Within three weeks of the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump for a second non-consecutive term, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was invited to the White House for an official working visit. This much anticipated trip occurred amidst a global effort to understand some sweeping changes afoot in U.S. policy, many of which were sign-posted throughout Trump’s campaign. Among these were challenges and opportunities that India too had anticipated and readied itself for. However, while Europe grapples with an American reworking of the trans-Atlantic relationship, the Indo-U.S. relationship has been largely marked with positivity. Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to the United States indicated New Delhi’s careful management of expected challenges while expending effort to extend the progress that symbolized Indo-U.S. ties during Trump’s first term. However, a lack of adequate strategic trust remains, at least in defense cooperation.
Resolve in Mutual Intent
Significant actions by Washington and New Delhi before and during Modi’s trip indicate that both sides are looking to build a future forward relationship despite differences in some areas.
The principal concern with the Trump administration was his promise to end “unfair” tariffs on U.S. exports by imposing reciprocal tariffs on offending states. New Delhi in particular was in his cross-hairs, with Trump having called India the “tariff king” during his campaign and reiterating his commitment to put strong reciprocal tariffs on the country even after his meeting with Modi. However, the specific issue of tariffs in Indo-U.S. ties is an old one, which both have learnt to silo while advancing the broader bilateral relationship in other sectors. In 2019, for instance, a few hours before PM Modi’s visit to Washington, Trump had charged that India was having a “field day putting tariffs on American products,” which was “no longer acceptable.” Even though Trump ended India’s preferential trade treatment that year and both states exchanged rounds of imposing reciprocal tariffs on each other, it did not adversely impact the strong positive trajectory of the bilateral overall and the Modi-Trump relationship in particular.
The joint statement…reflected both states’ intention to undertake striking changes in their domestic legal frameworks to break new ground in two specific sectors—defense trade and civil nuclear cooperation
This time, New Delhi cushioned some of the expected impact by promptly slashing tariffs on at least 30 items imported from the United States on the eve of the visit, to ensure that it was sending an unmistakable signal of commitment to Trump. Tariffs on bourbon for instance were slashed from 150 percent to 50 percent as recently as February 13, while PM Modi was in Washington, despite protests from the Indian liquor industry against excise concessions. Moreover, some of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs are expected to not substantially affect India, due to the different export profile of both states.
More significantly, the joint statement issued by the two countries at the end of Modi’s visit reflected both states’ intention to undertake striking changes in their domestic legal frameworks to break new ground in two specific sectors—defense trade and civil nuclear cooperation. The 2025 joint statement announced plans for a renewed 10-year framework for defense cooperation. But specifically, the statement stood out for the United States’ willingness to review its International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Before this, all joint statements had stopped just short of this commitment – leading to lingering questions on the defense relationship despite India being a Major Defense Partner with STA-1 authorization and defense trade having increased in the last decade. Given the Trump’s predominant focus on increasing defense sales to India and the latter’s successful purchase of a Missile Technology Control Regime Category-1 system (the MQ-9B) from the United States last year, a broader relaxation of restrictions on arms sales to India is a logical advancement of U.S. policy.
India, for its part, is undertaking an unprecedented attempt in its own domestic legal framework to finally kickstart civil nuclear cooperation with the United States 20 years after both sides first agreed to do so. The joint statement acknowledged India’s intention to amend its Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, which the Indian government first announced as part of its 2025 Budget earlier this month. India’s liability law has been infamously out of alignment with international standards and has been the key obstacle to fully operationalizing the Indo-U.S. 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement. Earlier attempts such as that between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, which the 2023 Modi-Biden joint statement had highlighted, remained hostage to this obstacle. Thus, this momentous legal step from India can unshackle U.S.-India nuclear energy cooperation.
Issues to Resolve
However, there are still several uncertainties in the U.S.-India bilateral after the Modi visit.
