One of the quaint, emotional, even hysterical accusation by numerous sections of the Indian media post-Hasina’ s exit of 5 August 2024 is that Bangladeshis are ungrateful for not sufficiently appreciating that 2,000 Indian soldiers died in the 1971 war’s eastern theater that led to its liberation. This article examines this accusation.
First and foremost, not only do these two events not have any bearing on each other, but also this accusation is false and absurd on the face of it. Every government since December 1971 has acknowledged the considerable help extended by the Indian peoples, government and the armed services. This acknowledgment was more euphoric and vocal in the years immediately after and following 1971.
But the intensity and frequency of this acknowledgment has changed naturally enough over the past five decades. One reason is the passage of time. This was as inevitable as the night following day.
Gratitude, certainly not eternal, is not a sound or sensible basis for realistic inter-state relations. Were this the case, then Eastern Europe should be permanently indebted to the USSR, which lost 8.9 million servicemen amongst the 26.6 million dead in the Second World War (Russian Academy of Sciences 1993 study), for liberation from Germany. It’s not.
On the other hand, Holland remains extremely conscious of Canada sheltering Queen Juliana in WWII and of the Canadian forces help in liberating it in 1945. Holland sends 20,000 bulbs of tulips each year to Canada that is used to hold the famed Ottawa tulip festival every May. The Den Hague-Ottawa relations are excellent, with distance lending enchantment to the view.
Another reason, more potent, is the irritants and irritations that have gradually developed between Dhaka and Delhi after 1971. These peaked through India’s unswerving but ultimately self-defeating support from 2009 to 2024 of the Mafiosi-fascist Hasina kleptocracy, culminating in the present state of “antipathy” between the capitals (Sobhan, 10 things India needs to know about Bangladesh, The Dhaka Tribune, 23 August 2024).
The roots of this “antipathy” go back a long way. Despite being joined at the hip, history has not been kind to the Hindus and Muslims of the former British Bengal Presidency. Their fraught relationship was characterized by economic disparity and cultural differentiation. This was evident in the terms Ghoti (for Hindu Bhadroloks) and Bangal (Muslim Bengalis and the palpable communal tensions displayed in the Partition of Bengal 1905 and its annulment in 1912 (Bengal Divide: Hindu communalism and partition, 1932-1947 by Joya Chatterji). This toxic legacy resurfaced again after December 1971, only this time as widespread belittlement by Indians of Bangladeshis generated by the hubris from having liberated Dhaka and causing proportionate blowback amongst the Bangladeshis.
Compare this sad state with the relations between the US and its former enemies Germany and Japan. They are now the best of friends. This shows that the present Indo-Bangla bad blood need not have happened.
But why did it?
It’s vital and necessary to recall that India went to war in 1971 to serve its national interests that coincided with that of the Bangladesh government-in-exile (underscoring supplied). Thus, the loss of 2,000 dead service members is a direct result of India’s voluntary and righteous decision to fight to achieve its goals.
This is not hair-splitting but the unvarnished truth. The good thing is that both Delhi and Dhaka benefited from this decision. We must now examine the process of sanctuary and external support that led to the war’s successful conclusion in December 1971.
Sanctuary and External Support
The Pakistan army crackdown on 25 March 1971 (and the subsequent refugee burden) created for India the “opportunity of a lifetime” to break-up Pakistan and establish Bangladesh through the defeat of the Pakistan army’s Eastern Command (GOC Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi) based in Dacca (now Dhaka) (late K. Subrahmanyam, then Director of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Delhi, statement issued end-March 1971). India provided sanctuary to the elected Awami Leage politicians and others fleeing East Pakistan from geopolitical and humanitarian considerations.
Despite calls by some Indian radical politicians for immediate physical intervention in East Pakistan, the iron-willed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, supported by her Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw, prudently decided to wait and keep India’s powder dry. In May 1971, however, India decided to support the Bengali irregulars (Mukti Bahini) openly.
