Derek Grossman
The Taliban’s reconquest of Afghanistan following the U.S. military’s withdrawal in August 2021 generated serious strategic concerns for India. No longer would New Delhi have a friendly Afghan government in place. Nor would it benefit from having U.S. troops on the ground to serve as a bulwark against instability and terrorism, especially against groups seeking India harm, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). And now, India’s top rivals — China and Pakistan — are trying to fill the power vacuum, with potentially significant economic and security consequences.
It is for these reasons that India is taking no chances. Indeed, New Delhi has been quietly reestablishing and elevating ties with the Taliban, not only to ensure they remain a strategic partner rather than adversary but also to incentivize cooperation with India over China and Pakistan. Although India closed its embassy in Kabul immediately after the Afghan national government fell to the Taliban in August 2021, India sent a “technical team” there in June 2022 to reestablish its diplomatic presence. The team was tasked with facilitating the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, which helped New Delhi build goodwill and trust with the Taliban shortly following the political transition.
Then, in November 2024, India obliged the Taliban’s request to allow an envoy into the country. According to reports, the Taliban appointed a post-doctoral student of international law from New Delhi’s South Asia University, Ikramuddin Kamil, as their unofficial or “acting” diplomatic representative in the Afghan Consulate in Mumbai.
This decision seemingly paved the way for a major diplomatic engagement that moved beyond previous low-level and indirect interactions at regional fora and in other venues. In January, India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, and the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met to discuss bilateral relations, marking the first time the two sides have met at such a high level. Clearly pleased by the outcome, the Taliban later said: “In line with Afghanistan’s balanced and economy-focused foreign policy, the Islamic Emirate aims to strengthen political and economic ties with India as a significant regional and economic partner.”
A notice with emergency numbers is seen at the entrance of the Afghan embassy in New Delhi on Nov. 24, 2023, on the day the embassy announced its permanently closure due to challenges from the Indian government and a lack of diplomatic support. © APMost recently, India is rumored to have agreed to a new Taliban request last month. The Taliban will send an ambassador-level though unofficial envoy to the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi. The Taliban is yet to name the representative, but the announcement appears imminent. Although India is unlikely to become the first nation to diplomatically recognize Taliban-led Afghanistan, it is certainly inching closer and closer to that milestone.
Whether New Delhi has been successful in its low-key engagement with the Taliban is yet to be determined. On the terrorism challenge, the Taliban in 2022 were reportedly allowing LeT and JeM to return to Afghanistan, raising renewed fears in New Delhi that the country could once again become a training platform for anti-India terrorist groups. But at a minimum, JeM is probably operating there less today, and the same may be true of LeT. However, this seems more a function of deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, which has prompted Islamabad to pull back its proxy forces, rather than India’s strengthening influence over Taliban decision-making.
It is also unclear whether India is making significant strategic headway against China. The early answer is probably not.
For example, although it does not diplomatically recognize the Taliban, China nonetheless has also welcomed a Taliban envoy to Beijing — but in this case, labelling him an official representative. And senior Chinese officials had engaged with Taliban counterparts even before the U.S. military withdrawal (India did not). Hence, Beijing probably has the inside track on accessing critical minerals within Afghanistan and leveraging it as part of a regional strategy of economic and security cooperation in Central Asia.
By contrast, New Delhi’s Central Asia strategy has consistently been hamstrung by poor relations with Pakistan and stiff competition from China. If India continues to have less influence than China in Afghanistan, it will continue to struggle in engaging with neighboring Central Asian states.
None of this, however, should suggest that India’s approach has been inconsequential or wrong. Rather, New Delhi’s strategy makes good sense because it gives India a fighting chance to succeed with Afghanistan.
The alternative policy of shunning Afghanistan’s rulers would virtually ensure less Taliban concern about anti-India terrorism and allow Chinese and Pakistani influence to grow unchecked. A pivot completely in the other direction, whereby India might become the first state to diplomatically recognize the Taliban, would also be a mistake since it would compromise New Delhi’s democratic values and bestow a benefit on the Taliban that is unlikely to be reciprocated.
Thus, the best policy is to engage directly, but in a quiet and incremental way, which should offer India some benefits without the risk of major harm to its strategic position.
The article appeared in the asia.nikkei