There is a sense within India that the Indo-U.S. relationship has plateaued, with no real strategic objective or purpose to the bilateral given Trump’s focus on isolationism and confusion over his China policy. His proposal during Modi’s visit to mediate between India and China reflected this; a repeat of his 2020 proposal on similar lines. Trump’s ambiguity on China also raises questions about his outlook on the Indo-Pacific, where on the one hand he has made some statements focused on drawing down U.S. security presence in the region but on the other hand is eager to boost the Quad as a “security partnership.”
More broadly, the case against the F-35 is tied to New Delhi’s worries about losing its much-celebrated strategic autonomy, fueled by the historic Indian bureaucratic mistrust of the United States that still lingers due to its past arms embargoes on New Delhi, and is indicative of the very real limits that India still applies to its alignment with Washington.
But a more specific issue is the gap in strategic alignment between India and the United States vis-à-vis defense. What best encapsulates this issue is New Delhi’s conundrum on procuring a fifth-generation fighter aircraft in light of Trump’s verbal proposal to sell the F-35 Lightning II to India. The United Stated has committed to a “review of its policy on releasing fifth generation fighters…to India.” Given that the American F-35 and the Russian Su-57 shared a tarmac for the first time at Aero India only a few days prior to Modi’s visit, this proposal animated the debate on fighter jets in India even further. The Indian Air Force is in a serious crisis due to its fast depleting squadron strength, with the sanctioned 42-squadrons being almost impossible to achieve in the next two decades. But more worryingly, the IAF also risks being stuck between generations of fighter jets at a time when China has already inducted large numbers fifth generation fighters and Pakistan is set to buy the J-35s from Beijing. India’s dilemma is enhanced by the long timeline estimated for its indigenous fifth generation jet (set to fly only a decade later, optimistically). Hence, a government-to-government stop-gap deal with Washington for a few F-35 jets in fly away condition makes strategic sense for India; it opted for this while buying 36 Rafale fighters from France in 2016. It would also strengthen the case for the F-35, especially in light of India’s growing comfort with U.S./Western defense equipment in the last decade.
Yet, the debate in India has been dominated by the technical challenges (it cannot naturally integrate with India’s diverse fleet of non-U.S. fighters) and economical hurdles (its exorbitant unit and maintenance costs) the F-35 presents. These are natural issues for any foreign platform that India might consider, including the Russian Su-57 (due to its stealth shortcomings, for instance), But there is a more serious criticism levelled at the F-35. Senior Indian veterans and analysts have raised concerns over potential end-user restrictions on the F-35 and India’s future reliance on the United States for spare parts, which Washington could withhold as leverage through sanctions or delays. More broadly, the case against the F-35 is tied to New Delhi’s worries about losing its much-celebrated strategic autonomy, fueled by the historic Indian bureaucratic mistrust of the United States that still lingers due to its past arms embargoes on New Delhi, and is indicative of the very real limits that India still applies to its alignment with Washington. This apprehension is greater when it comes to India’s defense preparedness, which explains New Delhi’s increased emphasis on indigenous manufacturing and insistence on transfer of technology to avoid foreign dependence during a crisis.
Looking Ahead
The Modi-Trump visit proved that there are sufficient guardrails in the bilateral relationship to prevent any crisis, whether economic or political. The latter was proved especially by India’s choice to not overtly criticize American deportation of illegal Indian migrants (in handcuffs), even as it caused a brief political storm domestically. However, even as India and the United States look towards fresh cooperation in strategic technology across civil and military domains, the focus remains on transactions and leveraging the pro-India character of many senior officials in the Trump administration, while avoiding crisis. Civil nuclear energy can allow for long-awaited cooperation but the effects of the legislative and bureaucratic changes on the Indian side are yet to be seen even as the intention is celebrated. Moreover, India has sufficient reason to claim vindication of its geopolitical choices in the Biden years, such as New Delhi’s balancing act on Russia-Ukraine, given Trump’s new approach to Russia. Similar cause for triumph exists in sticking with multilateral initiatives such as the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (a Biden era initiative that the Trump administration has committed itself to). However, whether the new repackaged defense and technological initiatives generate deeper strategic trust between the United States and India will depend on whether both states can “get things done fast,” as Indian commentator C. Raja Mohan asserts, before more global geopolitical shifts.
source : southasianvoices