Stephen M. Walt wrote for Foreign Policy, “An era of U.S. grand strategy is now ending. [Meaning, ‘Biden has delivered on his desires to end the forever wars,’ and] Here’s what should come next.” –FP April 28, 2021.
To unravel the former, I respectfully differ with Mr. Walt’s conclusion. I make the case ‘Biden’s War’ has just begun. It pays heed to Bob Woodward turned Bush’s War into Obama’s War, and now is an opportunity to pencil in ‘Biden’s War.’
Before I assess the latter part of Mr. Walt’s statement, he believes this war resulted from a combination of things, i.e., the American “hubris,” believing in the wave of “liberal democracy,” Afghanistan as a rouge terrorist state presented “existential threats,” and the American fear.
However, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, the former Chief of Staff of Gen. Collin Powell, from his granularity places three reasons for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, (a) to place the U.S. military hard power in close proximity to China’s OBOR initiative and impact that initiative if necessary; (b) to secure Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile; (c) to destabilize China with Muslim Uighurs in China. –Ron Paul Institute, Media and War Conference, 2018.
Furthermore, President Obama is on record. The president took our attention to the United States’ real interest. “Our interests [… is] Pakistan, not Afghanistan.” —Obama’s War, Bob Woodward. To achieve that interest, Pakistan had to destabilize first and become a failed state.
One must ask essential questions to unmask those that create history. If one believes in Col. Wilkerson’s assessment, then the people of the United States must understand the potential cost of such a policy to the tax payers in the light of my thesis that Biden’s War has just begun.
The latter part of Mr. Walt’s statement is advice, “what should come next.” That is, how to deal with China. Pending the U.S. correcting the premise in foreign policy (FP) syllogism, it leaves no canvass to place advice upon to grow from uncontested logic.
As I have stated in one of my SAJ articles on syllogism, found here; it states, “In the case of the United States’ FP, syllogism reasoning has taken a ‘true form.’ That is, it has no opposites, as a circle is without opposites, and it has no alternatives. The absolute option [from delusional and a syllogistic faulty premise] brings in the conduct of war…” In the case of AF-PAK, we have war.
Additionally, the “true form” has matured over time from the ambitions of the “government within the government,” which is a phrase coined by Mike Lofgren, or from the “misplaced power.” –Dwight D. Eisenhower, Jan. 17, 1961. The inner government hands off the mission to the elected representatives, those in uniform and the practitioners of the U.S. Foreign Policy. In support of the policy, the mainstream media and think tanks insure sound dissent is suppressed.
The usual advisors to the “true form” policy then naturally mirror a one trick pony and are on-boarded. They eagerly lunge to scheme with a single trick on hand to achieve the unachievable, which defies common sense and logic. Those goals cannot be achieved with making use of diplomacy either.
Therefore, these advisors have once more devised a strategy of force. This strategy requires for the U.S. to shop for military bases and to pin their hopes onto them. Use of force has become the strategic answer, even when peeling grapes.
The “true form” in syllogism and its delusional premise has not come about in thin air. The U.S. foreign policy’s roots live within a Group that created Israel. The policy’s roots, which the inner government promotes, have inherited a characteristic from the Truman administration. Truman was influenced by the Group.
When Truman decided to accept the partition of Palestine for the sake of the influential Jewish Zionist, it was widely opposed in the United States, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS.) Here is the October 1947 verbatim of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. George C. Marshall was one of the Chiefs. The JCS opinion was,
“… a decision to partition Palestine, if the decision were supported by the United States, would prejudice United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East to the point that United States influence in the area would be curtailed to that which could be maintained by military force.”
The de facto use of military force is trending. More wars are the outcome. Iraq and Libya was a success, Syria a partial success, Yemen a failure, and Afghanistan a stark failure from adopting a mismatched input from the U.S. foreign policy toolbox–force, and a misplaced delusional COIN strategy to wish for the desired outcomes.
In the case of Afghanistan, time has proved, the modern day advisors have lacked wisdom. Alternatively stated, the Truman decision plays into and has prejudiced their decisions with the only option—force, which is not a true solution. Their delusions then try to achieve the unachievable.
Similarly, President Obama cannot get any more delusional. A Harvard graduate is ‘eying’ Pakistan, and is expecting Pakistanis, the “enormous people,” Obama’s words, to “do more.” Obama has no option left but to authorize and prolong using force, because the U.S. actions are “curtailed to that which could [only] be maintained by military force.” –JCF.
