Introduction

Bangladesh has reached a diplomatic crossroads. At home and abroad, Bangladesh is currently experiencing geopolitical shifts amid rapid regional and international developments, characterized by major-power strategic rivalries, realignments, economic instability, security challenges, and more. Exactly five decades since independence, Bangladeshis are facing another new dawn politically, with the aftermath of the tumultuous events of 2024 ushering in a new government as of 2026. Bangladesh is now facing questions about its foreign policy interests, including the nature, direction, and goals it should pursue.

Should Bangladesh continue to be confined within political structures that serve the interests of others, especially India, or carve out a path towards a more pragmatic and independent foreign policy that puts Bangladesh's interests first?

Bangladeshis have found themselves reflecting on these questions yet again after reading the remarks of India's former high commissioner to Bangladesh, Vina Sikri. The former diplomat's comments analyzing Bangladesh's current political transition were laced with India's security interests in mind. Although her insight is noted, many would argue that Bangladesh's foreign policy should be shaped not by what is in India's interest but by what is in Bangladesh's.

The Legacy of the Hasina Era

Bangladesh has been criticized for pursuing an India-friendly foreign policy for most of the period between 2009 and 2024. Proponents of Sheikh Hasina maintained that Bangladesh's friendly foreign policy towards India brought stability to the region while promoting economic collaboration and security partnerships.

However, Bangladesh was also accused of compromising too easily without concessions from India. Bangladesh and India have yet to finalize a Teesta water-sharing deal, border killings continue to occur with some regularity, trade between Bangladesh and India continues to be heavily in Bangladesh's favor, and India has yet to meaningfully address the outcry over claims of discrimination against Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam and other states bordering Bangladesh.

No one can dispute the historical significance of the Awami League in Bangladeshi politics. It was established in 1949 and was at the forefront of the language movement, the movement for autonomy, and ultimately the Liberation War of 1971 under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Despite what may currently be happening in Bangladesh, the Awami League's role as the vehicle that led to the creation of Bangladesh will forever be embedded in history.

But history won't decide if they will be Bangladesh's government in the future. The way Awami League's 2024 collapsed, and the many dodgy scenarios its central leaders got entangled in, have changed the game for the party. Can they regroup? Can they self-correct? Can they stay relevant? Only time will tell.

Political Transition and the Search for a New Direction

Bangladesh's foreign policy under the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus had largely been continued under the newly elected government led by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman of the BNP. However, the new government has approached foreign policy with a slightly different outlook.

Past governments had often been accused of aligning themselves too closely with either one of Bangladesh's two primary regional partners. The new government, however, has sought to claim credit for adhering to a principle it calls "Bangladesh First". This "Bangladesh First" policy, it claims, stands for sovereignty, reciprocity, mutual respect, and gains, rather than choosing sides based on ideological grounds.

Dr. Khalilur Rahman has been appointed as Foreign Minister. Dr. Rahman, a career diplomat and economist who previously worked with the United Nations, is a technocrat picked by the government rather than a party insider. The fact that the BNP government decided to retain Dr. Rahman despite criticism of him as Foreign Minister under the Yunus government also indicates that they wish to move away from partisan foreign policy decision-making and focus more on competence. Recently, Khalilur Rahman was elected President of the United Nations General Assembly, which added a new dimension to Bangladesh.

The move will be seen by many as Bangladesh shifting its attention to dealing with great powers on its own terms.

Beyond India's Security Lens

A common theme that runs through most Indian writing on Bangladesh is that ties with Bangladesh are often looked at from New Delhi's security lens alone.

Vina Sikri's piece isn't exempt from that trait.

Her angst over purported terror networks, Dhaka's burgeoning ties with Pakistan and Turkey, and realignment in South Asia is couched in terms of what it means for India.

The problem is that not everything Bangladesh does will or should be viewed through the prism of New Delhi's fears and concerns.

Bangladesh cannot tailor its foreign policy solely based on what India doesn't want it to do.

Like all sovereign states, Bangladesh has every right to engage with any country in the world that helps it develop economically, increase trade, provide security and military support, or advance technologically.

Bangladesh might continue to engage with Pakistan, Turkey, China, Japan, the Gulf countries, Europe, the US, for that matter, any country in the world. Still, the success of that relationship should be measured by whether it's good for Bangladesh, not for India.

In the same way, India cannot expect Bangladesh to be mindful of its security concerns while disregarding border killings, water-sharing disputes, trade issues, and accusations of persecuting Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam and West Bengal.

Indian commentators must realize that Bangladeshis have their own set of fears when it comes to India.

