After a month of mass demonstrations against her government’s increasingly autocratic rule, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country on 5 August, seeking refuge in neighbouring India as thousands of protesters stormed her residence in the capital Dhaka. For several weeks, it had seemed inevitable that Hasina would be forced from office, but she fought doggedly – and brutally – to hold on to power. Altogether, at least 440 people were killed as state forces tried to suppress the unrest, the substantial majority being protesters. Her departure, which came after she lost the army’s support, sparked jubilation in Dhaka and cities across the country, but also outbreaks of violence and looting. The army chief announced that an interim government will step in until order is restored and new elections can be held. After a bloody month, the immediate priority is to prevent any further killings, whether at the hands of protesters or groups loyal to Hasina and her party, the Awami League. But Bangladesh also needs to embark on the arduous task of rebuilding democracy, which has badly eroded over the last decade as the country has moved ever closer to becoming a one-party state.

Protests erupted in Bangladesh in early July, when students began agitating against the reintroduction of controversial quotas for government jobs. The movement emerged amid widespread discontent with Hasina’s government, which had grown increasingly authoritarian during its fifteen years in power and had badly mismanaged the economy. In January, Hasina and the ruling party had claimed a massive win in a deeply flawed election, giving her a fourth consecutive term. But her lack of support was already clear; the main opposition force, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the vote and turnout was low.

Yet it was Hasina’s reaction to the protests that was her downfall. She sealed her fate when she decided to crack down rather than pursue dialogue with protest leaders. As demonstrations swelled across the country in mid-July, police and paramilitary forces reportedly killed more than 200 people – a level of political violence rarely seen in Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. Even after the Supreme Court drastically reduced the job quotas on 21 July, protests continued to gather steam, advancing new demands, including accountability for the killings and the government’s resignation.

Hasina announced a strict curfew and switched off the internet, but images of the brutality had already spread rapidly on social media, inflaming anger at the regime. She tried to blame the BNP and other opposition parties for the unrest, and she deployed the army while police arrested protest leaders, ostensibly “for their own safety”. In custody the detainees were forced to issue statements calling off the movement. But few Bangladeshis were fooled by her narrative that “anarchists” and “terrorists” were responsible for the violence. On 4 August, a final, terrible round of bloodshed left close to 100 people dead, most of them protesters shot by police and ruling-party members acting as vigilantes. The next day, hundreds of thousands heeded student leaders’ calls to march on Dhaka, defying another curfew and internet shutdown.

Faced with the possibility of hundreds more deaths, Bangladesh’s newly appointed army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman – a distant relative of Hasina’s – made it clear to the prime minister that his troops would not step in to save the government. Hasina was eventually persuaded to resign, handing power to the country’s figurehead president Mohammed Shahabuddin. She hurriedly flew to New Delhi – which has been a staunch ally of her government. As she was leaving, thousands of protesters stormed the official prime minister’s residence, taking selfies in Hasina’s bed and absconding with everything from paintings and ceiling fans to fish and chickens. Meanwhile, the army chief was holding talks with the country’s major political parties – minus the Awami League – and civil society representatives (though not including student leaders). Soon thereafter, Waker addressed the nation, calling for calm and announcing that an interim government would take shape in the coming days.

While Waker is calling the shots, formal power now rests with the president, Shahabuddin. He has already dissolved parliament and will oversee the swearing-in of an interim government late on 8 August, following consultations with the army chief and student leaders.

The interim government will have the tasks of maintaining order and running the country until new national elections can be held. The constitution states that a general election should take place within 90 days of parliament being dissolved. So far at least, neither Waker nor any other army officer seems eager to hold power for longer than necessary. The army chief has tried to resolve the crisis within constitutional bounds, by pushing Hasina to resign rather than forcing her out. The president has also not issued a proclamation of emergency, which would suspend fundamental rights, perhaps bringing blowback. Waker appears keen to avoid a repeat of 2007, when the army pressed a caretaker government to declare an emergency amid nationwide protests led by Hasina’s Awami League. It then installed a new caretaker administration that ruled Bangladesh for almost two years, far beyond the 120 days allowed by the constitution. The army’s actions during this period tarnished its image at home and abroad.

It is important that the interim administration be genuinely representative. Waker’s speech on 5 August suggests that it will comprise members of opposition parties and civil society. It is unclear whether the Awami League will have a slot. There would be an upside to giving it one: including a respected senior party official seen as blameless for the attacks on protesters could help the interim government gain the support of at least some Awami League members and supporters, who may still represent a sizeable chunk of the population. Attempts at political reform in 2007-2008 under the army-backed emergency government foundered due to a lack of support from the two major political parties.

