India’s G20 presidency is a decisive moment for the country on the global stage, and it could also have a positive payoff for human security. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi should consider seizing the opportunity to press forward for stronger international cooperation in the Brahmaputra basin. The region contains the world’s fifth-largest river by flow, traversing China, India, and Bangladesh. Unlike other major river systems, such as the Amazon, the Brahmaputra does not have a water management accord. Poor institutionalisation exacerbates existing challenges. The basin runs across a disputed border contested by two nuclear-armed countries engaged in tense border interactions. China has used its status as the upper riparian as a source of coercive leverage, including withholding hydrological data upon which India relies to forecast floods. China’s plans to build dams along the river, including a proposed mega-dam in the “great bend” region near the border, have stoked concerns about China’s ability to divert the river’s course.

Environmental security concerns also characterise the river’s basin. Millions of people rely on it, which brings floods and deaths in India’s Northeast and Bangladesh. The climate crisis will exacerbate these trends. PM Modi has vowed that India’s leadership of the G20 will be action-oriented. One way could be to promote peace closer to home: Launch discussions toward a water management accord in the Brahmaputra basin. Drawing on management approaches of other regional river systems — such as the Permanent Indus Commission for India and Pakistan, and the Joint Rivers Commission for India and Bangladesh — an accord could even see the creation of a Brahmaputra Basin Commission. Identifying requirements for data-sharing and scientific exchanges between riparian nations could be a first step toward the ambitious outcome that will help India make a case for its growing international leadership.

A push by India during the G20 cycle could be more productive for several reasons.

First, seeking a solution to the Brahmaputra basin’s lack of a water management framework would be a tangible way to highlight India’s role in advancing international legal order and stability. India has already helped achieve this outcome in the Bay of Bengal by accepting the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2014 regarding the Bangladesh-India maritime boundary dispute; in contrast, China refused to participate in the 2016 PCA process regarding the Philippines-China dispute in the South China Sea.

The second enabler concerns China’s incentives for cooperation. After the 20th Party Congress last October, Xi Jinping redoubled his outreach to countries where China’s image has suffered. Such outreach reflects several realities, including Xi’s ability to turn his attention outwards after the party conclave, the recognition that China’s international image had taken a beating, and the attractiveness of a strategic gambit to counter US influence by courting its allies and partners. A high-profile agreement to discuss a water management accord could be a politically low risk and diplomatically high reward way for Xi to enhance ties with India. Of course, China will always have coercive leverage as an upper riparian, and no agreement will stunt its ability to build additional dams. But agreeing to discuss river management challenges could be a way to demonstrate goodwill to India and Bangladesh.

A final driver for New Delhi to lead the Brahmaputra water cooperation is that such an initiative would support its Inland Waterways Authority’s objective to expand cooperation and economic development between the Northeast and Bangladesh.

During its G20 presidency, India could call for working-level meetings with water ministry officials from all three riparians to develop an agenda for multilateral cooperation on the river. In addition, China and India could take steps to dial down tensions by detailing their hydropower construction and river management plans. As an act of goodwill, Beijing could also offer to provide year-round river data to India and Bangladesh. Discussions could explore the contours of a plan to develop a Brahmaputra Basin Commission. The platform must be consensus-oriented, and its chair could rotate between the three primary riparians. Given the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, it would have to sidestep the fundamental question of ownership of resources. Still, it could be a way to regularise cooperation in several areas of water management, including hydrological data-sharing, flood forecasting, joint emergency response, dam safety, and sharing of climate crisis research.

Nilanthi Samaranayake is director, Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, CNA. Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the US National Defense University. Satu Limaye is vice-president and director, East-West Center, WashingtonThe views expressed are personal

The article was published in the Hindustan Times. It has been republished here with the permission o fthe authors.