The president’s demand that the Taliban return U.S. weaponry shows he is looking for new leverage.
Trump’s Afghanistan Conundrum
At the Conservative Political Action Conference over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated a demand issued the day before his inauguration: for the Taliban to return U.S.-made military equipment. Trump tied future U.S. aid to Afghanistan to the return of the weaponry, which is worth $7 billion and was seized by the Taliban in August 2021.
This may sound like another case of the transactional leader seeking a deal to benefit U.S. interests. But Trump could be looking for new leverage over the Taliban regime—something that the United States has struggled to do since exiting Afghanistan. (The presence of U.S. military personnel was previously a key source of leverage.)
Though the Taliban are headed by hard-line mullahs in Kandahar, the Kabul-based political leadership seeks better ties with the United States for more global legitimacy; more U.S. assistance; and access to Afghan central bank funds frozen by Washington. The United States has sent $21 billion in humanitarian and refugee assistance to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power.
Largely because of their implacable senior leadership, however, the Taliban have done little to address international demands. The Trump administration might see a pitch for the return of weaponry as a more realistic request than calling for changes in specific Taliban policies, which have long been at the heart of the group’s core ideology.
Turmoil among the Taliban over policy differences, including several top leaders publicly upbraiding the country’s ban on girls’ secondary education, arguably gives the regime a stronger incentive to seek more foreign aid. Such assistance would better enable the group to ease economic stress and reduce risks of social unrest.
But demanding that the Taliban return U.S. weaponry is a hard sell. For the Taliban, the arms have prestige value and symbolize what the group views as its defeat of the United States; returning them would amount to a form of surrender.
The Taliban also have tactical reasons to reject Trump’s demand. The weaponry bolsters the regime’s capacity to carry out operations against the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), which is a rival to the Taliban. U.S. forces relied heavily on air power to manage the IS-K threat, and the Taliban’s U.S.-made equipment includes air-to-ground munitions and aircraft.
Though the Taliban haven’t responded to Trump’s latest demand, the group rejected his initial one and reportedly called on the United States to supply Afghanistan with more weapons. After all, the group aims to strengthen its limited air power.
Trump may face broader challenges with Afghanistan policy. Much like under former U.S. President Joe Biden, the United States will struggle to pursue its goals in the country—including addressing concerns about IS-K’s growing threat—without formal ties with the Taliban or a physical presence in Kabul.
There may also be divergent views within the Trump administration. During his first term, Washington participated in talks with the Taliban that led to the U.S. troop withdrawal, and he might be open to some engagement. But U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, an Afghanistan war veteran who opposed the withdrawal, condemns the Taliban in harsh terms.
Ultimately, Trump’s approach to Afghanistan will likely be as limited as Biden’s. The administration’s policy bandwidth will largely focus on securing the release of U.S. citizens still held captive in Afghanistan. It may also look to India for help with counterterrorism. New Delhi has scaled up ties with the Taliban and might be willing to share intelligence on IS-K.
Trump’s second-term foreign policy has already produced some agreements on tariffs and immigration. But not all deals come easily, especially with an uncompromising interlocutor like the Taliban. And some experts say that the Taliban’s U.S.-made weaponry isn’t even in good condition. Trump’s proposed deal may not make sense for the United States, either.CV in the population.”
The article appeared in the Foreign Policy Magazine