Pakistan must enforce constitution to avoid Bangladesh’s fate

Salman Rafi Sheikh 

Pakistan is courting disaster. State institutions, failing to heed the lessons from recent upheavals in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, are scrambling for power. The Asian Development Bank last year flagged political turbulence as the foremost threat to economic stability — a threat that has only intensified.

On July 13, the Supreme Court overturned previous rulings by the Peshawar High Court and the Election Commission, granting Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the party of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, eligibility for reserved parliamentary seats. This decision made the PTI the largest party in Parliament, destabilizing the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz-led ruling coalition.

Facing a loss of legitimacy, the coalition not only began to mull banning the PTI but also filed — as if it was sure of some support — a review petition in the Supreme Court. The July 13 verdict was a majority decision supported by eight judges but opposed by five, including the chief justice. Between 2019 and 2022, the same chief justice was the subject of a corruption case filed by the then-ruling PTI. The case was, however, thrown out by the court in June 2020. This time though, the chief justice appeared keen to expedite the review petition. But his opinion was defeated by the court committee that decides the formation of case benches, postponing the case until after summer vacation.

This case reveals an intra-elite tussle that is eating into Pakistan’s vitals. The court decided in favor of the PTI even when the military-backed ruling coalition had made it known that the PTI could play no political role. Thus, the judges’ defiance has pitted the judiciary against the government and the military.

Part of this defiance is driven by the military’s political interference. Earlier in March, six judges of the Islamabad High Court wrote a letter to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) accusing the military of constant meddling. When the Supreme Court took a suo motu ( on its own motion) notice of the case, Justice Athar Minallah — who also gave a pro-PTI verdict in the reserved seat case — said the “truth [of military interference] was hidden for 76 years.”

But the defiance is not simply to counter the military; it is also about “seeking [judicial] supremacy” within Pakistan’s hybrid system. Since 2010, when a lawyers’ movement restored the chief justice dismissed by former military leader President Pervez Musharraf, the Supreme Court has been positioning itself as a populist political player. Between 2016 and 2018, the court played a key role in disqualifying Nawaz Sharif, paving the way for the PTI to win elections.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Islamabad.   © Reuters

Pakistan can ill afford these political battles. The country needs political stability for economic stability. It needs to repay more than $27 billion to China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and international creditors by the end of this year. Two-thirds of the population is below 30, and they expect the government to deliver and provide jobs. Youth unemployment of 11.1% combined with political and economic instability is a sure recipe for a disaster similar to the ones in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

But Pakistan can avert this by restoring constitutionalism. This would entail running the system according to the constitution, not political or institutional whims. The constitution, for instance, stipulates free and fair elections. The first step towards constitutionalism would be for the Supreme Court to rule on the case filed by the PTI on the alleged rigging of the 2024 elections. If rigging is proven, fresh elections must be held for a truly popularly backed government to assume power.

Only a genuinely elected government can make decisions — including undertaking key structural reforms — that can steer the country out of an impending economic crisis. Only such a government can also enforce the constitution to keep the political ambitions of both the judiciary and the military in check. This is necessary to get rid of the hybrid system with its built-in space for institutional power struggle.

How can this be achieved? Politics is ultimately for politicians and Pakistan’s constitution declares this unambiguously. However, Pakistan’s political parties need to realize that, unless they come together and develop a consensus around strict constitutionalism, they cannot get rid of the hybrid system.

There are clear lessons for them to learn from countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. In Indonesia, for instance, a cross-party political consensus after Suharto’s exit from power in 1998 redefined the rules of the political game through constitutional and legal reforms. These reforms abolished the dual role — political and security-related — of the military to permanently get rid of Suharto’s hybrid system. It paid dividends. Indonesia has not seen another military intervention and is economically strong enough to earn a seat in the G20. Turkey has grown strong enough to defeat coup attempts, as it did in 2016.

To achieve this, a minimum consensus in Pakistan would entail reinforcing the constitution that, for instance, forbids the military from playing any political role. It also forbids the judiciary from legitimizing military interference. Enforcing these rules means politicians developing a minimal consensus about not relying on any extrapolitical force to assume — and stay in — power. Doing so only empowers these forces, keeping them involved in politics and allowing them to manipulate the system to serve petty political interests.

source : asia.nikkei