But the key will be to ensure that the protest movement is capably represented. If calm is to be restored, those who risked and sacrificed the most to compel Hasina to resign – namely, the students who initiated the protest movement – should have a meaningful voice in the government’s counsels, rather than find themselves sidelined by conservative generals and opportunistic politicians. There is no shortage of leaders within their ranks; many politically astute, deeply committed students have emerged from the movement over the past month and become household names. But recognising that they also need some experience on their side, they have nominated Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, the micro-credit pioneer and veteran civil society figure, to lead the interim government. Talks between the president, army chief and student leaders late on 6 August reportedly ended with a deal to put Yunus in charge. It was an important step: without the students’ support, the interim government would have had limited credibility and may even have faced fresh demonstrations. Shahabuddin is now scheduled to swear in an interim government of around fifteen members, headed by Yunus, late on 8 August.

Even before the interim government is formed, the army, politicians and student leaders need to take all possible steps to prevent further outbreaks of deadly violence. Alongside the joy and relief on the streets of Dhaka in the wake of Hasina’s resignation, there is a great deal of hatred of the repressive apparatus she built to maintain her grip on power. Protesters have attacked police stations, the offices of the Awami League and homes of Hasina’s key lieutenants, including her long-serving home affairs minister, Asaduzzaman Khan, whom they hold largely responsible for the police’s brutality over the last month. A desire for vengeance was evident even before Hasina fled; the victims of the 4 August violence included fourteen police officers and at least eight members of the ruling party. In one particularly serious incident, 24 people died after a mob set fire to a hotel in Jessore owned by a local Awami League official. There have also been reports of ruling-party members killing protesters in the wake of Hasina’s resignation, as well as assaults on minority Hindus, although it is unclear who is responsible for the latter.

Since the police are compromised by their heavy-handed actions, the army will have a particularly important role to play in ensuring security and stability, including staving off reprisal attacks on Awami League members. The party’s student wing, which in mid-July beat student demonstrators and has a reputation for violence, is a likely target. Under Hasina’s rule, the police and other agencies under the home affairs ministry became tools of repression whose primary aim was to keep her government in power. Many recruits were Awami League loyalists who saw their futures tied to the regime’s survival. Their association with the ruling party, alongside chronic corruption, has created a deep well of resentment of the security forces, who have engaged in human rights violations ranging from arbitrary arrests to forced disappearances. While the army has also been linked to abuses, and some senior officers are known to be strong Hasina supporters, institutionally it has a much better reputation and is more widely trusted. To enhance public confidence, Waker announced a reshuffle on 6 August, shunting aside a key Hasina loyalist.

The incoming interim government should demonstrate its commitment to ensuring justice for the carnage of recent weeks. In his national address, army chief Waker promised “a trial for every killing”. The key will be to ensure that these prosecutions are conducted in accordance with due process and other safeguards, so that they cannot reasonably be portrayed as show trials aimed at appeasing the public. A first step would be for the interim administration to begin credible investigations into the violence; the UN and other international partners should make clear their willingness to provide support as requested. Already, some individuals linked to human rights abuses – including the sacked army general, two senior members of the Awami League’s student wing and the communications minister, who shut down the internet during the protests – have been barred from leaving the country.

Beyond the pursuit of judicial accountability, the government should provide redress to the families who lost relatives in the crackdown, along with the thousands who were injured. A national day of mourning could also help bring the country together. Meanwhile, the interim government should ensure that the thousands of people arrested for participating in the protests are released. The hundreds of thousands of charges filed (many of them against unidentified suspects) should be dropped. The president has got off on the right foot by freeing BNP leader Khaleda Zia and ordering the release of those detained from 1 July to 5 August.

Quickly restoring stability will also help avert another short-term risk: an economic crisis. In the decades after military rule ended in 1990, Bangladesh experienced an “economic miracle” that pulled tens of millions out of poverty, largely on the back of a booming ready-made garments sector. But since emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, the country has experienced high inflation, particularly in food prices, and shortages of foreign currency. These are largely the result of domestic factors, including corruption and government mismanagement; for political reasons, Hasina’s administration was reluctant to pursue serious economic reform. The past month’s unrest has only deepened the country’s economic problems, with remittances drying up and garment buyers cancelling orders. To avoid a balance of payments crisis, the interim government will need to quickly restore confidence in the economy and, in particular, get the garment sector – which accounts for 85 per cent of the country’s export earnings – back up to speed. External partners, including international financial institutions, should stand ready to provide emergency assistance if the economy begins to teeter.

