Yamen M Hoque
As a water resources/dam operations engineer with the US Army Corps of Engineers, transboundary water management is something I am quite familiar with. Such endeavours are governed by water sharing treaties that the countries involved formulate and agree to adhere to. The treaties address a wide array of water rights, ranging from environmental regulation to hydropower generation and flood risk mitigation. My intent is to shed some light on a few of the treaties that shape water sharing between the US and Canada, and to see whether some lessons can be learned as they pertain to the water sharing dispute that has continued to plague Bangladesh and India for decades.
The bedrock of all water sharing agreements between the US and Canada is the Boundary Waters Treaty, signed in 1909. This led to the formation of the International Joint Commission (IJC) which is responsible for approving any project impacting transboundary flow of water and mediating any disputes between the two countries. The Boundary Waters Treaty provided the framework for other treaties signed between the US and Canada in the subsequent decades. One of these is the Columbia River Treaty, which impacts my own region in the Pacific Northwest.
The Columbia River originates in the Canadian Rockies, flows south into the US via the state of Washington, before continuing on through Oregon and terminating into the Pacific Ocean. It is close to a little over 1,200 miles long and encompasses a catchment area roughly the size of France. Managing such an expansive river system requires tremendous coordination, not only among several agencies stateside, but also their Canadian counterparts responsible for the parts of the river north of the border. The Columbia River Treaty signed in 1961 provided the overall guidelines for dam development and operations. How flood risk mitigation operations are shared between the neighbours is one of its primary focuses.
Since Canada is the upstream country, under the terms of the treaty they were required to assist the US in flood risk mitigation by allocating a portion of the flood storage space in three of their dams constructed along the border. In return for this benefit, the US paid Canada a sum of $64.4 million, along with a commitment to deliver a portion of hydropower generated by US dams downstream. Recently, the treaty underwent a substantial review, and some modifications to its terms had been agreed to, including the US agreeing to pay an additional $37.6m over the next 20 years. Both nations have, so far, upheld their parts of the bargain, and mutually benefited — for the US, it has provided flood security; while for Canada, monetary as well as hydropower benefits.
At this time, let us shift our focus to Bangladesh and India. Soon after independence, Bangladesh and India formed the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in 1972. Similar to the US-Canada IJC, the JRC was supposed to work towards finding solutions to disputes regarding water rights between Bangladesh and India. However, unlike the ICJ, the JRC has found long-standing resolutions hard — if not downright impossible — to come by. A major driver of the discontent has been India’s reckless unilateral actions regarding the management of upstream portions of the rivers which drain through the two countries.
With approximately 54 rivers shared between them, Bangladesh is naturally at a disadvantage to begin with, being on the downstream end of the system. This is exacerbated by the fact that over the years, India has unilaterally constructed close to 30 dams on their side of the border to heavily regulate the flow of water. During the dry months, this generally means the risk of drought conditions being increased, owing to excess drawing of water by India. Conversely, during monsoon, flood conditions in Bangladesh are potentially worsened when the upstream dams release excess water as part of their own flood mitigation operations.
After decades of disagreements and negotiations, breakthrough was achieved in 1996 when the landmark Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was signed. Under the terms of this treaty, agreement was reached on the guidelines of sharing the water available at the Farakka Barrage. This should have been the dawn of a new era and utilized to inform future water-sharing treaties for the other rivers shared across borders.
Unfortunately, that has not been the case as other similar treaties have been hard to come by.
While the proposed Teesta River Treaty, for example, was almost agreed upon in 2011, it was indefinitely put on hold at the eleventh hour thanks to vehement opposition from the state government of West Bengal. Even the Ganges Treaty might come under threat soon, as it is up for renewal in 2026 and there have been rumblings from West Bengal that they might oppose it being ratified again.
All the while, India has continued to give short shrift to international laws like the Helsinki Rules or the UN Water Convention by operating their dams to suit only their interests with little regard to the impacts downstream. There have been some minor agreements, such as the sharing of flood forecast data and the commitment to provide advance warning if the dams are to release flood water, however, these have come with their own inefficiencies. A recent example was the controversy regarding the operation of the Dumbur Dam in Tripura during the historic flooding that affected both countries. Bangladesh has accused India of exacerbating flood conditions by aggressively releasing flood water from Dumbur without any prior warning. India denies this, saying data was provided to Bangladesh until a power outage due to heavy rainfall causing disruption of further data transmittal.
The merits of the claims and counterclaims of the Dumbur Dam incident have been discussed in detail elsewhere and I will not repeat them. Suffice it to say, this further illustrates that the systems in place are inadequate and inefficient when it comes to transboundary water management.
What lessons can be gleaned from the US-Canada water-sharing practices and the problems which seem to hamper similar harmonious co-existence between Bangladesh and India?
To begin with, there has to be an attempt on both sides to negotiate in good faith and for mutual benefit. In India’s case, historically there seem to have been little regard for treating the river system as a whole, being only concerned with the benefit of those within their own borders, the rights and plight of downstream neighbours be damned. Nothing else explains the unilateral construction of downstream partners who are directly affected by their operations — Bangladesh should have had a say in whether these dams should be constructed or, failing that, how they are operated.
That is what international laws would suggest, but, as mentioned previously, India has repeatedly violated them without remorse. The inconvenient truth here is that international water laws and conventions are notoriously hard to enforce. This is one of the main reasons why countries negotiate and sign their own independent treaties which govern water-sharing, because those are less likely to be violated.
Such treaties also allow for one party to offer incentives to the other to make sure the terms are being met. Mention has already been made of how, as part of the Columbia River Treaty, the US offers Canada significant monetary and hydro-power benefits for access to flood storage space in upstream dams. Has something similar been tried in any of the numerous negotiations that yielded zero results between Bangladesh and India? One may argue that the US and Canada stand on equal footing and it is easier for them to come to a mutual understanding regarding the benefits one can offer the other. Is that even possible when India literally dwarfs Bangladesh in every aspect? But that may be countered by pointing out that Bangladesh does have a few proverbial carrots which it can dangle as incentives. Not least of which is convenient transit to the landlocked eastern Indian states of Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya, which is highly coveted by our neighbours.
The past Awami League government already allowed some points through which transit is provided to India. Additional avenues of transit were agreed upon, but since the fall of Sheikh Hasina on August 5 , I am not sure if those agreements would be honoured by the current interim government headed by Mohammad Yunus. While pleading complete ignorance about the intricacies of foreign diplomacy, this does seem like an opportunity to at least try and get India to play ball.
It is an undeniable truth that past Bangladeshi governments, with the notable exception of the Ganges Treaty, have had negligible success in negotiating water rights with India, and even less of an appetite to call out repeated injustices meted out to them. No matter who has been in power, the focus has been to either spout populist rhetoric that has done little but stoke communal hatred, or to subserviently appease our “friendly neighbours” as a means to hold on to a dubiously gained mandate to govern.
Unfortunately, undertaking sincere (and, if need be, stern) diplomatic efforts to use all available resources to get India to agree to and sign a binding comprehensive water treaty has been lacking. The water problems facing Bangladesh are not all due to India’s reckless selfishness. But coming to a viable solution would certainly be a big boon to the country’s well being.
Dr Yamen M. Hoque, Civil Engineer, US Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, Oregon.
source : dhakatribune