advanced fighter aircraft. Neither will it welcome improved relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Hasina’s government had minimal diplomatic engagement with Lahore, and in public forums including the UN General Assembly Hasina strongly emphasized justice for alleged crimes committed during the 1971 war.
Yunus will have created further distance with New Delhi by pursuing closer military ties with Turkey. New Delhi was angered by President Erdoğan’s support for Pakistan during May’s military exchanges. But under Yunus, Dhaka is exploring working with Ankara to establish joint defence production facilities in Bangladesh, positioning it as a key hub for Turkish arms exports in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
India’s strategic miscalculation
India has helped provoke this Bangladeshi realignment. Some argue that by supporting Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime, New Delhi helped stifle Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations leading to an era of exploitation and resentment. India gave more than $7 billion as a line of credit to Bangladesh for infrastructure and development projects between 2010 and 2024 (although Bangladesh struggled to utilize it due to stringent procurement conditions and slow disbursement of funds).
Also, during the student-led July 2024 revolution, disinformation spread by some Indian media misrepresented the uprising as an ‘Islamist insurgency’. India then provided refuge to Hasina following her ousting, souring relations further.
Border violence and the forced deportation of civilians by Indian border guards have also recently intensified, posing a serious and ongoing concern for Bangladesh. (India says the expulsions are security related following April’s terror attacks). Yunus’s remarks on India’s ‘Seven Sisters’ – states bordering Bangladesh – during his China trip struck a nerve in New Delhi, leading to the cancellation of a major transshipment agreement, followed by reciprocal countermeasures taken by Dhaka.
All of this has stoked anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh. A recent survey shows that over 75 per cent of Bangladeshi respondents view relations with Beijing positively, 59 per cent view relations with Pakistan favourably, while only 11 per cent favour ties with New Delhi.
Any newly elected government in Bangladesh would likely need to consider this public sentiment to avoid further unrest.
From regional pawn to regional player
Under Yunus, Bangladesh is planning to become more than a periphery state to India, engaging the world on its own terms, pursuing strategic diversification through collaboration with Chinese, Turkish and Pakistani partners on military technology and digital infrastructure.
The aim is development and greater autonomy – balancing China with Dhaka’s partners in the West, including the US. If sustained, this multipolar strategy could make Bangladesh a stabilizing force in the region.
India’s reaction will help determine whether this new regional order becomes sustainable or volatile. So too will the long-term effects of closer ties with Beijing: closer relations are not without risk.
While Yunus’s foreign policy has elevated Bangladesh’s global profile, its growing reliance on China – particularly for AI and military technology – raises critical concerns about data privacy and Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy. The absence of robust public discourse on data ethics, as Yunus seeks to rapidly deploy technological solutions to corruption and other issues, suggests that the pursuit of innovation is outpacing safeguards.
Moreover, there is a real risk that Bangladesh could slip into a peripheral role within China’s regional strategy – if it fails to maintain a balanced and independent foreign policy. So far, the Yunus government has shown the capacity to navigate these complexities, earning significant public trust – evident in grassroots calls for him to remain in power. However, with elections on the horizon, future governments must uphold this standard of strategic clarity and autonomy. Otherwise, Bangladesh risks becoming a client state once again – whether to China or any other major power.
The article appeared in the chathamhouse