The bigger challenge for the interim government will be to put Bangladesh back on the path of genuine democracy. The country has not seen a competitive election for fifteen years – in part due to opposition boycotts, as occurred in January – which is part of the reason why the protest movement grew so large. A key issue will be deciding when the elections take place. While the constitution stipulates a three-month deadline, elections are only part of the answer to Bangladesh’s political crisis; without more fundamental reforms, the country could find itself in familiar patterns of repression and instability. Legal commentators are already proposing that the elections be pushed back beyond 90 days to give the interim government more time to undertake necessary political reforms. The delay, they say, could be legitimised through a future amendment to the constitution. If the interim government goes down this route, it is important that it builds consensus with key political players to avoid a constitutional crisis or further street protests and violence. It needs to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of pushing back the elections; once it departs from the framework set by the current constitution, it risks losing its own legitimacy, undercutting the reform movement and creating new threats to the country’s stability.

In the meantime, the interim government will need to begin the hard work of restoring the independence of key institutions. Under Hasina, the parliament became a rubber stamp, the civil service and judiciary were highly politicised, and the media and civil society were closely controlled. While some of these institutions will quickly flourish in a more open environment, others will bear the scars of subordination for years to come. An immediate priority should be re-establishing the independence of the election commission to build confidence in the forthcoming polls. Here again, outside actors should be able to lend support and expertise.

Legal and security reform is also urgently needed. For too long, Bangladeshis have lived in fear of various security agencies – not only the police, but also the Rapid Action Battalion, Detective Branch and the army’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, which enjoyed almost total impunity under Hasina’s administrations. Bangladesh will only truly enter a new era when people have confidence they will not be arrested, “disappeared” or even killed extrajudicially for political reasons, as occurred regularly under the ousted government. The appointment of a new police chief, in place of a Hasina loyalist who was sanctioned by the United States for human rights abuses, is a positive step, but deeper reforms are needed from the interim government and the army to change the culture within these agencies. It should also form a legal commission to review repressive laws, such as the Cyber Security Act, that Hasina’s regime used to stifle dissent and target political opponents. The commission could report to the incoming parliament and government, which would have the mandate to amend or repeal the laws.

In addition, Bangladesh faces a profound need for political renewal. If an election were to occur tomorrow, the BNP, which last held office from 2001 to 2006, would probably emerge victorious, if only due to its large network of supporters. It is no surprise, then, that the party is pushing for elections within 90 days. But for many who remember its time in power during the 1990s and 2000s, the party is little better than the Awami League that has just been turfed from office. The magnitude of the student-led protests revealed the BNP’s weakness, contrasting starkly with the party’s campaign for political reform ahead of the January election, which drew in few people beyond its base. Despite Hasina’s repeated claims that the opposition was manipulating the protests, the ambivalence toward the BNP was clear: few of those on the streets were looking to it for leadership. The students likely have ambitions of forming their own political party to contest the vote and should be given adequate time to do so.

Hasina’s departure presents a unique opportunity to move beyond the hyper-partisan, winner-take-all electoral dynamics that have caused so much damage to Bangladeshi politics over the past three decades. The interim government should work with a broad range of actors, including established political parties, civil society members, technocrats and, most importantly, student leaders who have gained the public’s respect, to pursue reforms that can create a more stable political environment and prevent another autocrat from emerging. Options include a return to the constitutional provision for a caretaker government in the run-up to elections (which Hasina’s government did away with in 2011), changes to the voting or electoral system, term limits for prime ministers, and clearer separation of executive and legislative powers. Some of these changes would entail amending the constitution, which would need to happen after an election through a two-thirds majority in parliament. Again, consensus among the key political actors will be crucial so that all can contest the election confident that any agreed-upon constitutional or legal changes will subsequently be enacted in parliament, regardless of which party wins.

Foreign governments can support Bangladesh in a number of ways. First, they should make clear to the army and interim administration that they expect an elected civilian government to take the reins in a reasonable timeframe. Secondly, they should stand ready to provide financial assistance, as economic instability will only make the political transition more difficult, and technical assistance on democratic reforms. Thirdly, they should review their cooperation with Bangladeshi security services and make any future exchanges conditional on these agencies undertaking reforms that begin to address the culture of impunity and abuse. As Hasina’s strongest international backer, India will need to tread particularly carefully. In supporting her administration so staunchly despite its clear unpopularity, India has badly damaged itself in Bangladeshis’ eyes. If it now seems to be standing in the way of reform, it will only amplify anti-India sentiment, which could linger to the detriment of neighbourly relations. It should instead support the interim government, revive links with parties other than the Awami League – particularly the BNP, but also new forces that might emerge as part of political renewal – and generally avoid actions that Bangladeshis could perceive as undermining their efforts to restore democracy.

Bangladesh is entering a period of political uncertainty, with a high risk of both violence and economic instability. But Hasina’s departure is also a chance for renewal. Initial moves from the president and army chief suggest willingness among at least some of the country’s old guard to support newly emerging forces in a reform effort that can put the country on a stable and prosperous path. International actors should do what they can to help Bangladesh take advantage of a once-in-a-generation opportunity.