After Bangladesh’s independence, India played a crucial role as the new nation’s so-called “patron-protector” until the violent overthrow of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975. Although this event was a setback for India, it did not mark the end of Indian influence in Bangladesh. However, India has yet to come to terms with the abrupt removal of the pro-India Hasina government this August.
While the Modi Administration is making both overt and covert efforts to restore an India-friendly government in Bangladesh—ideally one led by the Awami League, with or without Hasina—the Indian media has been more vocal in supporting the ousted Hasina regime than the Indian government itself. The media has become quite aggressive in its stance, while the Modi Administration continues to tread carefully, promoting the former regime by criticizing the current one led by Muhammad Yunus.
After Mujib’s violent overthrow, following a six-year hiatus, India resumed guardianship over Bangladesh in March 1982 when General Hussain Muhammad Ershad took power after eliminating Ziaur Rahman, the country’s popular leader. This guardianship continued until December 1990. Following Ershad’s removal, India’s influence waned during Khaleda Zia’s terms as Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006. However, India maintained dominance during the military rule of General Muin U. Ahmed until January 2009 and under Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year authoritarian regime, which ended on August 5, 2024. After Hasina’s overthrow, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership on August 8, 2024, with significant public support. Since then, India has lost its guardianship of Bangladesh, which poses challenges for Narendra Modi’s government.
The significant increase in anti-Bangladesh (specifically anti-Yunus) sentiment in Indian media, both print and electronic, may be seen as a reaction to the “unfriendly” Yunus Administration. Following Hasina’s removal, she has been living in India as a “guest”. The Yunus Administration seeks her for trial on charges including murders and crimes against humanity, corruption, and ruling without the public’s mandate. The post-Hasina government in Bangladesh has been courting Pakistan and China more vigorously than ever before. This has further frustrated the Modi Administration.
Indian media’s and government’s recent campaign of hate against Bangladesh, triggered by the arrival of a Pakistani cargo ship at the Chattogram port, is a clear example of India’s “Pakistan Syndrome,” which is linked to its anxiety regarding China and Bangladesh. The “Pakistan Syndrome” is deeply ingrained in the Indian collective psyche. This belief spans the highest levels of civil administration, the armed forces, politicians, civil society, the bureaucracy, the media, and various segments of the general public.
Many Indians think that Pakistan is responsible for many of the country’s problems and threats to its existence. The Indian media’s exaggerated and alarmist portrayal of a Pakistani cargo ship docking at Chattogram port in Bangladesh on November 13 has likely surpassed all bounds of decency. This coverage depicts both Bangladesh and Pakistan as malevolent actors conspiring against India’s best interests. We can only mention a limited number of these reports here.
The Indian media’s immediate response to the docking of a Pakistani cargo ship at Chattogram port, which transported Pakistani products including essential raw materials for Bangladeshi garment factories, appears, at best, to be an overreaction and, at worst, a fundamentally unjust portrayal of Bangladesh when examined objectively. A recurring narrative in numerous Indian news reports is the suggestion that the Yunus Administration of Bangladesh has deliberately and “mysteriously” permitted a Pakistani cargo vessel to dock in a Bangladeshi port. This perspective is particularly contentious in light of the historical allegations against Pakistan, which include the claims of three million Bengalis being killed and approximately two hundred thousand Bengali women being raped during the events of 1971. These figures are frequently regarded as inflated and lacking credible support.
The day after a Pakistani cargo ship docked at Chattogram port, the influential Indian daily, The Times of India, published a biased report on this on November 14. The report highlights the Yunus government’s eagerness to strengthen ties with Pakistan while ridiculing Bangladesh for this move, despite the widespread belief in Bangladesh that Pakistan is responsible for mass atrocities committed during the 1971 Liberation War. Additionally, it criticizes Bangladeshis for destroying Sheikh Mujib’s statues and portraits during the anti-Hasina protests this year, which amounts to the “removal of symbols of the 1971 War”. This raises a question: why do countries like Vietnam and Japan—both of whom suffered from US military excesses in the past—trade with or maintain diplomatic relations with the United States?
