The combination of growing internal chaos with corresponding diplomatic moves and opposition force alliances has the potential to lead quickly to the Taliban government’s downfall. Moreover, the Cipher article penned by Matin Bek explains how the Taliban government faces collapse through inner divisions as both former Chief of Staff and member of the Afghan Peace Negotiation team.
However, Taliban Emir’s first priority from a global perspective is institutionalization of a gender apartheid regime. To date, however, the regime has been unable to repossess this unshakable front, and is struggling all the while to put in suspension this obstinate continuity. Inside the Taliban, each faction is standing up so it can be strengthened while the remaining institutions built over two decades of Western involvement weaken.
These internal fissures have also begun to appear in public discussion in recent times. What is discussed belongs to only the surface of a deeper issue. The dominant theme sees the battle inside power struggle in the Kabul and Kandahar Taliban. The fractures really go deeper, they are anchored with regional and ethnic identities. Along these fault lines, the formerly cohesive, monolithic terrorist entity is deteriorating.
Unlike its founder Mullah Omar, the current Taliban Emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, does not have the same pull and unifying force that is required for the movement to remain intact. He has entrenched gender apartheid, isolated Afghanistan from the world community, and maintained links with terrorist networks including Al Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with the aim of pushing his dynasty to reign over Afghanistan more firmly. Akhundzada has been reported holding regular meetings with the leaders of these groups. Though he has been able to accomplish unity and cohesion none has been sustained and none enjoyed unity. He has aggravated internal tensions instead of rallying the group under one umbrella, and his moves to centralize power have been in favoring commanders within his own tribe, the Noorzai.
In the past three years, the Taliban had a large opportunity to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. They let it get by. Rather than bowing to popular will, they have imposed upon the Afghans oppression and physical decrees depriving Afghans of political, social and civil liberties. Rather than mitigating poverty or creating economic prospects, they have benedicted themselves on the country’s wealth, particularly on the priceable mining domain which is now held under personalities, like Haji Bashir Noorzai.
In addition, ordinary Afghans have also been burdened with further taxation by the Taliban methods, having little to spare for purchasing. U.S. financial support has been supporting the Afghan economy, and holding the Afghan currency steady at a relatively steady rate, for three and a half years. In dialogues about ceasing this financial assistance, the Afghan currency plummets and inflation surges. Terminating this financial lifeline has proved to have far more political fallout than expected. Because of that, the Taliban regime is caught in a progressively precarious place.
In addition to their poor economic stewardship, the Taliban also had an important opportunity to connect with the world at large and secure global recognition through a constructive engagement. Given diplomatic signals by the United States and the United Nations, they have demonstrated little intention of becoming a responsible international actor. But they have rejected all the avenues to legitimacy, preferring not to be some form of normal governance but instead a rogue faction who acts.
It is assumed by many that neither external criticism nor pressure will make any difference to the Taliban. But recent events raise question to this assumption. The International Criminal Court prosecutor’s petition to the arrest warrant of the Taliban’s Emir and Chief Justice on the ground of crimes against humanity related to their gender apartheid strategy has made a great impact. The warrant has increased internal discord as factions claim the Emir’s right to the post with it in hand. Yet the warrant is nothing more than a highly symbolic gesture. Many of the figures within and from the Taliban read it as a sign that their grip on power was slipping.
Beyond its judicial importance, the warrant expresses formally that Afghan women had suffered systemic injustices. The Taliban also have a sensitive reaction to it, something the group is acutely aware of, even if it has been reeling in rhetoric. The warrant also serves as a type of public censure to reveal the shaky durability and undeniable illegitimacy of the Taliban’s governance. However, this demonstrates that int’l norms and sustained dip. initiatives still carry weight. It is up to the global community to keep spotlighting the Taliban flogging women and its other human rights record and for them still to remain under global scrutiny.
A second significant event is when President Donald Trump states that U.S. financial help to Afghanistan during Taliban rule is being cut off. The bottom line, they have severely undercut the Taliban’s financial stability, one of the few remaining aspects in which the Taliban actually operated as an administrative body. When it comes to humanitarian aid, the Taliban have a history of using it to suit their own ends, concentrating assets while Afghan lives are made to suffer. From now on, aid must be restructured to get around the Taliban while making sure that aid and assistance does not directly benefit the ruling regime in Afghanistan, but actually makes it to the Afghan citizen. Finally, President Trump is motivated to regain control of the billions of dollars worth of U.S. military hardware left behind in Afghanistan and, if possible, to retake Bagram Air Base. It has been suggested that there are two possible ways: to engage directly with the Taliban or to work with the exiled opposition forces. However, either alone will not suffice. What is needed is a third, more nuanced alternative that incorporates elements of all of them.
Direct negotiations with the Taliban have produced nothing but the opposite result of any policy moderation. A better path would involve delegating a diplomatic champion of the U.S. to work more intensely with Afghan opposition factions at the same time exploiting the Taliban’s vulnerability. It is still possible that the Taliban could rehabilitate themselves by building their views on some of the aspects of Afghanistan’s previous governance model combined with orthodox doctrine. One has occurred in Syria as well, where once radical insurgent faction implemented deliberate policy changes to garner broader legitimacy. It is conceivable that Afghanistan would end as a similar outcome given Taliban internal rivalries and the leverage of U.S. allies in the Gulf region.