Pakistan should learn from Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy

Pakistan’s overly militaristic anti-terror strategy is not working. The nation needs a smarter approach to tackling militancy, akin to the one taken by Indonesia.

Despite conducting 197 separate military operations in 2023, 1,524 people were killed in 586 terrorist attacks — a 57% increase in incidents from a year earlier, according to the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies.

Some of these attacks targeted Chinese personnel, becoming a key reason for Beijing’s increasing concerns over security and for a visible decline in activity related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

But rather than revise its strategy, Pakistan appears to be doubling down. Islamabad has announced yet another military operation, called Azm-e-Istehkam, or Resolve for Stability, that aims to “re-energize the implementation” of the National Action Plan (NAP), a comprehensive anti-terror program that took effect in 2015 after an attack on a school in Peshawar killed more than 140 children.

While the 20-point NAP outlines very broad steps that Pakistan would take to curb terrorism, it has various shortcomings. For instance, it critically lacks any implementation mechanism. According to one report, at least 14 different committees were established to work on NAP’s implementation, but only two of them were fully functional by 2021.

Similarly, NAP aims to regulate religious seminaries known as madrassa. However, there were at least 22,000 unregistered madrassa in Pakistan last year. According to a report from the Islamabad Police, there were some 250 unregistered madrassa in 2022 in the capital alone. Thus, an important breeding ground of militancy remains active.

Furthermore, NAP aims to strengthen civilian-led counterterrorism departments (CTDs). However, a recent report by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies showed that CTDs lack clarity on militant groups’ dynamics and operational strategies. A key reason is the lack of funding and adequate training. Similarly, NAP refers to a “Balochistan reconciliation process,” but no steps have been taken recently in this direction.

Therefore, starting a “new” military operation will hardly serve the purpose. On the contrary, Pakistan would do well to learn from Indonesia’s overall counterterrorism strategy that differentiates between forms of terrorism and militancy to devise appropriate strategies, and also continuously invests in strengthening civilian-led counterterrorism departments.

Until around 2000, Indonesia’s main security concerns came from separatist movements, such as the Free Aceh Movement. However, the implementation of Special Autonomy Laws in 2001 followed by demilitarization brought peace that has proved durable. While Pakistan also passed its 18th constitutional amendment in 2010 to grant autonomy to the provinces, its lack of implementation and the continued militarization of Balochistan mean the core issue of ethnic power-sharing has not been addressed, creating space for armed separatist groups to expand their operations.

To counter religious terrorism, Indonesia also established its powerful, heavily funded and well-equipped National Counter Terrorism Agency in 2010, which works very closely with the police and the military to implement national counterterrorism strategies as well as a national deradicalization plan alongside civil society.

A firefighter extinguishes a structure following a controlled explosion during an anti-terror drill initiated by Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency.   © Reuters

These structures and programs have been consistently reinforced over the years — in particular, the strengthening of the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), a dedicated counterterrorism department under the police driving Indonesia’s struggle against terrorism — leading to a considerable decline in terrorism in the country. Most analysts associate this success with the inability of groups like the Islamic State group to establish strong roots in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country.

There are a few lessons for Pakistan to learn here. First, a sole reliance on the military approach is insufficient. The fact that the new operation will extend against Baloch separatists shows Pakistan’s inability to differentiate between religious terrorism and a separatist movement. Islamabad consequently fails, unlike Indonesia, to take appropriate political steps to counter separatism.

The consequent overreliance on the military has allowed groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists to forge alliances. This is one key reason why there was a 57% increase in attacks in Balochistan in 2023 and why Aceh in Indonesia has been relatively peaceful.

In this context, implementing the 18th amendment in Balochistan — which requires free and fair elections and the establishment of a fully representative government — as well as partial demilitarization, could not only open up space for dialogue with separatists but also cause militancy to decline. At present, one of the key reasons for a popularly backed militancy in Balochistan is the widespread disbelief in electoral and political means of resolving grievances.

Second, strengthening civilian CTDs by allocating more funds for training, equipment and enhancing intelligence capacity, will prove more effective in tackling religious terrorism. Unlike the military, civilian law enforcement structures have deep roots within communities. These roots provide leverage that CTD law enforcement personnel can utilize to have greater operational freedom over militant groups — in particular, religious groups — embedded within urban and rural centers.

Like in Indonesia, Pakistan would do well to establish deradicalization and rehabilitation programs that also engage with civil society organizations.

There is an external dimension too. Pakistan claims that major militant groups such as the TTP and Baloch separatist groups operate from Afghanistan. Eliminating their bases logically requires friendly ties with Kabul. However, Pakistan’s recent decision to expel millions of Afghan refugees to eliminate terrorism has proven counterproductive, making Kabul indifferent towards TTP.

Pakistan, in short, needs a multidimensional strategy that not only differentiates between forms of terrorism but also devises targeted approaches to tackle them. Not doing so could have serious consequences, such as driving away foreign investors, including those from China.

Salman Rafi Sheikh is assistant professor of politics at the Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Lahore University of Management Sciences.

source : asia.nikkei