Regional Diversification and Strategic Balance

Bangladesh's blossoming relationships with multiple countries are reminiscent of an emerging trend worldwide. Instead of relying heavily on a single nation, medium powers around the world are hedging their bets diplomatically and economically by cultivating beneficial relationships with multiple partners.

Relations with China remain tethered to business interests. Chinese development aid and investments into infrastructure, transportation, energy, and industrial projects have bolstered Bangladesh's growth story in recent decades. However, Dhaka's leaders are also mindful of unsustainable debt burden and overreliance.

Washington will remain an important partner from whom Bangladesh receives trade and investment, security cooperation, and support for its democratic institutions. The EU remains Bangladesh's single biggest export destination.

Turkey has begun playing a larger role as a defense and tech partner in recent years, and the Gulf will remain important as a destination for migrant workers and a source of remittance income. Bangladesh is less likely to pick sides in great-power rivalries and will continue to look to benefit from all partnerships it can cultivate. This approach aligns with Bangladesh's long-held foreign policy maxim, "friendship to all, malice towards none."

Revisiting Regional Cooperation

The SAARC vs BIMSTEC debate indeed mirrors the differing perspectives on what South Asia should look like in the future.

SAARC was designed to enable South Asian states to engage with one another despite bilateral issues among them. Bangladesh was at the forefront of establishing SAARC because Dhaka held the conviction that regionalism in South Asia required institutionalization to ensure equitable participation among smaller countries.

India-Pakistan hostility essentially placed SAARC in deep freeze; critics have also gone to the extent of saying regionalism is held hostage to India-Pakistan geopolitics.

Founded much later, BIMSTEC aims to foster cooperation among countries around the Bay of Bengal. However, though seemingly promising, the results are far from being impressive.

Bangladesh's newfound interest in reviving SAARC is not necessarily a return to the good old days. Dhaka seems to think that regional cooperation cannot be held hostage to India-Pakistan conflicts forever.

Water, Borders, and Reciprocity

Nothing highlights Bangladesh's grievances better than India's inability to clinch a Teesta water-sharing deal.

Successive Indian governments have spoken about resolving the issue but blamed domestic politics, particularly West Bengal's resistance, for the failure to reach an agreement. Although this might be true from a constitutional standpoint, what hurts Bangladeshis' sentiments is the delay in resolving the matter, which makes them feel their concerns are secondary to India's domestic agenda.

Border killings are another recurring problem, causing resentment and suspicion among Bangladeshis. Each time it happens, it further reminds them that Bangladesh's interests don't matter enough when decisions are being made.

Bangladesh needs to adopt an independent foreign policy based on reciprocity and taking its partners seriously. India will always be an important country for Bangladesh. But the relationship must be fostered on reality, not on endless assurances.

The Energy Dimension

Questions over who benefits from electricity tariff hikes have dredged up wider concerns over sovereignty and external reliance. Conversations over internal Bangladeshi forums are beginning to question how much electricity imports, infrastructure agreements, and cross-border settlements actually benefit Bangladesh.

Political pundits may debate how reliant Bangladesh could become on imported electricity, but one thing is certain: economics and national security go hand in hand. To become more politically independent, Bangladesh must become more energy-independent by diversifying its electricity sources and using them more efficiently domestically.

This also doesn't discount working with neighboring countries. Bangladesh should still prioritize partnerships with its neighbors, but make sure all agreements put Bangladesh first.

Conclusion

Bangladesh is no longer the weak, aid-dependent country it was in 1971, ruined by war. Today, Bangladesh is home to over 180 million people; it has one of South Asia's fastest-growing economies, is the second-largest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, and is playing an increasingly significant role in the Indo- Pacific.

Instead of worrying about which side Bangladesh should choose, policymakers in Dhaka should focus on how to cooperate with India, China, the United States, and others without compromising Bangladesh's strategic autonomy. For Bangladesh, an independent foreign policy should neither be anti-India nor pro-China.

Being friendly towards India does not compromise Bangladesh's strategic autonomy. So does letting another power or an alliance of powers fill the void if Dhaka fails to trust itself. Bangladesh can and should chart its own course, grounded in a strong faith in Bangladesh's interests, institutions, and abilities.

If Bangladesh takes steps to balance its relations with all major powers and seeks partnerships with multiple countries, that will be true independence. If it places the national interest of Bangladesh First, but not defined in an ideological sense, above all else, that will be true independence.

Bangladesh does not have to pick sides. Instead, it should continue down a path that prioritizes Bangladesh’s interests over others' geopolitical games.