Initially, this was done through limited supply of small arms and inadequately modest training lasting six weeks that caused many youths to lose their lives unnecessarily (cannon fodder) and caused much anguish amongst the Bengali fighters. Later, this support was expanded to encompass greater supply of arms and other forms of material aid but, more crucially, through robust diplomatic initiatives cannily executed by Mrs. Gandhi’s adviser managing the Bangladesh portfolio Durga Prasad Dhar. He did this effectively and efficaciously in close collaboration with Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister of the Bangladesh government-in-exile ( Muldhara’71 by Muyeedul Hasan).
Starting in May 1971, the mobilisation of Inda’s armed forces, especially her Eastern Command (GOC-in-C Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora), went ahead rapidly under the security umbrella provided by the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty of August 1971 (India and the Bangladesh Liberation War by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta). This combination ensured the success of the joint Indo-Bangladesh military command formed on 2 December 1971 under Aurora’s Eastern Command, formed more for political optics than military needs.
India enjoyed inestimable advantages. These included: a favourable political and diplomatic environment; time for operational planning, war gaming and logistical build-up; absolute air and naval supremacy and considerable land superiority; excellent tactical intelligence; substantive and substantial support from guerrillas and local population; and a weary, demoralised and tactically unbalanced enemy with poor command and control and without a cause and the will to fight (Surrender at Dacca by Maj. Gen. later Lt. Gen. J. F. R Jacob–Aurora’s chief of staff–and The Betrayal of East Pakistan by Lt. Gen. A. A. K Niazi).
If Napoleon’s dictum that the moral is to the material as three is to one is relevant, then Aurora’s operating environment was a commander’s dream. His Eastern Command astutely exploited these assets. With the help from Mukti Bahini and local civilians, Aurora’s units by-passed, infiltrated and set roadblocks to unhinge and destroy the Pakistanis. This was like Macarthur’s island-hopping strategy in the SW Pacific in 1943-1944 during WWII (American Caesar by William Manchester).
The Indian regulars conducted few if any decisive set piece battles. Instead, they fought a series of robust somewhat independent sector skirmishes involving battalions occasionally brigade-level forces supported by artillery and air strikes, and occasionally tanks. Extensive mopping-up operations followed these skirmishes. Cynics may wonder whether the figure of 2,000 dead reflected inefficient operations by the vastly superior Indian forces against an outgunned enemy.
An equally cynical view is that Islamabad and GHQ, Rawalpindi had written off East Pakistan as it could no longer be milked as a cash cow. The only way to ditch the province acceptably and enable the master intriguer Bhutto to come to power in West Pakistan was through a military defeat.
Thus, Niazi was ordered to, and did, deploy his forces in penny packets throughout the border areas, thereby hastening his troops disintegration and surrender (Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership by Maj. Gen. (retd) Fazal Muqeem Khan, 128). Apart from a few protests by some officers loyal to Bhutto at an abortive conference addressed by Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan on 20 December 1971, the discipline of the Pakistan Army held as there was no widespread rebellion (Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier’s Life by Maj. Gen. A. O. Mitha, 370).
The Pakistanis surrender of Jessore (abandoned on 7 December 1971, also Pearl Harbour Day) and Mainamati, Chittagong Hill Tracts without fighting show their low morale and reluctance to incur casualties for an unworthy cause. Where fixed positions as in Bhaduria, Hilli, Jamalpur, Kamalpur and Sylhet were assaulted, the Pakistan defenders showed a degree of stout resistance.
Aurora’s Eastern Command did an excellent job. But to describe its operations as a lightning campaign (Blitzkrieg), as do Major Generals D. K. Palit (retd) and Lachhman Singh, is to exaggerate (Lightning Campaign and Victory in Bangladesh, respectively). Having won, the narration of most Indian authors inclines towards euphoria.
Similarly, having lost, Pakistani commentators tend to be defensive, harping on individual or small unit rather than corporate heroism (Witness to Surrender by Siddiq Salek—a more nuanced book compared to other Pakistani accounts).