Here comes an outsider—Trump. President Trump attempted to bust the old “government within the government” system—the establishment, to fetch first the American peoples’ interest. In the process, Trump compromised on his election campaign views to dismantle NATO, and at one time changed his mind to support the war in Afghanistan, but later abandoned his support.
In an unconventional State’s move, the Trump administration in February 2020, negotiated agreement in Qatar with Taliban to withdraw the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. When the Kabul government was excluded from the U.S. Taliban negotiations in Qatar, Trump’s policy became a wash for the previous administration’s goals, one being to strengthen the Afghan puppet government for the U.S. to maintain her strategic influence in the region.
The Biden administration aims to revive the war in Afghanistan. Biden’s policy in support of war is evident from asking Pakistan for military bases. Following this, President Biden is inclined to use force in pursuit of those ambitions. A conclusion may not be far from truth; Biden has gotten hold of the same advisors that have miserably failed in delivering the delusional outcomes from their ill-conceived inputs into the AF-PAK policy.
It is high-time for the Biden administration to let go of these advisors because they are likely to craft another ‘genius’ in hopes to fetch the U.S. interest. As Biden, they have blindly bought into the premise of those wielding the “misplaced power.”
The U.S. approach to using force takes after the undercurrents identified in the Joint Chiefs 1947 opinion. As the JCS predicated, the U.S. showed up in the region with a gun. The Joint Chiefs’ prediction has made the architects of strategy and their supporters, the think tanks, come across as toxic and intellectual paraplegics. The U.S. FP has inherited atrophy from the Truman decision, and this is a total debacle.
The CIA had good intelligence. It is evident from declassified CIA documentation that the CIA did an accurate assessment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and placed cautions against impact on Pakistan. In the case of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, I am hoping the CIA did not allow them to selectively harvest the brain-trust of the CIA to back the U.S. delusion.
The approach to achieving the U.S. interest, and influence in South Asia, can be gleaned from Lord Curzon’s speeches, understanding why the Sandeman Doctrine worked in Baluchistan but failed in the adjacent territories—Waziristan, now in Pakistan. Why did the British from their experience in the 1800s abandon the Forward Policy? And why did the British for the underlying reasons opt for the creation of Pakistan?
The answers are common sense, to explore new approaches within the cultural norms, and lessons taken from history. Try leveraging a simple low cost and high value behavioral and cultural strength of Pakistan. The Pakistani diaspora has a distinguishing qualitative attribute—the people have love for the United States and Pakistan. This unique feature can deliver the U.S. interest in South Asia, which the U.S. has abstained from cultivating. This attribute is precisely untrue for immigrants coming from hyper-nationalist countries.
Afghans are behaviorists as well. The majority ethnic Pashtuns are the ultimate behaviorist by taking pride in bending backwards in friendship. In theory, four-hundred and twenty-one (421) Americans, one American assigned to each of the 421 districts to assimilate the Afghan culture in friendship would have amply influenced China’s inspirations as a hegemon from the venue of Afghanistan than the current inputs placed in the debacle.
Americans are closer in concept and in kind to the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Taliban, than the communist or the socialist, i.e., the Russians and the Chinese. British played this card nicely in the nineteenth century among the fundamental Muslims against Russia. Yet today, the U.S. foreign policy’s inputs have turned an advantage into a handicap, and have forced Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Russian camp.
History teaches us that the current inputs into the U.S. policy in relation to AF-PAK have not worked for various reasons. One is the spirits of Jihad. NATO is fashioned after the principle of Jihad, which ties two continents to further the expression of the collective. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the NATO expression took a boost from the believers in Jihad, the Mujahidin. Pakistan along with the believers in Jihad defeated the Soviet Union.
Today, the chemistry is the same. The believers in Jihad, this time the Taliban, in the near future will benefit from the expression of a different collective–the coalition of China and Russia with a common thread—Pakistan. Try throwing this cart off the camel’s back, it will give us regional turmoil, but no wins.
I find it appropriate at this time to introduce the misunderstood concept of Pakistan’s interest in “strategic depth,” a strategy coined by Gen. Ziaul Haq. In that regard, the former COAS Gen. Beg explains that the “educated classes” have spun Zia’s “strategic depth” strategy principle into a physical concept, i.e., Pakistan seeking physical presence in Afghanistan, is not correct. Gen. Beg explains, the “strategic depth” for Pakistan was the strategic benefit from Jihad that lies in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s “strategic depth” principle was potent, and Gen. Zia’s execution of war will be unmatched by Pakistan’s army for years to come. Gen. Zia’s mysterious plane crash may very well have to do with his strategic depth principle.