Another media outlet, ETV Bharat, reported on November 16 that the “mysterious arrival” of a Pakistani cargo ship in Bangladesh has sparked speculation and could be detrimental to overall security in South Asia. However, these reports, not the arrival of the Pakistani ship itself, are mysterious and potentially harmful to the region’s best interests. Although not as alarmist as other Indian media outlets, The Hindu, another influential Indian daily, is critical of Yunus’s attempts to revive the SAARC with Pakistani support. Another influential Indian newspaper, The Hindu, is also critical of Yunus’s efforts to revive the SAARC with Pakistani support. The paper writes that while Mujib and Hasina did not prioritize improving Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan, Yunus is actively working to do so.
An influential online TV channel, Gravitas, which tends to support Modi’s Hindutva agenda, reported shortly after the Pakistani cargo ship docked at Chattogram port on November 13 and again on November 19. It questioned why no Pakistani cargo ships had ever arrived in Bangladesh during the tenures of Mujib or Hasina. It referenced the events of 1971 when Pakistanis allegedly killed “three million” Bengalis and raped “two hundred thousand women.” This narrative closely mirrors statements made by Hasina, her government, the media, and her supporters over the years.
Gravitas portrayed Muhammad Yunus as pro-Pakistan – a stigma in both Bangladesh and India – highlighting his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the UN in New York last September. The media outlet criticized the Yunus Administration for seemingly ignored the atrocities committed by Pakistan against Bengalis in 1971. It also noted that Pakistan has allowed visa-free entry for Bangladeshi visitors into the country, and that India should be concerned about Dhaka’s decision to distance itself from Delhi, revitalize SAARC, strengthen ties with Islamabad, and initiate another “India Out” campaign in the region, similar to that of the Maldives. Another online media outlet, The Print, argues on November 19 that under Yunus, Bangladesh has effectively become East Pakistan, more than fifty years after its separation from Pakistan.
On November 19, The Indian Express labels the arrival of a Pakistani ship in Bangladesh a “turning point” in Subcontinental history. The article raises concerns about the growing closeness between Islamabad and Dhaka, particularly regarding India’s security in its Northeast region. It criticizes Yunus’s friendly gestures toward Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan has “never apologized” to Bangladesh for 1971, which is inaccurate.
In a similar vein, The EurAsian Times writes about the cargo ship’s visit, fearing it indicates a “troubling” Pak-Bangladesh relationship which will be detrimental to India. He mentions popular Pakistani singer Rahat Fateh Ali Khan performing at the Bangladesh Premier League (BPL) opening. By the way, the said Pakistani singer performed in India as a playback singer and stage performer for several years recently. In sum, almost all the Indian media reports on the Pakistani cargo ship episode present a dire scenario for India, suggesting that Bangladesh could become another Pakistan posing a significant security threat. Consequently, some believe that criticizing Bangladesh, which maintains friendly relations with both China and Pakistan (India’s two main rivals), serves as a suitable strategy to address issues related to these nuclear neighbours indirectly. This approach might comfort Indians, although the reasons for this sentiment are open to interpretation.
In conclusion, the Indian media’s strong criticism of Dhaka for normalizing its relationship with Islamabad while distancing itself from Delhi reflects the mindset of the Modi government and fervent Hindu nationalists, as well as the so-called liberal-secular individuals within the Congress party and their political allies. It is concerning that many Indians, regardless of their support for Hindu nationalism, liberal secularism, socialism, or even atheism, harbour anti-Pakistani or anti-Bangladeshi sentiments that are, whether intentionally or unintentionally, Islamophobic. It is important to note that atheist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) was the founder of Hindutva, an exclusive political ideology that promotes the idea of Akhand Bharat, or Greater India, stretching from Afghanistan to Bali. Amid India’s dominant approach towards its smaller neighbours and the rise of Hindutva nationalism in the country, many Muslims in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh find security in their Muslim identity. However, this identity is often intertwined with elements of cultural and political Islamism as well. The controversy in the Indian government and media regarding a Pakistani cargo ship docking in Bangladesh, coupled with the increasing support among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis for Islamic identity, are concerning indicators of the gradual rise of vague but illiberal Hindu and Muslim identities. This trend may not be a distant issue but rather a pressing concern for the near future.