A contrary exaggeration is the remark by the late Indian Major General B. N. Sarkar—Eastern
Command’s coordinator of Mukti Bahini operations in liaison with Bangladesh Command– to Muyeedul Hasan privately that the exertions of Aurora’s forces after 10 December 1971 were comparable to that of an extended route march, and commensurately not very hazardous!
Nevertheless, Blitzkrieg’s essence is speed. All arms combine to punch holes along a narrow front. These are exploited to become the floodgates for an expanding torrent (The Strategy of Indirect Approach by B. H. Liddell Hart; Blitzkrieg by Len Deighton).
The Indian Army’s equipment, training and outlook plus the Bangladesh terrain made such prolonged and swift movement impractical and unimaginable. Nor did it happen.
Nevertheless, Aurora’s three corps made good gains in early days of the war that broke out formally on 4 December 1971. This is shown by the capture of Jhenidah by II Corps (Lt. Gen. later COAS Gen. T. N. Raina); Palashbari by XXXIII Corps (Lt. Gen. M. L. Thapan) and the Meghna Bulge River ports of Ashuganj, Daudkandi and Chandpur by IV corps (Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh) by 9 December.
Thereafter, movement slowed down due to terrain difficulties and lagging logistics. Thus, IV Corps took four days despite negligible opposition to set up an effective bridgehead in Narsingdi because of insufficient amphibious and helicopter-capability to cross over to Meghna’s eastern bank.
2 Para of the crack 50 Independent Para Brigade captured Tangail on 11 December afternoon. It took three days for the advance elements of 101 Communications Zone (Maj. Gen. GC Nagra replacing Maj. Gen. GS Gill injured on 4 December) to reach the almost defenceless outskirts of Dhaka 90 kms away because of transport constraints.
In retrospect, it’s clear that Indian operational plans would have been more effective and efficacious had Army Headquarters (AHQ), Delhi allotted more resources including armour and 6 Mountain Division from Sikkim to the northern sector under 101 Comm. Zone. The terrain north of Dhaka offers scope for armour operations and is the shortest route to the capital. The war conceivably could have been ended a few days sooner than 16 December, with proportionately salutary results and benefits (for example, the killing of intellectuals that the Pakistani authorities planned on 12 December 1971 may have been avoided—Muldhara ’71, 199, footnote 294).
Dhaka became the prime aim after the US 7th Fleet entered the Bay of Bengal on 11 December. Thus, Maj. Gen. Jacob’s criticism of AHQ including Manekshaw’s role in supervising the preparation of the Ops Plan where Dacca incredibly was not the main goal, is not without merit (Surrender at Dacca, 65-67).
To be fair, these observations are hindsight footnotes. They in no way detract from the praiseworthy performance of Aurora’s Eastern Command.
An interesting statistic is that the fight between the Indian and Pakistani regulars occurred essentially between the so-called martial races. Niazi’s troops were PMs (Punjabi Mussalmans), Pathans and a sprinkling of Baluchis. Sixty-one of Aurora’s 71 infantry battalions that saw action were Garhwalis and Rajputs (11 battalions each), Dogras/Jats/Punjabis and Sikhs (18 battalions in total) and some Gorkha battalions (Surrender at Dacca, Appendix 9).
Conclusion
Iron cuts iron. Regular armies defeat other regulars. The Mukti Bahini’s resistance operations inside and outside Bangladesh kept hope alive amongst the occupied population. These operations primarily psychologically and secondarily physically softened Pakistan’s Eastern Command, eroding its morale and will to fight.
The Bangladesh liberation movement was a complex product of history, geography and human folly. It differs in major respects particularly duration (only nine months) from other national liberations movements such as those of Vietnam and Algeria (years in the making).
The Bangladesh Government-in-exile played a key role in mobilising guerrillas, Indian forces and Soviet support for the Bangladesh cause. Indubitably, India’s sanctuary and diplomatic-cum- military support were pivotal for success. The good guys won the just war of 1971 in the eastern theatre.
But those who claim that Bangladeshis do not acknowledge India’s sacrifice and contribution are talking through their hat, as portrayed in this narration about a highly intricate and difficult undertaking spanning nine months.