A few more years of Gen. Zia, and India would have been cut in size. An Indian ambassador had approached the late DG ISI Gen. Hamid Gul, and asked if there was a way to stop Jihad, a concept like NATO with a force of assured results.
Jihad in Islam is a fundamental FP tool against foreign expression. The Ottoman Empire was defeated because the British, through their brilliance, were able to diminish the spirits of Jihad. Therefore, as a strategy of the West, Jihad is ridiculed, and is equated to terrorism. The West has placed mechanism to demonize and obscure Jihad, which does not make it less effective. Nonetheless, Jihad is a winning strategy in Afghanistan over the invader’s use of force.
A way forward for the U.S. to achieve her interest is quite clear for the wise by applying the true and tested methods of the past in dealing with the Taliban—the majority ethnic Pashtuns. The U.S. must adjust her syllogistic premise and for the U.S. citizens to check the ambitions of this “misplaced power.” Only then the U.S. can genuinely embrace Pakistan, which is a path of least resistance for the Biden administration to further our interest in South Asia.
By adjusting policy, only then the U.S. can insure its top ranking place in the geopolitical sphere. Since there is no possibility in the near future for the U.S. to mend her policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1947 opinion is foretelling, “As a consequence [‘of the disturbances resulting from the decision’] the USSR might replace the United States […] in influence and power throughout the area.” The Chinese and Russians have surpassed the U.S. in influence, and possibly power in the near future.
Taliban to a great extent will reach Kabul from brokered deals among the tribal elders of the districts. Afghan security forces in many provinces are surrendering without resistance from the brokered deals. However, the Northern Alliance, once a Soviet strong arm, now blessed by the U.S. graces, may stand as temporary resistance to Taliban.
When the Kabul government falls, the elites of Kabul and others will take the usual migration flight path towards Pakistan, grabbing whatever government and private transport available. Without the U.S., China and Russia’s supervision, Pakistan will have an influx of refugees and a costly mess as before on their hands.
Will the era of civil war in Afghanistan begin just as before? Probably with lesser intensity, due to Chinese and Russian interest in eradicating groups like ISIS. Russia may take a page out of the Syrian crisis playbook. Taliban are striving for all parties’ inclusive approach to governance.
For centuries, the importance of this territory has made the region subject to foreign intrigues. The Great Game between the British and Russians, the Cold War, and now the New Game between the U.S. system, and the Chinese inching forward to trump the U.S. system of world governance.
India and Iran have no choice but to follow Pakistan. The analytics of Pakistan must be understood from the world’s governance system and not from a financially strapped country with her enormous challenges. Many rejoice the subsequent fictional and reality based Pakistan bashing, which hampers Pakistan’s image, but does not hamper her strengths.
PM Khan with Pakistan’s interest in mind has refused the U.S. military bases inside Pakistan. Pakistan can face ill-conceived sanctions. The one Pakistan dreads is landing on the FATF black list. FATF is a watchdog that insures Pakistan is fighting money laundering and terrorism against performance indicators.
Pakistan has become ever important to China and Russia because of the U.S. FP. Bagging Pakistan is a trophy. How much these two countries will come to aid, as Pakistan has refused air bases to the U.S., does not require deep assessment.
China and Russia have made Pakistan their interest to insure Pakistan survives, as it was in the interest of the U.S. for Pakistan not to destabilize and survive the shockwaves from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s survival will be addressed with inputs into Afghanistan to shift the fallout from Pakistani decisions.
To save Pakistan, Taliban Jihad will see weapons introduced at par with the effect of stinger missiles on the Soviet gunships and the outcome of the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan may become a technological test bed for new weapons.
Hence, Pakistan is forced to get answers from China and Russia on her stand against the U.S. demands from Pakistan. Their assurances have likely emboldened Pakistan to let go of the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
In this very odd relationship, the U.S. can’t let go of this symbiotic relationship, because Pakistan is the key to anyone’s success in that region. Knowing that, the U.S. chose India from the underlying Truman’s decision. It would be naive for the U.S. to expect, should Pakistan agree to any concession, it would bring about a benefit to the stack of un-harvested delusional outcomes the U.S. was seeking from the old AF-PAK policy.
The Biden administration foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asia has met her first major obstacle; Pakistan has made a choice to act in her own interest. Pakistan now faces a new challenge: How to avoid a faceoff with the mighty United States of America.
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